Showing posts with label roman church. Show all posts
Showing posts with label roman church. Show all posts

November 26, 2014

Of Confidence and Confidentiality

Issues of disclosure have been much in the news lately. From the scandals plaguing the Roman Church to the debates about the seal of the confessional in the Church of England, to the concerns about closed meetings of Executive Council, and unpublished bylaws at the General Seminary, there appears to be a good deal of confusion about what things, and when and how and to what extent, ought to be kept under wraps.

One of the common reasons advanced for confidentiality concerns “personnel matters.” But when the personnel matter under discussion is misconduct — in some cases to a criminal level — then confidentiality that allows the guilty employee to find another job in a similar setting amounts to conspiracy, and in the long run serves no one well. Even if it did, that is a road down which no one should want to tread.

Another reason for confidentiality is that being allowed to reveal incriminating information about oneself without fear of it going any farther is essential to the ministry of reconciliation in the confessional. The argument here is that few would avail themselves of this ministry without the assurance that what is said will not be held against them. I can understand the pastoral practical side of this, but have been unable to find any dogmatic rationale that supports the notion, particularly given the dominical teaching on the dangers of hypocrisy: that what is said in secret will be made known at length (Luke 12:1-3). The apocalypse is a warning that in the end nothing is covered up that will not be revealed.

Obviously some things do deserve the protection of confidentiality — which at the level of the confessional applies to the act of confession as well as its content. But some things, by their nature, demand public notice. Among these are minutes of meetings, actions taken by boards of directors, and changes made to bylaws. This is particularly the case where the decisions are taken in the name of some larger entity than just those immediately present in the room. Any action that touches a wider constituency ought to be communicated to that constituency.

Above all it is important to distinguish between confidentiality and secrecy. For instance, doctor / patient and attorney / client confidentiality is well understood not to prevent a doctor or lawyer from discussing a case study — with the name of the patient or client concealed.

To apply this to some of the current controversies about publication of actions of church bodies, I have suggested that in part the Chatham House Rule would make good sense in such situations. Under this rule, the subject matter of a closed meeting, and comments made in it, can be shared, but the identity of the speaker and the speaker’s affiliation are not to be revealed. This allows for open discussion of the subject matter without endangering anyone for expressing an opinion that might be controversial.

But in the end, I have no confidence in confidentiality when it amounts to selective secrecy.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG


February 14, 2014

Projection by Bigots

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jos (Nigeria) is complaining that the West forces various things, including homosexuality and condoms "down Africans' throats." The irony here concerns not just the content of what is allegedly being force-fed, but the one making the allegation: whose manner of teaching could fairly be characterized as entailing "requirements" suddenly objecting to the notion of others doing the same... as if they were!

For, of course, the West is not "forcing" homosexuality or condom use on anyone, and definitely not down anyone's throat. We are dealing here with a matter of projection: conservatives such as the Archbishop of Jos really do want everyone to do as they say they ought, and they think everyone is the same as they are with regard to that which they think is good. There is no nuance of "all may, none must, some should," but rather "I've said it, you must do it!" Such folks have no grasp of pluralism, only of mandate, and they project their narrow insistence that all must do as they do upon others who are, instead, content to live and let live. That someone who champions the repressive and regressive Nigerian anti-gay legislation could, with a straight face, complain about people being forced to act in a certain way would be laughable if the laughter didn't stick in, shall I say, one's throat.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

July 17, 2013

Marriage Equality Still too Equal for Some...

... in England and Wales

With the Royal Assent coming very quickly on the heels of action in the Lords and Commons, marriage equality is a reality (on the statute books if not in the registrars’ offices; getting all the forms printed and revised will take some time, as no doubt the Sir Humphrey Applebys of the Civil Service are engaged in their usual careful and studious work. Sad to say that Nigel Hawthorne did not live to see this day.)

Thinking Anglicans reports that not all are pleased with the new law. Some anxious Christian groups are bemoaning what they see to be undue haste in the six months of debate and discussion that led to this Act. Perhaps they would feel more at home with our Congress, if not our Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, the Roman Bishops in the affected areas of Great Britain have said, “With this new legislation, marriage has now become an institution in which openness to children, and with it the responsibility on fathers and mothers to remain together to care for children born into their family unit, are no longer central.”

Perhaps I missed the relevant clause of the Act (as it now is) that diminishes "openness to children" for those for whom such "openness" is possible, or the statute that allows for irresponsibility for the care of children born to them. I am not sure what the bishops mean by “central,” but where possible, childbirth is still possible, and the responsibility for the consequences of childbirth appear to be completely unaltered.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 26, 2013

The Sorrowful

Well, as the old saying goes, you can't please everybody. The Roman Conference of Bishops has issued a rather petty but also profoundly revealing whine concerning today's Supreme Court rulings. The truly sad thing about this statement is how theologically shallow it is; and one would think the shallows would be the easiest place not to miss the boat — yet they manage so to do.

This comes from the incessant hammering on a thesis as if it were "a truth" when it is nothing of the sort. It is an assertion, and one that fails the simplest tests of reason.

The thesis that "marriage is the only institution that brings together a man and a woman for life, providing any child who comes from their union with the secure foundation of a mother and a father" appears to take no cognizance of the reality that this is only a function of marriage, and not one which all marriages carry out. Marriages that do result in the birth and nurture of a child by its biological parents are in no way diminished by those marriages that do not, mixed-sex or same-sex.

More importantly, this short statement, for all its quoting of Jesus on marriage, misses the test of faith, and seems to take no recognition of what God may have intended to convey through the birth of that very Jesus, who did not, according to the doctrine, enjoy being raised by his biological father and mother. His mother narrowly missed being put away or put to death on good legal grounds. Perhaps, had they been around, these prelates would so have advised.

I am reminded of a passage from the Protoevangelium of James: Joseph beholds Mary (on the way to Bethlehem) alternately weeping and laughing, and asks why. She explains, "It is because I behold two peoples with mine eyes, the one weeping and lamenting and the other rejoicing and exulting..."

I think the Blessed Mother of God is shaking her head in dismay at this Conference of unwed prelates, whose views on marriage derive entirely from theory; who have by choice refused to participate in the very institution they say they hold in such high esteem. I think she would repeat the old saying I cited above, "Well, you can't please everybody."

Whatever else, this sad batch of waterless clouds will not rain on my parade.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 3, 2013

Not What They Expected

When the Conclave elected Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli to the Chair of Peter in 1958, many thought the elderly cardinal would be a benign placeholder for a few years, allowing the Roman Church to catch its breath after the long pontificate of Pius XII, the end of the hot war and the tensions of the cold.

Such was not to be the case, and John XXIII, practically off the bat, called for the first major Council in years, which led to a startling number of reforms whose impact is felt to this day, fifty years after his death.

Let us pray. Lord of all truth and peace, you raised up your bishop John to be servant of the servants of God and gave him wisdom to call for the work of renewing your Church: Grant that, following his example, we may reach out to other Christians to clasp them with the love of your Son, and labor throughout the nations of the world to kindle a desire for justice and peace; through Jesus Christ, who lives and reigns with you and the Holy Spirit, one God, now and for ever. Amen.

The icon in watercolor pencil is an attempt to capture his generosity of spirit, with the suggestion he is about to break into a smile and give a little wave of benediction. We need more church leaders like "Good Pope John."

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

May 16, 2013

Central or Usual?

The leaders of the Roman Church in England have issued another alert to legislators about the possible dangers of marriage equality. They worry that "Marriage will become an institution in which openness to children, and with it the responsibility on fathers and mothers to remain together to care for children born into their family, is no longer central to society’s understanding of marriage..."

Of course, this notion has never been true universally. "Openness to children" (whatever that means to an infertile couple, whose marriage is allowed even in the Roman Church, I can not grasp) and upbringing by their biological parents has been, in many cultures, one aspect or a possible outcome, or even expectation, of marriage. But it is not universal, nor has it always even been "central."

In particular, the Church of England has recognized that this "use" or "purpose" of marriage is only one among a number, explicitly since 1549, by directing that the prayer for procreation “shall be omitted” when the woman is beyond the age of childbearing.

It is a basic principle of logic that things that must be omitted in some circumstances cannot be central, and that things which are not present in all instances of an entity cannot be essential to that entity. The procreation and rearing of children are phenomena which can and do take place apart from marriage, and marriage can take place absent either. Do they need someone to draw a Venn diagram? Or is it merely the Roman tendency to try to force a desired form onto a reality that is far more spacious than they want to allow? I would argue that it is not even "best" in the abstract that children should be raised by their own parents. It all depends on the particular case, and in the case of bad parents foster care is to be preferred.

I will let pass here any extended reference to how poorly this Roman position reflects on the sacred history, with its rich imagery of adoption and foster-parenthood. But the absence of such references seem to me to indicate a particular blind spot, or a phenomenon in which marriage as they understand it has become like the apple in Maigritte's portrait of the man who can see nothing else, nor even understand it to be an apple, but as a green wall obstructing all knowledge of anything else.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

May 1, 2013

How You Know Things Are Changing

The surest sign that things have changed is when people insist they haven't or they can't.

Whenever I hear someone claim that the "definition" is what is important, I quickly remind myself that on the contrary it is what is defined that is important -- and that words change their meanings as the world they describe changes. Few things have changed as much as "marriage."

Thus it is interesting to note that some in the Roman Catholic Church are aware that a new wind is blowing, and things are changing. The fact that some in the RCC now seem to be able to tolerate "civil unions" but hold firm at the word "marriage" indicate that this is the final phase of the logomachia, and the wind of the Spirit, which sometimes must — perhaps always does — start with the world instead of the church, is blowing the change that will turn a settled and intolerant world upside down.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 25, 2013

More Flawed Reasoning from Expert

A Roman Catholic priest and professor has launched another assault on marriage equality. Fr Rhonheimer claims that marriage equality actually imposes a burden upon, or discriminates against mixed-sex marriages.

Conferring legal equality to same-sex unions signifies to publicly establish, in the law system, the principle of dissociation of sexuality and procreation... Besides containing an erroneous moral message, it actually means to objectively discriminate against married people, who intentionally have engaged in a union ordered towards the task of the transmission of human life, accepting all the burdens and responsibilities of this task.
As is so often the case with arguments from the procreationist side of the reality divide, this fails to recognize that the "burdens and responsibilities" of procreation do not fall upon all mixed sex couples, however "ordered" their union might be. Moreover, all citizens bear some of the burden of supporting other people's children. So even the unmarried, dare I mention even the celibate, or those married but without children, share in the burdens and responsibilities placed upon them by those who do bear children — some of whom actually become wards of the state because of the inadequacies or misfortunes of their biological parents. So if anything, those who procreate discriminate against those who don't.

If anything is "erroneous" it is Father Rhonheimer.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 16, 2013

Inconsistency is not Orthodoxy

Listening to Mary Eberstadt of the "Ethics and Public Policy Center" this morning I was at the end struck by the incredible gaps in her thinking, and the logical non sequiturs and other fallacies (mostly of causation) she managed to fit in a very short interview.

She pressed for cleaving to "Orthodoxy" rather than becoming a bellwether of the wider society because it is necessary for  "families of a certain size to carry on the Christan Tradition." (I suppose the Holy Family wasn't big enough. She also tipped her hat in favor of continuing the celibate priesthood rather than giving in to pressure to change from so-called Catholics, deploying an example of the "No True Scotsman" fallacy.)

She noted the "graying" and "few children" among mainline Protestants, and the booming "Orthodox" evangelicals. (Has she considered it might be the music and atmosphere, rather than the doctrines? Are Pentecostals "Orthodox"?) She made the telling observation that "If you water down Christianity by telling people to be nice to each other.... people figure out they can be nice at home..." So it isn't really about the central moral teaching of Jesus, focusing on how you treat others, but about, as the English say, "bums in pews."

But wait... When faced with the decline in the Roman Catholic Church she then ended all of this with the astounding assertion that "It's not a numbers game; it's a Truth game..."

After building up an entire argument about numbers, it's really about Truth. So why was the bulk of her talk devoted to family size and demographics?

No thanks, Mary; you can keep your incoherent "Truth." This is not Orthodoxy, but Conservatism.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Update: and here's some evidence of the wrongheadedness of Eberstadt's argument. The Pew study shows that, yes, "strong" protestantism is on the rise, but in addition to Roman Catholicism's general decline, there is a particular decline among "strong" RCs, in relation to the total population.

February 11, 2013

No To the Papacy

a review of Habemus Papam released in the US as We Have A Pope, a film by Nanni Moretti, 2011.
I watched and enjoyed this film some weeks ago on Netflix. Actually I enjoyed it so much that I watched it twice. Little did I know at the time how timely it might become. For this unassuming little film is about a man who resigns from the papacy — or I should say, puts the College of Cardinals into confusion and captivity by being elected, accepting the office, but then, in a crisis of conscience, refusing to be presented on the balcony — leaving them in the quandary of having a duly elected pope who refuses to be announced as such.

The film is billed as both a comedy and drama, and indeed that is what it is; there are any number of satirical pokes at institutions as various as the church and the press — including a delightfully gaffe-prone TV journalist who keeps making announcements that he must immediately correct. But the take-away for me is the poignancy of many of the characterizations; particularly that of the reluctant pope himself, beautifully crafted by Michel Piccoli. He captures both the gentleness and irascibility to which pastors who are also men of power are given, in a carefully graded blend of nostalgia for paths not taken, anger both at his own incompetence and at the misplaced help of others, and a sense of loss and dismay and incapacity. One might observe the director intended a commentary on the church itself; if that is the case, Piccoli serves well to portray it.

The cast is uniformly excellent in both large and small roles. I would take particular note of the director himself, who plays an atheist psychoanalyst made a prisoner of the Vatican, and who has delightful and meaningful encounters with the large (and convincing) cast of Cardinals who are similarly locked up until their dilemma can be resolved. Jerzy Stuhr as Il Portavoce, the Vatican press secretary, is a wonderful example of someone tasked with something inconceivable, yet managing to use all his wiles to cover the obvious embarrassment. This includes finding a Swiss Guard to hang out in the papal apartments and give the impression that all is well (the almost nonspeaking role of a man thrust into an inconceivable position is played with great charm by Gianluca Gobbi.)

I’ll stop there lest I give away too many spoilers, as there are many twists and turns in the plot — suffice it to say the film is well worth seeing, amusing and moving at turns, funny and poignant. But at this point, timely. Whether it is a parable of a church that has lost its way I will leave to you to decide, but it does raise some questions — now more than ever.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG







January 15, 2013

People, Look East

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

This article appeared in somewhat different form in The Anglican Catholic, Volume XV (Summer 2003), and in the newsletter of Saint Paul's Church, K Street, The Epistle.

One of the more contentious issues of liturgical reform in the last third of the last century concerned the position and posture of the priest and people in relation to the altar. Many exponents of the Liturgical Movement, both in the Roman and Anglican communions, encouraged the erection of free-standing altars in new churches (the ravages of World War II in France and Germany gave ample opportunity for this) and the relocation of altars (or where impractical, their supplementation through installation of new altars). Historical and liturgical arguments were invoked in favor of the move towards free-standing altars and celebration in which the priest and people faced each other over and across them. It was commonly asserted that this was a recovery of ancient tradition, which fostered a greater sense of the church as a gathered community empowered for mission. In this paper I will join a number of historians and liturgists who are finding it prudent to reexamine these claims.

History reexamined

The part of this literal “liturgical movement” connected with the furniture had a sound historical basis: altars had, for the most part, been freestanding, based on the scant evidence of the earliest house churches, to the well-documented basilicas, and on through the renaissance — and the placement of the altar as a massive sideboard against the eastern wall of the apse was a fairly late development. Note, however, that even these high altars of the baroque era, though they appear to be up against the wall due to the elaboration of gradine and reredos, almost without exception have passageways behind them to allow the circumambulation required by rubric at their dedication. (Anson 1948, 76.) (This technical compliance with the rubric reminds one of the creasing of hosts with the edge of the paten which conscientious anglo-catholic clergy used to do in deference to the “lesser fraction” rubric, saving the complete breaking of the bread for the point at which they knew it to be proper!) So at least as far as historical precedent for the position of the altar goes, the leaders of the Liturgical Movement had some foundation.

Along with the restoration of the freestanding altar, the celebration of the eucharist with the priest facing the people (technically called “versus populum,” henceforth “VP”) was also encouraged, in the earnest belief that this was the ancient position for the celebrant, whether bishop or priest. However, even during the height of the Liturgical Movement and the Vatican II reform cautionary voices were raised. Few scholars felt the freestanding altar required or implied a VP Eucharist, and the primary impetus appears to have been the enthusiasm generated in the excitement of rearranging the furniture. A calm and careful look at the historical evidence since the heady days of the 60s and 70s has led many to reexamine and rethink the matter.

What the evidence shows is that, with very few exceptions, the celebrant at the eucharist rarely faced the congregation across the altar, at least during the eucharistic prayer. It appears that the position of the bishop’s chair behind the altar in the early basilica may have been the source of the confusion. Since the bishop faced the people during the liturgy of the word it was wrongly assumed that he continued to do so at the prayers or at the liturgy of the table. However, the early church was not concerned about whether the bishop faced the people or not, but about the direction all worshipers faced for prayer. Prayer, above all the eucharistic prayer, was addressed, not to the assembly, but to God. The traditional direction for prayer was towards the east, towards the rising of the sun that symbolized the coming of Christ. This meant that in churches that were “oriented” with the apse in the east, the bishop would come around the altar and join the congregation, leading their prayer as they all faced east together.

In the city of Rome, however, basilicas were often if not always “portal oriented” — that is, their entry door faced east, and the altar was in the western end. In this case the bishop was already facing east for prayer, and the congregation would join him, not turning their backs on him but turning to face east with him, leaving the altar behind them. This may seem odd to us, but in this early period the medieval concern with “seeing the consecration” had not yet evolved. Indeed, in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, visibility was never a primary issue, as the whole people of God, clergy and laity, were quite happy to pray together and in the same direction whether they could see each other or not. (Jungmann 137f; Bouyer 175) As Louis Bouyer notes:

The notion that the arrangement of the Roman basilica is ideal for a Christian church because it enables priests and faithful to face each other during the celebration of Mass is really a misconstruction. It is certainly the last thing which the early Christians would have considered, and is actually contrary to the way in which the sacred functions were carried out in connection with this arrangement. (175)

There is no need here to rehearse the process by which the basilican freestanding altar evolved into the magnificent sideboard of the middle ages, though Jungmann suggests (138) that the impracticality of the people turning away from the altar (in the Roman portal-oriented layout) led to the development of “altar orientation,” the eventual notion of a “liturgical east,” the movement of the altar deeper into the apse, and the adoption of the “eastward position” (EP) in which the celebrant turns to join and lead the people, in facing the same way together with them.

It is fair to say that this practical change was accompanied, but not driven, by an emerging theology of sacrifice. It was largely in reaction to this theology of sacrifice, and a desire to introduce a resemblance to the “Lord’s Supper” that the Reformers transformed the altar into a table around which the assembly gathered — though here too their intent had little historical authority, even if the eucharist had ever been conceived of simply as a recreation of the Last Supper. For in a classical banquet all those partaking, host and guests alike, sat or reclined on the same side of the table or tables— an image preserved in countless (even late) representations of the Last Supper. (Ratzinger 78)

Many of the newly designed freestanding altars of the Roman Catholic tradition in the middle of the last century still required an EP celebration. A number of photographs of these grand but now rather dated “modern” liturgical spaces (even in texts such as Hammond’s, that argue for VP) reveal the limitations upon the VP posture, due to the tabernacle and candlesticks still present on the mensa. It was only with Vatican II that the Roman Catholic Church, by banishing the tabernacle and candlesticks (admittedly late additions) from the altar, made VP celebration almost universally possible, though as some Roman Catholic liturgists are now emphasizing (as they reconsider the wisdom of this change), the rubrics do not require this posture. It has also been pointed out that even at Saint Peter’s, where the pope has stood opposite the people since the basilica was constructed, it was not in order to face them: indeed, in the long period from the Baroque until Vatican II in which tabernacles reigned, the celebrating pope could no more see the people than they him.

On this side of the Tiber (and the Atlantic), our own Book of Common Prayer rubrics still expect the EP posture, and the rubric at the end of the dialogue leading to the preface states, “Then, facing the holy Table, the Celebrant proceeds...” (BCP 361, etc. Note, however, that this rubric has uncountably disappeared from the Spanish version of our Prayer Book!) Bonnell Spencer, writing in 1965, noted that the rationale for the introduction of VP in the Roman church provided a means of improved visual participation in a church which at that time conducted much of its liturgy in a low voice and the Latin language, but that the Anglican tradition had less need of such visual rearrangements because it had long since dealt with the verbal accessibility of its liturgy. Joint prayer of the people and priest together, he noted, “is a far superior form of corporate participation than merely watching the celebrant.” (161)

Yet, in spite of the specious foundation for the historical argument for VP, i.e., that it represents a recovery of the ancient tradition of the church, this has become the dominant Roman Catholic liturgical fashion, and is now prevalent among Anglicans.

There are times when historical justification is less significant than present need — tradition should inform, but not bind the church in its efforts to serve. However, while we need not be dominated by our history, we should at least be well informed concerning it, particularly if we are going to argue from it. Liturgists in particular seem to fall prey to a kind of historical nostalgia, whether for the apostolic, patristic, or some other golden era. But it is no good picking up one feature of some past liturgical customary (always assuming that scholars and fashion-setters have it right— which it seems many didn’t with VP) and simply patching it onto our contemporary situation. New wineskins really are needed for new wine, and there has been a lot of water under the Milvian Bridge.

Communion and Community

So, is there a compelling rationale for VP — or a return to EP — on some other basis than the historical. When making liturgical changes (whether one sees them as a recovery or a development) it is important to consider the whole context of the world as it is today, and what different meanings a gesture from the fourth century may have for us, and what effects. We really ought to be saying what we intend.

My conclusion is that while VP has its place in certain limited and specialized environments (closed communities such as convents or schools, or informal private gatherings) it raises a number of practical and pastoral problems, and what is worse, has had and will continue to have deleterious effects on the parish, the wider church, and its understanding of ministry.

Far from encouraging a growth in the sense of community, as texts from the Liturgical and Parish Communion Movements too numerous to list insist, the dominance of VP has sometimes led on the contrary to a new and more insidious form of clericalism. How so?

Take, for example, Peter Hammond’s critique of EP and his insistence that VP not only will bring about greater liturgical participation, but spur the laity on to apostolic mission in the world. (Note as well his acknowledgment that the foundation for VP is ideological rather than historical, or as he says “missionary rather than antiquarian.”)

Preoccupations which have already brought about a widespread restoration of the ancient ceremonies connected with the offertory, and the celebration of the eucharist versus populum have all been missionary rather than antiquarian. So long as the layman in church remains a passive spectator of something done on his behalf by professional actors, it is likely that he will be equally passive in regard to what is done out of church. (168)

Just think about the logical and historical problems with this assertion. The historical assumption concerning the VP itself has been addressed above. Here it is more important to note that the church’s great missionary efforts in previous ages managed to survive without the benefit of VP quite nicely, and many laity, Roman and Anglican alike, have gone forth from churches with baroque or gothic furnishings and truly antique ceremonial, nourished with a sense of mission and outreach, of which I have not noted an incredible resurgence since the adoption of VP as a virtual norm. One need only cite Jesuit mission and Jesuit architecture to see the fallacy in Hammond’s assertion.

More problematical is the second sentence in Hammond’s analysis. I have actually been a professional actor, having appeared on Broadway and off for a period of fifteen years before I entered full-time church work, and the one thing professional actors are above all eager to avoid is turning away from the audience. While it is certainly true that some priests who used the EP may from time to time have thought of themselves as performers, and some congregants who worshiped in their churches may also have felt themselves reduced to spectator status, that clearly has nothing to do with the professional theater, and any actors who habitually “upstaged” themselves would soon find themselves out of work! Actors quite normally face their audiences, and while there is one time in the liturgy where a certain element of performance craft is not out of place — the sermon — in general any semblance of “performing” should be restrained.

Sadly, and contrary to Hammond’s assertion, VP enforces the “performance” mode, most particularly in the eucharistic celebration, where the celebrant becomes a kind of ecclesiastical Julia Child confecting the eucharist, or worse, acting out the Last Supper (the Reformers have had their way after all!). How many times have we had to endure clergy “stretching out their arms upon the cross” or similarly pantomiming the surmised actions of Christ at the table in the upper room? Far from avoiding performance mode, the VP has virtually set it in stone, as the altar becomes a barrier as substantial as any rood screen, and as definitive and divisive of the liturgical space as any proscenium is of the theatrical. This has burdened many clergy with the task (in many cases far beyond their talents) of performing for, rather than praying with their congregation. It is, in short, a less subtle and more demanding form of clericalism. As Bonnell Spencer pointed out, “Far from being eliminated, the idea that the priest is celebrating for the people is made more explicit. They can watch him do it.” (162) Of course, this model of the priest as alter Christus par excellence fits quite nicely into the Roman Catholic conceptualization of church hierarchy, as an essentially papal model of eucharistic celebration became the norm for every parish (as the suggestions in the General Instructions on the Roman Missal of the 1960s came more and more to be interpreted as rules in the 1990s). If one wishes to emphasize hierarchy there are few more effective ways of doing it than dividing the people from the celebrant. For the Roman hierarchy, it is also a way to emphasize the all-male priesthood. Note this 1993 instruction from the Congregation for Divine Worship and Discipline of the Sacraments:

The celebration of the Eucharist versus populum requires of the priest a greater and more sincere expression of his ministerial conscience: his gestures, his prayer, his facial expression must reveal to the assembly in a more direct way the principal actor, the Lord Jesus. One does not improvise this; one acquires it with some technique. Only a profound sense of the proper priestly identity in spiritu et veritate is able to attain this. (12:1)

In my experience, clergy more often attain to the level of talent show MCs or nightclub performers; the burden of being a performer is more than most can bear. I will address below at greater length the even greater burden of “revealing to the assembly in a more direct way... the Lord Jesus.”

Another problem with VP is the confusion of exactly to whom the various parts of the eucharistic prayer are addressed. EP made it very easy to distinguish those portions of the prayer addressed to the assembly from those in which the presiding minister turned to lead the assembly in addressing God, normally symbolized (or at least given liturgical focus) through the cross above and to the east of the altar. With VP, the celebrant finds him or herself either looking into thin air, a rose window, lowering the eyes to concentrate on the altar book or the chalice and paten, or looking at the congregation (thereby giving the impression that the eucharistic prayer is addressed to them). And what does the congregation have to look at? Again, the smiling or somber priest must naturally become the focus of attention. After all, isn’t it rude not to look at someone who appears to be speaking to you? The liturgy comes to be more and more about the celebrant.

On the mission and ministry front, the widespread adoption of VP has led, not to greater lay involvement in church mission either for Romans or for Anglicans, but to a proliferation of lay participation in roles on the “other side of the rail” even in broad and low churches, and greater lay involvement in “speaking roles” for the Roman Catholics. (The anglo-catholic parish always had lots of things for people to do “on the altar.”) How many times have you heard “participation” limited to being a reader, an acolyte, a chalice administrant, or intercessor, all of them formerly ministries not of the laity but of the “minor orders,” and many of them once the reserve of the deacon (and of the many forces working against a revived and flourishing diaconate in our time this is one of the most insidious)? Often greater lay participation on the “other side of the footlights” (facing the congregation) has precisely the opposite effect, as in the dismal failure of the Roman Catholic ministry of “song leader” — which sometimes has the effect of rendering congregations completely silent as they are “led” by someone who appears to them to be more of a nightclub performer than a cantor.

Ultimately, no amount of such “participation” will have an impact on what people do in the world unless while assembled in church they have been fed with the bread from heaven and transformed in their hearts to become what they behold. Theater on a proscenium stage, or a three-quarter thrust, or in the round, will always have its actors and its spectators, and if what you think you are doing in church is theater, then it really doesn’t matter which way you face.

Turning one’s back for leadership

The contemptuous way in which the ideologues of last century’s VP movement commonly described EP, as the priest “turning his back on the people” (Lowrie 158), also indicates the essentially clericalist focus of their concerns. No one ever suggested that the people in the front pews had turned their backs on the people behind them. It is the priest who matters, and who he or she is facing. But though it may be true that many clergy who have used the EP think in terms of who they are turning from, I think many more rightly focus on whom they are turning toward as they join their congregations to face the same direction together. Liturgy is primarily an essentially plural enterprise in which the many focus on the One in holiness and adoration, and that mutual focus draws them together. If the priest usurps the focus by becoming the actor, or the people become the focus for the priest who has nothing else to look at, the center of worship becomes the worshipers themselves.

VP and EP simply represent two very different models for the church, one focused inward primarily on itself and its concerns, the other looking outward and onward; one emphasizing the gathered community, the other the transcendent presence of God. What we have in these two models is, in short, the circle or the procession. Both have their place, but there is a clear question as to which better truly builds community. As mentioned above, there are situations in which the circular arrangement for the eucharist makes a good deal of sense: a permanently or situationally closed community (a convent or school). But in these cases the strong sense of community already exists; in fact, the stronger this sort of community, the harder it is for an outsider to feel welcome — it is very hard to break into a circle, but it is wonderfully easy to slip in at the end of a procession. Community is far more easily built by adding a sense of common direction and mission, rather than focusing on the membership itself. This is particularly true when the VP is circular in name only, for example, when a gothic church’s high altar is moved forward by about a third or less, with the celebrant on one side and the congregation on the other. This has all of the weaknesses of both models, to my way of thinking, and I will reflect at greater length below on how this setup, far from creating an aura of equality, is even more clericalizing in its effects than the most distant high altar of the old tradition.

Let me also note at this point that I have seen and experienced worship in modern churches that embrace the circular model with far greater success: balancing the aspects of leadership of and membership in the body, without losing a sense of direction. For example, Saint Matthew and Saint Timothy’s in New York, while providing an intimate and almost womb-like gathering place for the assembly (entered via a long corridor that echoes the sacred caves and catacombs of antiquity), manages to preserve a marvelous sense of the transcendent, as the central altar is bathed in light from the atrium above, and the liturgical direction becomes up. The priest in this case is clearly leading the liturgy, but is also clearly a member of the circle, directing the attention of the whole assembly with word and gesture but also joining with them in raising their hearts on high together.

That sense of a community joined in a common direction is at the heart of the liturgy. C.S. Lewis once described the difference between friendship and love as a matter of focus: that lovers look at each other, and friends stand side by side looking towards some common goal. Clearly, the church is called to be a loving community, but isn’t the church’s love based at least in part on the sense of God as the ultimate lover, towards whom all our attention ultimately turns, and from whom we gain our life and power to love others, most especially those not already part of our inner circle? If we become fixated on each other in the liturgical assembly, rather then turning our attention to God, where will we get the emotional and spiritual energy to carry our love for God out into the world, instead of spending it all on ourselves?

And if the priest must become the “stand in” for Christ, does that not place upon him (or her) an intolerable need both to “deliver” and to receive the displaced love of the whole congregation, rather than leading and guiding that love towards the transcendent One who is before us, beyond us, above us and yet at the same time with us? Seeking to reveal Christ through one’s own “gestures, prayer and facial expression” (as the Congregation on Divine Worship recommended) strikes me as the cult of the personality verging on idolatry: and any priest who succeeded in doing so would likely be a great danger to his (so the Roman Catholics would have it) flock and to himself. I am reminded of that wonderful short story from Ray Bradbury’s Martian Chronicles in which a shape-shifting Martian becomes the object of the inmost need of each person he encounters (including a priest, who sees him as the crucified Christ). Ultimately the conflicting needs of the people destroy the poor empathetic alien. Is there any connection between what I have said here and the cases of clerical misconduct and burnout that seem to have become so common? I wonder.

I am more secure in saying that the processional form for the liturgy provides a responsible and at the same time less debilitating model for leadership and mission. First of all, there is a clear sense of direction, implying motion, or at least an expectancy of motion, a sense of a yet-to-be-realized eschaton, reminding us that even our Eucharist is a type and shadow of the glory that shall be, and not its full accomplishment. Secondly, the goal and focus is not within the community, but beyond it. And thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the priest is the leader but not the goal.

Finally, to mention the deacon again: how much more powerful is the dismissal as a sending forth in a particular direction, than as the mere dispersal of a circle. I have more than once heard the traditional oblong church model described dismissively as an “airplane.” Well, at least airplanes go somewhere.

So where do we go from here?

Now, I realize in all of this that I risk being catalogued as the worst kind of retrograde reactionary. And I admit that I am a bit uncomfortable to find that I share any opinion at all with Josef Cardinal Ratzinger. (I was quite amazed when his Splendor of the Liturgy appeared, decrying the great “mistakes” of Vatican II, in which I can only say I felt as if he’d been reading my mind, if not my journal notes!)

But I am heartened to find that my thoughts on this matter were presaged by the likes of Fathers Bonnell Spencer and Josef Jungmann, and today are echoed by numerous younger clergy and laity. Moreover, my practical experience has also shown me that a balanced eucharistic liturgy, with elements of the liturgy of the word (particularly the readings and the sermon) executed in an engaging, lively, and personable manner, coupled with a liturgy of the table that brings with it notes of transcendence, solemnity, and purpose, has provided the congregations which I have served with a real sense of renewal. In both parishes I have served my predecessors had abandoned the old “high altar” and introduced freestanding altars, and in both I made the decision to abandon this liturgical novelty in favor of the manner of worship which has been predominant for most of Christian history — not because of the historical reality, but because people are hungry for transcendence in a world that so aggressively confronts them or performs for them, rather than accompanying them and leading them.

Simply rearranging the furniture is not an answer to church growth or mission in itself. Nor is simply changing the posture of the clergy in relation to the laity. What the church needs now is a complete attitude adjustment and recovery of what it means to worship the One who is the object of our prayer, and the source of our life. Let us mean what we say, do what we intend, and become what we behold.

Sources

Anson, Peter F. Churches: Their Plan and Furnishing. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1948)

Anson, Peter F. Fashions in Church Furnishings: 1840-1940. Second edition. (London: Studio Vista Ltd, 1965)

Bouyer, Louis. Rite & Man: Natural Sacredness and Christian Liturgy. (Notre Dame, Ind.:University of Notre Dame Press, 1963).

Congregation for Divine Worship and Discipline of the Sacraments. “Praying Ad Orientem Versus,” in Notitiae 332, Vol. 29, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 245-249.

Gamber, Klaus. Reform of the Roman Liturgy : Its Problems and Background. (Roman Catholic Books, 1993).

Hammond, Peter. Liturgy and Architecture. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

Jungmann, Josef A., S.J. The Early Liturgy. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,

Lowrie, Walter. Action in the Liturgy. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953).

Ratzinger, Josef. Spirit of the Liturgy. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000)/

Spencer, Bonnell, OHC. Sacrifice of Thanksgiving. (West Park, N.Y.: Holy Cross Publications,

June 19, 2012

Impeded Marriages

For those who have difficulty grasping the difference between civil and church marriage in the U.K. Government's presentation on same-sex marriage, it is helpful perhaps to frame the divorce question in the terms in which it is applied to marriage.

"Being unmarried" (whether by virtue of never having been married, or through widowhood, an annulment or legal divorce, is a  "necessary condition" for each party entering into a legal marriage. Up until this point in the U.K., so has the mixed gender of the couple — though this interestingly enough is a quality not of each member of the couple but of the couple as couple.

That being said, the Church makes distinctions concerning which divorces it recognizes -- if, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, it recognizes them at all. There is no legal difference between marriages officiated by the state or the church; but there are some marriages the church will not recognize that the state will, on the grounds of other living spouses.

That is the difference the Government is attempting to point to, and it seems obvious that the church's legitimate choice to refuse to recognize some marriages does in fact create or reify this difference.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE; It seems part of the English confusion lies in the fact that marriage can mean both a rite and an estate.

The issue for the church is in solemnizing marriages of which it might not approve; and the church is at present free to refuse to solemnize some marriages that can be solemnized under the civil law, as in the case of divorced person, where the church has discretion to refuse to solemnize the marriage.

As far as I know the legal status of “being married” does not confer any ecclesiastical rights or entail any responsibilities. The church therefore has no interest in distinguishing between a married or an unmarried couple; or married or unmarried individuals; I think we are long past the days when a person who was divorced and had a civil marriage might risk excommunication as scandalous to the community. It is only the rite of marriage that is at issue.

So the confusion here seems to be the use of marriage both for the estate and the rite. It is the rite that is at issue for the church. The civil law proposed is affirming that the church will not have to make the rite available to couples it deems incapable of marriage — just as it does now with [some] divorced persons.

Civil and church marriage will still have the same legal statue, as an estate, but the church can and will be able to reject some couples as unmarriageble under its rites. There is no separate "species" or estates of marriage, but there are civil marriage ceremonies and church marriage ceremonies, and some people eligible for the former are, and will be (likely for some time)  ineligible for the latter, on objective and legally cognizable grounds.

TSH

February 18, 2012

Contraception Coniption

In response to my earlier post on the subject of the extent to which religious expression has to engage with a larger social world, one correspondent expressed astonishment that I did not see what he believes to be the point: that a constitutional right is being infringed by a merely civil action.

My point, of course, in that post, and now, is that there are in fact limits to the free exercise of religion, and many of them are parts of statutory law. These regulations do not prohibit free exercise of religion, to use the language of the Constitution, and they provide some separation between the religious doctrine and the civil provisions.

Some Roman Catholics are upset at having to provide health insurance to employees in church-related institutions that includes coverage for procedures or prescriptions to which they are opposed on religious grounds. I do understand their opposition. They do not understand the legal principles at play, and have come up with analogies — such as Bishop Lori's Kosher Deli required to serve ham — that go far to revealing their lack of understanding.

What they fail to grasp is that health insurance is but one part of employee benefits. Some of these benefits have long been mandated by law, as, for example, minimum wage. The provision of health care insurance is now similarly mandated. But the fact that the health insurance includes coverage for contraception is ultimately no different — ethically speaking in regard to the employer's responsibility or agency either for the provision or the use of contraceptives — from the salary itself being spent on things of which the employer might disapprove on religious grounds. To take the Bishop's example, there is nothing to prevent a Kosher deli-worker from spending his wages on ham, or even bacon-and-swiss, sandwiches. Neither the deli nor the church is responsible for the religiously objectionable act. They may not like it, but they are not morally responsible for it.

To take an extreme example, imagine a Roman Catholic priest who uses a portion of his stipend to pay for his sister's abortion. This is, needless to say, a very grave matter and carries a very serious penalty, which the church is by all means free to impose. But for that very reason it would be absurd to suggest that the church itself was "providing for the abortion" simply on the basis of the fact that its funds, paid as a stipend, were used to that end, and by one of its officials at that.

No individual's religious rights are being abridged or impeded by the provision of health care insurance — nor is the church's collective right to teach as it chooses to teach. There are several degrees of separation between the teaching and the insurance, any one of which is sufficient to insulate the church from any moral responsibility. It is as simple as that.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

February 13, 2012

Religious Freedoms Are Limited

The recent to-do over insurance plans providing contraception seems to me to be a good example of exactly where the boundary to religious freedom lies -- with oneself and those who share ones beliefs. Thus it is perfectly fine, to my mind, for a church to be allowed to tell its clergy and its religious employees not to have a certain kind of insurance coverage -- or to let the coverage be there but unused, which it seems to me is the real ethical point. (I mean, just paying for something because you have to does not indicate approval --- Lord knows I can mention several foreign wars of the last five decades upon which I wish my tax money had not been spent.)

But it is wrong to assert that the mere provision of a benefit is unacceptable in the context of something not directly a religious institution such as a church, but what the old orders would call "a work" (a school or hospital, for example), in which employees may well not be adherents of the particular sect or beholden to its beliefs.

In short, it is fine for the Roman Catholic Church to teach against contraception, and to insist its adherents make no use of it, but completely specious to claim that they are morally compromised by providing insurance coverage that happens to include this benefit to people who are under no obligation to use it, nor, in some cases, under any obligation to adhere to the teaching.

Otherwise, any Jehovah Witness-sponsored organization should have the right to insist that its secular employees not be covered for blood transfusions; 7th Day Adventists should be able to forbid their non-church employees from being fed hospital food containing meat, and Jews and Muslims, pork. And let's not even get started with the Christian Scientists, who ought, under this understanding, to be able to refuse the need to provide health insurance to anyone who works for them.


On that, just to be clear, I do defend the right of any person not to have health insurance on the basis of their religious belief; and I think that Christian Scientists should be granted that individual exemption, just as some of the Mennonite (Amish) groups members are --- though for different reasons concerning opposing receipt of government assistance.


But let's be clear: the individual right to make moral decisions for oneself is not something to be spread and imposed on others. If you don't want health coverage, no one is forced to use it, even if you are required to pay for it. A truly principled "martyr" would pay and stand tall in refusal to use.


Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

February 10, 2012

Thought for 02.10.12

Your religious rights end with your own body. You have no right to expect or demand that all will do as you believe all ought to do.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
with the emphasis on the expectation; one can, of course, “demand” anything one likes, but no one need heed those demands

August 28, 2011

On the Faults of Natural Law

This short essay is not intended as an exhaustive exploration of the subject, but is designed to express in a short space the primary difficulties I have with the concept and application of natural law. This presents a problem at the outset as there are at two very different understandings of the term “natural law.” The 1910 edition of the Catholic Encyclopedia article on the subject begins,

In English this term is frequently employed as equivalent to the laws of nature, meaning the order which governs the activities of the material universe. Among the Roman jurists natural law designated those instincts and emotions common to man and the lower animals, such as the instinct of self-preservation and love of offspring. In its strictly ethical application — the sense in which this article treats it — the natural law is the rule of conduct which is prescribed to us by the Creator in the constitution of the nature with which He has endowed us.

It is the final understanding, and its application, I am addressing at this point — as it is the one that I feel is most pernicious and ethically problematical, and open to the greatest abuse.

However, let me first raise the question of why anyone should feel the need to develop such an overarching theory of morality in the first place. It seems to me that this stems from a desire for objective standards, rather than a willingness to live in a conditional moral universe that is subjective at its heart. The evident problem with such a desire for objectivity lies in the fact that morality itself is necessarily relative — that is, it deals with the interrelations between various entities, and how they interact with each other. This necessitates an inescapable degree of subjectivity. Even behaviors of an individual in relation to some nonhuman entity — the state, the church, or even God — are by definition relational. The desire to declare a given act as moral or immoral divorced from the relation of the actor to the act and to that which is acted upon leaves precious little with which to deal.

For example, theft, which as an act-in-itself is simply the manipulation of some object (real or — in this day and age — even virtual), is only considered “theft” because of the relationship of the thief to the thing stolen, and touches on whole areas of presupposed or unexamined philosophical groundwork such as the nature of ownership itself: what makes something “belong” to one individual and not to another. There is nothing essentially rational or necessary in the concept of ownership — it depends upon other concepts that derive from cultures and their attitudes and have no objective or universal standing.

This exposes the greatest problem with natural law: that the supposedly self-evident truths to which it appeals are themselves philosophical constructs that even if widely shared still reflect the cultural prejudices of those who share them. I commend reading the whole article in the Catholic Encyclopedia (see link below) which, dating from 1910, reveals rather clearer traces of these cultural prejudices proclaimed as self-evident truths than might be risked with such bluntness today.

In short, natural law, as a system, is hopelessly guilty of begging the question. It assumes as its necessary premises answers to some of the very issues it purports to address.

Perhaps the most “question-begging” aspect of the concept lies in the essentially useless conclusion identifying the ultimate principle of natural law. As Aquinas says, (and as the CE reports),

the supreme principle [governing all of natural law], from which all the other principles and precepts are derived, is that good is to be done, and evil avoided (I-II.Q94.2).

Well, that’s settled then. Just do what is good, avoid evil, and all is taken care of. The problem, of course, is that rational people disagree as to what is even the highest good, and what subsidiary goods flow from it, and what actions and relations are in accordance with the highest or subsidiary goods.

The problems begin almost as soon as one begins to attempt to apply the basic premise. As the article in the CE goes on to say, the universality of natural law

pertains not to those abstract imperfect formulæ in which the law is commonly expressed, but to the moral standard as it applies to action in the concrete, surrounded with all its determinate conditions. We enunciate, for instance, one of the leading precepts in the words: “Thou shalt not kill”; yet the taking of human life is sometimes a lawful, and even an obligatory act. Herein exists no variation in the law; what the law forbids is not all taking of life, but all unjust taking of life.

The emphasis above is mine: the authors recognize that the concrete reality and conditions of any action have a role in determining whether that action is in fact good or not — that is, if it is in accordance with natural law. But the natural law itself cannot be used to make that determination because all it says, in essence and in its pure form, is that one should seek the good and avoid evil. In the case cited, all hinges on what is determined to be “unjust” — and of course in some contexts even the meaning of “life” — and so the whole weight of morality has to refer to that universe of conditions and circumstances rather than to any objective, immutable, or universally shared principle.

Take, as another example, the good of procreation — any rational person would say that the continuance of the human species is a good thing. But some cultures or moral systems (such as rabbinic Judaism, see mYebamoth 6.6) have held that the duty to procreate is incumbent upon all men; while others (for example, the Roman Church) have held that celibacy is not only permissible but virtuous. (Aquinas’ way around the problem of celibacy — II-II.Q152.2 — was to note that the commandment to be fruitful and multiply was addressed not to the individual human but to humanity as a species — a rather clever solution, but one that also tends to undercut the very basis of natural law as incumbent upon every human as human! And clearly the Roman Church is not willing to apply this same principle to birth control, but invokes a completely different moral touchstone: the dubious notion that the “procreative function” is not to be separated from the “unitive.” Since these functions are to some extent separate even in nature and can further be separated by human action, and there may well be quite rational causes for doing so — for example, in the case of a woman for whom it has been determined that bearing a child would be a significant danger to her life — the objectivity of this moral law comes into question.)

Additional difficulties arise the further one wades into the defense of natural law. In an effort to define its “essence” the CE continues with these two principles:

(a) The natural law is universal, that is to say, it applies to the entire human race, and is in itself the same for all. Every man, because he is a man, is bound, if he will conform to the universal order willed by the Creator, to live conformably to his own rational nature, and to be guided by reason. However, infants and insane persons, who have not the actual use of their reason and cannot therefore know the law, are not responsible for that failure to comply with its demands. (b) The natural law is immutable in itself and also extrinsically. Since it is founded in the very nature of man and his destination to his end — two bases which rest upon the immutable ground of the eternal law — it follows that, assuming the continued existence of human nature, it cannot cease to exist. The natural law commands and forbids in the same tenor everywhere and always.

Noting already the exceptional cases of those who do not have the use of reason, another problem with this asserted universality arises when particular human actions judged irrational by some are judged rational by others. Who is to set the objective standard as to what is rational? Do we not end at base with reliance upon cultural norms and prejudices, which by definition are not universal?

The usual response from natural lawyers is to say that a culture (or an individual) who fails to follow some precept which the proponents derive from natural law is either depraved or perverse: that is to say, like infants or the insane they simply have not attained or have lost the use of reason or have reasoned in error, or they know full well that what they are doing is wrong but persist in doing it out of some innate disordered desire to do what they know full well is “evil.”

This is, however, merely a cloak for cultural prejudices. Allow me to cite one more example from the CE article, which is at some pains to defend the toleration of polygamy in the Hebrew dispensation (“dispensation” itself being a somewhat uncomfortable fit with a supposedly universal and immutable law):

Under no circumstances is polyandry compatible with the moral order, while polygamy, though inconsistent with human relations in their proper moral and social development, is not absolutely incompatible with them under less civilized conditions.

This blatantly sexist (and vaguely racist) declaration is clearly at odds with right reason. If polygamy is permitted (because it advances a primary end of marital union, i.e., procreation) then surely the same is true of polyandry. The rabbinic ruling (cited above) that commands a man whose wife does not bear a child within a certain term of years to take another assumes that the problem lies in the woman. But a woman whose husband is sterile is forbidden to take another man. This stems not from any truly “natural law” but from a firm bondage to patriarchy, in which tracking the patrilineal descent is considered crucial. Obviously matriarchy and family inheritance by matrilineal descent is not only just as “natural” but arguably more secure, as the occasional doubts about paternity do not arise in the case of maternity. In fact, I recall a woman stand-up comedian some years ago deriving quite a laugh from her line, “I don’t have any kids... [proud smirk] that I know of...!” The allowance of polygamy and rejection of polyandry is not objective and rational, but mere cultural prejudice at work. (I do not, by the way, say any of this in defense of either polygamy or polyandry, but simply to point out the inconsistency and sexism inherent in culturally conditioned “natural law.”)

So, is it possible to develop some objective standard that is actually helpful in guiding moral behavior. Clearly, simply to say, “Seek the good and avoid evil,” is entirely unsatisfactory and only begs the question — perhaps giving a useful definition of morality but no actual particular guidance to what constitutes moral behavior. It is rather like telling someone who wants to learn how to spell to use the alphabet.

Some of the hardest moral questions facing us in our day will not yield to a merely doctrinaire and “objective” conclusion. Acts cannot be judged good or bad in the abstract apart from the actors and what is acted upon, and the circumstances and motives underpinning and enveloping the action. Some will judge acts entirely on the basis of their consequences — and all sorts of ethical systems have evolved which attempt to judge the good or ill of those consequences (pleasure, prosperity and well-being of the greatest number, for example). Others will judge acts on the basis of positive laws and duties — surely a rational approach, but hard to put into practice divorced from motive and circumstance. Others will appeal to the social contract for interactions between human beings. Some, such as myself, will fall back upon the moral advice of Jesus in terms of love of God and neighbor.

My point is that the very existence of all of these various systems of morality seriously damage the credibility of the base assertions of natural law — and of all the systems at our disposal, it is the least likely actually to bear useful fruit, given its question-begging, cultural bondage and sterile dogmatism.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG


citations of the Catholic Encyclopedia are from the online version of the article: Fox, James. “Natural Law.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. Accessed 28 Aug. 2011 http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm. The CE received the approbation of the Roman Catholic Church as follows: Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, Censor. Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York.

June 25, 2011

Cornerstone of Civilization

New York State has joined a literal handful of other US judicatories and about the same number of international jurisdictions in approving marriage equality, to take effect in about a month.

The response has been elation on one side (my own) and the expected warnings of doom on the other, led locally by the Roman Catholic bishops of New York, who question the state's interference in what they call "the cornerstone of civilization." That this comes from a group of celibate men, who none-the-less appear by all standards to be relatively civilized, does not appear to have dawned upon them.

When it comes to cornerstones, civilization has more than marriage to rest upon. Most social scientists and historians credit agriculture and animal husbandry (quiet in the back!) as more central to the establishment of civilization than marriage — and in fact, most marriage law may more likely be seen as an outgrowth of civilization than its cause.

It is also evident, from the historical record (including the biblical one) that "one man / one woman marriage" has not been the only "civilizing" form even of marriage down through the years. As a reminder, allow me to share once again, my "Biblical Wedding Cake Toppers Bookmark" — suitable for keeping one's place in the tangles of the Torah or the Pauline Epistles.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 21, 2011

Let Them Have It

The NY State Senate is still tied up with a resolution that would finally permit same-sex marriage in the state. The tie up is largely due to “concerns” from some religious leaders (by no means all — several Episcopal bishops including Sisk and Singh to name but two have spoken out in support of the resolution). These other concerned religious leaders, perhaps best represented by the one with most to fret about, Archbishop Dolan, wish to have the act amended to provide greater “protections” to various of their members and agencies.

Of course, as we all know (don’t we?) no church can be forced to perform a marriage against its doctrine. Roman Catholics can turn legally divorced persons away without blinking an eye; no rabbi can be forced to officiate at a marriage of non-Jews; nor could an Episcopal priest be required to solemnize a marriage in which both of the parties are unbaptized. There is, in short, no civil right to marriage that trumps a religious right to refuse to solemnize those deemed outside the relevant religious tradition. There is no right to a rite.

So the “concerns” are more removed from the actual issue of marriage itself, at least in the ritual or religious sense. A church that rents its hall for parties may want to refuse to rent it for a gay couple's wedding reception. A church-related agency for adoption or foster-care may want to refuse to place a child with a married lesbian couple.

And my opinion is, let them have it. Let them discriminate on these grounds. There are other halls to rent, and adoption and foster care agencies to place children. (I do feel for the children who may not find or be delayed in finding a loving couple to care for them; but the responsibility for this will lie with the religious leaders who place a premium on their own concept of righteousness at the expense of the little ones.)

This view is not, by the way, meant to accommodate the individual person of strong religious views, but only institutionally related facilities. The homophobic baker should not have the right to refuse to bake a cake for gay couples — though, at the same time, there are other bakers who will be glad to oblige. But we do get into sticky areas of fondant and marzipan when personal beliefs, however deeply held, are granted special privilege to operate apart from some institution committed to that peculiar view, and for specifically doctrinal reasons.

I say this because I believe the arc of history is on our side. Even the baker will soon find herself with fewer customers, were this provision even to be extended so far — which as I say I do not advise. If the Roman Catholic Church wishes to take what it thinks is the high road — let them do it. History — and the Almighty — will be their judge, as history and God are mine.

But I can read history as well as anyone, and conservative churches wed to the bigotries of the past soon are wearing unbecoming widows' weeds. They do not have a particularly good track record in this regard, whether the matter be the treatment of spiritual movements, of slavery, or even of cosmology.

What the Almighty will say when all is said and done... well, that will depend upon who is acting with greater consistency with the Gospel.

Update and clarification: I neglected to mention the issue of church-related agencies that receive state financial support. I by no means want to suggest that, for example, a church-affiliated adoption agency should continue to receive public financial support if it chooses to limit its services on the grounds of religious beliefs. To continue to offer financial support would be precisely to favor a particular religious aspect of their general work. They cannot have it both ways: if they are claiming an exemption from respecting the civil rights of others on religious grounds, then the civil society has every responsibility to withhold its support of what is, by their own admission, an action based on religion.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 8, 2011

The Covenant Crisis

As I have noted previously, I find myself poised somewhere between the two extremes of the Anglican Covenant debate. At one end are those who appear to think that not only is no agreement needed, but that the very idea of pan-Anglican governance is inimical to our identity as Anglicans. At the other extreme are those who appear to think that the AngCov is not merely the best way forward but the only way forward to settle the disputes that have raged through the Communion over the last two decades or so.

I find myself much more inclined towards the former than to the latter. In fact, I find the latter position not only to be facially absurd — if the member provinces of the Communion cannot agree on the Covenant itself, it cannot very well be the basis or means for subsequent agreement — but contradictory to the historical evidence, and arguably misguided as a way forward even were there signs of widespread willingness to move in such a direction.

The latter view is well typified by this comment from the Rev’d Dr. Alyson Barnett-Cowan, Director for Unity, Faith and Order in the Anglican Communion Office.

It’s become quite clear that if we’re to be a global church, we need something that expresses how we live together as a family.

One of the good things about this thesis is that it recognizes — by expressing it as a goal — that the Anglican Communion is not “a global church.” So what is it? It is “a fellowship of autonomous churches.” This fact raises two questions: 1) what is autonomy? And 2) is autonomy circumstantial or essential to Anglicanism?

The meaning of autonomy

Autonomy means self-governance. In the Anglican usage it is really more like its political equivalent “sovereignty.” When a church is autonomous it means that there is no “superior synod” to which it is answerable. (Mark McCall has argued just the opposite, on the basis of political double-speak that refers to “autonomous regions” within some larger governing structure — but it is double-speak I am attempting to clear away, and there is no need for the church to ape the duplicity of the state! “Conditional autonomy” belongs in the category with “partial virginity” and, as Groucho observed, “military intelligence.”)

One of the catchphrases of the AngCov debate has been the Windsor Report’s, “Communion is the limit of autonomy.” I reflected on this at length almost three years ago, and my views have not changed since. My point is that if autonomy is limited then it isn’t autonomy. Even if it is merely voluntary self-censorship, it is precisely submission to a heteronomous influence.

My sense is that all of this is the heritage of the liberal knee-jerk reaction to past colonialism adopted at the Toronto Congress in 1963 under the mealy-mouthed term mutual responsibility and interdependence. “Mutual responsibility” I can certainly buy — no church is an island, as John Donne might observe were he around to participate in our current discussions. But “interdependence?” While “responsibility” carries with it some idea of gifts, “interdependence” is far too needy a term. This is not to say, with anti-Pauline brusqueness, “I have no need of you.” Rather it is to acknowledge the reality that while the various churches can learn from each other and work together with each other, the idea that we “depend” on each other is both a historical and logical fallacy.

Circumstance or essence?

Which brings me to the second question. The Church of England’s assertion of autonomy from the Church of Rome is not a mere historical accident. The sense of national autonomy was passed down to all of the daughter churches arising from the English colonial and imperial adventures, and the further granddaughters borne by those churches. As I noted in my previous post on this subject, so keen were the English to keep the American church separate from them, that they forbade (by Act of Parliament) the newly consecrated American bishops White and Provoost, and anyone they would consecrate or ordain, from ever functioning within his Majesty’s dominions. (Obviously this Act of Parliament was either repealed or ignored at some point.) This sense of autonomy was so powerful that it led to the formation of a separate Protestant Episcopal Church of the Confederate States of America at the time of the Civil War — a new entity created with some sense of regret at the necessity in the South and utterly ignored in the Union and the General Convention.

I have written before about the practical advantage of autonomy — it allows for provincial testing of contextual developments in discipline and worship and for their gradual reception or rejection by other provinces. (Such developments have happened at a slower pace in the past, and much of the tension in the Communion in our time is no doubt due to the rapid increase in the pace of communication and almost instant reactivity.) Autonomy is the safeguard both of local privilege of development and local insulation from foreign developments judged unacceptable. As I have noted time and again, no other province is forced or even expected to adopt what they regard as innovations in any other province, and autonomy is the bulwark against such pressures, if they are perceived to exist. The true statement is: Autonomy is the limit of communion interference.

Globalism as a confusion with Communion

The Anglican Communion is not a “global church” and I don’t want it to become one, for the very reason that such globalism will stifle the greatest gift Anglicanism offers to world Christendom (and if we have nothing to offer why do we exist?) — autonomy in diversity in a fellowship of churches who are not bound by each other’s local decisions.

This is a different model to the Roman, the church which “subsists” in the college of bishops in union with the heir of Peter. It is more like than unlike the Orthodox model of autocephalous churches pledged to a common inheritance of liturgy and canon law, each Orthodox entity holding itself to be the local expression of the fullness of the whole church.

Anglicans have historically understood the national or provincial church in much the same way, though without the common canon law aspect. It might be helpful to apply to the church the same term the Anglican Founders applied to Scripture: sufficiency. Each national or provincial church is sufficient unto itself for its own maintenance. It does not require or depend upon any input from any other sister church, although it welcomes and celebrates its communion with the other members of the Anglican family. Unlike an individual diocese, which cannot create a successor to its own bishop without the input of the larger church body of which the diocese forms a part, the national church or province is sufficient and competent to its own maintenance.

Finally, the Anglican Communion is, as the good Canon observes, a family. Families do not, in fact, require a written document to govern their behavior with one another. A few basic ground-rules defending autonomy, rather than generating a specious interdependency, would not be bad. Lionel Deimel put together such a list a while back. Such rules, some of which go back to Nicaea, include respect for provincial boundaries, fidelity to the Creeds, Sacraments, and the sufficiency of Scripture for salvation. If we are to have a Covenant, let it be one that preserves what is best in what we have, rather than mooning after something we have never had, and likely don’t need.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG


November 21, 2010

Reality Cheque

President Koch of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity says that Protestants have forsaken true ecumenism by not holding out for true, visible unity. By which, of course, he means institutional unity.

Well, as the policeman said, "Move along, nothing to look at here." This has always been the Roman model for ecumenism — as the church, in the view from the Vatican Hill, is officially defined as subsisting in that hierarchy of bishops in communion with the pope. The idea of independently governed churches being in communion with each other but answerable to no higher-level administration is simply foreign to their way of thinking. (And apparently some Anglicans find it hard to grasp, too!)

The proverb is true, and to be believed: When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
h/t Episcopal Café