Let the Children...

When I'm asked about the role of children in marriage, I respond that in my parochial experience they are usually old enough to serve as ring-bearers or flower-girls.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Do the Math

For those who want to place procreation at the head or heart of marriage, it is good to recall that the prevailing description of marriage is the means by which two become one, not how two become three or more.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Order in the Court

Richard Posner's opinion in the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, striking down anti-marriage equality obstacles in Wisconsin and Indiana, is a fine piece of work, as others have noted. One thing that stood out for me was his citation of Supreme Court Justice Alito's dissent in Windsor, in which Alito refers favorably to the argument "that marriage is essentially the solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not always do so." (133 S. Ct. at 2718)

This thesis is one of those truthisms that mere repetition does not prove. It is absurd on the face of it, but that doesn't stop some people taking it seriously. The principle problem lies in the word intrinsically, which means essentially, necessarily, or inherently: something that is in the nature of a thing as and in itself, without which that thing would not be what it is. So, why does this not work for marriage? I can quickly come up with four reasons.

First, to attach a modifier like intrinsic to an action (such as marriage or sexual intercourse within marriage) is already philosophically questionable, since actions are by their nature not "substances" or "things" but the behavior or activity of things.

Second, the notion of an order is about intention or plan — even further removed from being intrinsic, since intent and plan necessarily involve a state not yet realized.

Third, the action in question, and the estate in which it takes place, is one involving more than one actor — two "things" if you will — and this also violates the notion of intrinsic as particular to a thing.

This is brought home in the final astounding admission that the desired result — assuming it to be desired, which it often isn't even when possible — does not always take place. So much for it being essential, inherent, or intrinsic — something which may not be possible can hardly be held to be essential.

It is fine to say that procreation ought to take place within marriage; but to attempt to reduce marriage to one of its possible outcomes — and one acknowledged not to be possible in many cases — is looking into the beautifully decorated wedding hall through a very narrow crack.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

A different slope

Last week I was drawn into a Facebook conversation with an English Evangelical. As always, I found it helpful and informative, not the least for confirming my sense that the general trend of my thinking is in the right direction.

The conversation arose in response to a recently publicized instance of polyamory — a trio of women whom the press said had “married.” This led to some “I told you so” fulfillment of the slippery slope: the promise that permission for same-sex marriage would open the floodgates to all sorts of other sexual variations. I’ve addressed this argument, and the logical fallacy of which it is an instance, elsewhere, and won’t repeat my comments here beyond the simple evidence that polyamory made its first appearance in the seventh generation from Adam, so blaming the gays seems an effort to close a barn door opened by someone else.

However, this was not the thesis that engendered the discussion. It was the more nuanced suggestion, “The arguments used in support of same-sex marriage can also be used to support polyamory.” This is a slope of a different slip, a logical fallacy so far as concerns addressing the validity of the arguments in question. That does not mean the phenomenon does not happen — a logical fallacy may still describe a true situation; but it remains a fallacy because it does not address the underlying argument.

As I noted on Facebook,

The thesis takes the form: Argument X in favor of Y is wrong because it can also be used in favor of Z. In the present instance, the claim is that arguments advanced in favor of same-sex marriage fail because those same arguments can be used to support, in this case, polygamy.
There are a number of problems with this thesis. Most importantly, it does not in fact disprove the validity of Argument X, but merely observes that the same argument may be employed in another case. Mere antipathy to that other case (which may reflect antipathy towards the first case) is in itself irrelevant. In reality, arguments that support things one holds to be good can also be used to support conclusions one feels are bad.

Let me raise a case where I think the thesis is true, even if fallacious. The libertarian argument in favor of same-sex marriage (or anything else, as it is less an argument than an ideology) takes the form, “People should be allowed to marry if they love each other and are doing no harm to others.” The same argument can be applied to polygamy, and very likely has been. But even though that is the case, it doesn’t actually prove the argument to be wrong, in either case. A whole separate debate on the virtues of libertarianism would need to be entered; and I think most people are neither fierce absolute libertarians nor equivalently doctrinaire authoritarians. In practical terms most people would, I think, given the popularity of another ideology, utilitarianism, home in on whatever alleged “harm to others” might result from any given action. (And however popular and common, a debate on the virtues of utilitarianism would also need take place!) So I concur that a libertarian argument may in fact have wider application than intended — but it may still apply in relation to the action and the harm that are the real subject of debate. If one wishes to debate the principle of liberty or utility themselves, that will have to be a separate discussion.

Getting back to arguments that I have actually encountered in the same-sex marriage debate, one of the principle arguments against it revolves around procreation. Again, I’ve dealt with the merits of that argument elsewhere at considerable length and won’t repeat it here except to note that the overlap between procreation and marriage is incomplete, on both sides.

But the proffered example of procreation can serve as a case in point in the larger question of arguments in favor of things one likes being used to support things one does not. For while procreation is cited as one of the “causes” for marriage, it can also be used as an argument in favor of polygamy.

This is not an abstract thought experiment, but a reality. Jewish law holds the command to “be fruitful and multiply” as binding on all men and women. This leads directly to polygamy in the case where a man’s wife cannot conceive (or has not conceived); Scripture provides case studies as with Elkanah, Peninnah and Hannah, and also that of Abraham (although Hagar remains a concubine rather than a formal wife). The necessity to procreate also leads to the Levirate law in which a childless widow is to be impregnated by her brother-in-law. This law figures in salvation history in the person of Ruth and Boaz; and when the question of the Levirate law is raised to Jesus by the Sadducees, he does not speak against it, in principle, though he does aver that marriage is a thing of this world. Closer to the Anglican homestead, observe the extent to which Henry Rex’s concern for the succession led him to employ, and then reject, the Levirate law; and even briefly, so it is said, to contemplate plural marriage — precisely what the pope accused him of undertaking when he married “Anne of a thousand days.”

On the other side, a negative argument involving procreation is often advanced against same-sex marriage, as a kind of Kantian categorical imperative: that if everyone practiced it the human race would cease to exist. However, the same argument can be advanced against celibacy. Again, this is not merely theoretical, but (in keeping with the understanding of the "first commandment" to multiplication of the human species) forms part of the groundwork for the opprobrium attached to celibacy in mainstream rabbinic Judaism.

Ultimately we owe to the scholastic church the fine argument that the command to procreation is addressed to the species as a whole, not to all individual members of it. This let the celibates off the hook, but the application to family planning has run aground on the shoals of natural law — another example of the fact that arguments can be applied to different concerns with very different results.

In summary, then, it would appear that arguments ought to be weighed on their own merits, not on ancillary or subsidiary possible circumstances. Those represent slopes down which it is not at all necessary to slip.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

A Fallacy That Will Not Die

Once again — how many times has this come up? — it is being asserted widely that the reason only mixed-sex couples can marry is that only they are “inherently” capable of procreation. This is not only false, but a fallacy.

First, though, let it be acknowledged that the state, and for what it is worth, many religions, do hold that procreation ought to take place within the context of marriage, thereby implicitly recognizing the sadly obvious fact that marriage is not essential to procreation. However, as soon as this is said, it also has to be recognized that the converse is equally true and obvious: that neither the state, nor most religions, require procreation of married couples. Some religious groups insist that couples at least attempt procreation, but the bearing of children is, for most states and most faiths, a positive outcome and not a requirement. Making the institution of marriage depend on what is essentially a contingency robs it of relation to what in fact constitutes the marriage, which is the mutual consent to life together.

In short, it is not the bearing of children that “makes” the marriage a marriage. As long ago as the 17th century, the eminent Scottish jurist James Dalrymple, the Viscount Stair, wrote in his Institutions of the Law of Scotland,

It is not the consent of Marriage as it relateth to the procreation of Children that is requisite; for it may consist, though the Woman be far beyond that date; but it is the consent, whereby ariseth that Conjugal Society, which may have the conjunction of Bodies as well as of Minds, as the general end of the Institution of Marriage, is the solace and satisfaction of Man. For the Lord saw that it was not fit for him to be alone, and therefore made a help meet for him: Yet though this capacity should never be actuat, as if persons, both capable, should after Marriage live together, and it should be known and acknowledged that they did abstain, yet were the Marriage valid, as to the Conjugal Rights on either part. (I.iv.6)

However, we then come to the fallacious belief that any given mixed-sex couple are somehow “inherently” capable of procreation, while same-sex couples never are. First of all, the obvious truth is that it takes two to dance the procreative tango — and both must be, individually as well as jointly, capable of procreation, in order for procreation to happen. The marriage of a couple consisting of one member of each sex does not have any "inherent" capacity to procreation, solely on the basis of their sex. Such a couple either has "actual" capacity for procreation or it doesn't.

So let me sketch this out in simpler terms. The “traditionalists” appear to be arguing thus:

a. Male and female are required for procreation
b. Marriage requires procreation, therefore
c. Marriage requires male and female.

I hope you can see the syllogism follows, but only if (b) is accepted as true. However, in fact its contrary is true. As it stands (b) is not acceptable to most states or faiths — any more than same-sex marriage is acceptable to most states and faiths. So those who frame the argument in this way are employing a premise they do not in fact accept to reach a conclusion they desire.

Let’s look at it another way:

a. A couple including a person of each sex, each of whom is capable of procreation has an inherent capacity to procreate as a couple.
a(1). This means that the inability of either or both members of the couple to procreate prevents the couple from procreation.
b. The inability to procreate is not grounds for forbidding marriage, or dissolving marriage.
b(1). This means that those who wish to prohibit same-sex marriage on the grounds of incapacity to procreate need to come up with a better argument.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

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Framing Some Questions

But suppose there is no child; do they remain two and not one? No; their intercourse effects the joining of their bodies, and they are made one, just as when perfume is mixed with ointment.” — John Chrysostom, Homily 12 on Colossians

 This quote from John Chrysostom popped upon the HoBD list recently. It provides a good rejoinder to a common assertion made by those who oppose same-sex marriage (and birth control) that the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage cannot be separated without seriously damaging the very concept of marriage itself. Even without Chrysostom’s testimony, it is obvious that the unitive and procreative are separated by nature during the “infertile period” and in not-all-that-advanced age, as well as by accident or illness.

Arguments that an infertile couple are “open to procreation” or that their conjugal acts are “procreative in principle” or “in kind” or “essentially ordered towards children” are a kind of verbal legerdemain. For example Girgis, George, and Anderson compare sex between an infertile couple to a baseball game in which a team plays but fails to win, analogized with failure to conceive. But it’s still baseball, they say. The problem with this analogy is that, apart from a no-hitter or a tie, one or the other team necessarily loses a baseball game; and the possibility of winning is real, not merely intended. The proper analogy to an infertile couple would be a baseball game played without bats, or perhaps in this case more appropriately, balls. Such a mimed game would not be baseball any more than infertile sex is “procreative.” To use an analogy from my own writings, air guitar is not musical. Only a pre-scientific mind would could think that procreation did not require, at minimum, sperm and ovum.

So, as Chrysostom wisely observes, the conjugal act is in and of itself, regardless of any actual, potential, or intentional procreation, unitive.

The real questions ought to be: What, if it is not procreation, is the locus of the unitive aspect of marriage? Can a same-sex marriage be unitive? Can such a marriage be moral?

I think that Scripture and reason together can give us answers to these questions, or at least guidance the testimony of which is not lightly to be discounted.

In response to the first question I say that limiting the unitive function to the genitals is problematical. That the genital is one aspect of union is beyond denial. But it is also obvious that the union is also in mind and heart, as the preface to the liturgy notes. Adam recognized Eve as of one flesh (and bone) with him prior to their conjugal (and postlapsarian) joining. And Jesus helpfully noted, in a negative context, that the eye and the heart could be the organs for adultery. (Matt 5:28) So “unity” is not solely or even necessarily a matter of genital union.

In answer to the second question I hope that no one will doubt that same-sex couples can experience union of heart and mind. It would also appear, again from a negative example, that (at least) a male couple can unite in the flesh in the same way as a heterosexual couple; the oft-cited Leviticus 18:22 could find no other way to describe male homosexual relations than in heterosexual terms: literally, “with a male do not lay the layings of a woman.”

Obviously these negative texts raise the question, “Can such uniting be moral?” However, I think it important to note that not every uniting of male and female is moral; in addition to adultery, there is also the harlotry condemned in 1 Cor 6:16, in which becoming “one flesh” is a scandal, not a good. So, clearly, uniting in and of itself is morally neutral — the good or the bad depends on something other than the union itself.

So the issue before us is whether the uniting of two persons of the same sex can be moral. Clearly it can be, and in a growing number of places is, legal. But the church’s proper province is morality, not legality.

I hope that this brief note has dispelled or at least disabled the circular “impossiblist” argument as expounded in the Girgis, George, Anderson paper (marriage requires a male and a female ordered to childbearing to be marriage, ergo only males and females can marry), and moves us to the real issue that faces us: is same-sex marriage capable of being moral.

To answer that we need to look at the locus of morality, which is not in the anatomy, but in the mind and heart, as Jesus taught.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Word Play

One of the constant themes in discussions of same-sex marriage is the "just don't call it 'marriage'" meme — call it a civil union or a domestic partnership. 

Well, as to "union" Websters Unabridged (2d edition 1975) lists as definition 4 of marriage, "Any close or intimate union." The Book of Common Prayer itself refers to marriage as a "union" in its opening exhortation. So all this definitional fuss about "civil marriage" versus "civil union" is not based on any real usage of the terms, but is an effort to introduce a lexical distinction where none exists, or need exist. This is not to say that same-sex marriages and mixed-sex marriages are the same; obviously they differ in one important feature. But the word marriage is big enough to embrace them both.

We have marriages of high-boys with low-boys, as the Keno Twins will testify on "Antiques Roadshow"; laundries regularly marry matching socks, left to right; and Shakespeare argued against the introduction of impediments to the marriage of true minds. The word marriage has needed little expansion, and perhaps only the slightest of redefinitions, in order to cover, as it now does in a number of jurisdictions around the world, couples who happen to be of the same sex.

However, if you want to see a real assault upon language, read some of the tortured efforts to claim that infertile heterosexual couples are still somehow "open to the possibility of procreation" or "in principle capable of generating life" — which does more violence to the meaning of the words possibility, in principle and capable than "same-sex marriage" does to the word marriage.

 Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Thought for 02.10.12

Your religious rights end with your own body. You have no right to expect or demand that all will do as you believe all ought to do.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
with the emphasis on the expectation; one can, of course, “demand” anything one likes, but no one need heed those demands

The Wheel Goes Round

One aspect of the sexuality debates is the extent to which those opposed to same-sex marriage ground their arguments in circular reasoning. Most of them are aware enough to see how empty it sounds to say, “Same-sex couples cannot marry because marriage is only for men and women.” So their thesis usually takes a more nuanced, but no less circular, form. “Only a man and a woman can marry because only a man and a woman are capable of procreation.” When it is noted that men and women who cannot procreate are still permitted to marry, and that marriages do not end with the end of the ability to procreate, the language shifts to, “Only men and women can marry because only a man and woman are capable of performing a procreative act.” By “procreative act” they mean an act that could be procreative if the couple were procreative.

It is very easy to become caught in the linguistic and logical thicket such thinking is based on, but in the long run it is of the form, “A procreative act is an act which, if the couple were capable of procreation, would be capable of procreation.” This strange thesis entirely begs the question, in part because “acts” aren’t procreative — people are. Procreation is not a matter of form, but of substance and capacity. If the couple aren’t capable of procreation, no act they perform can be “procreative.” In the long run this is just another way of framing the assertion that only men and women can marry.

To get a bit technical, this is the assertion of a counterfactual conditional as if it were an indicative conditional. (The difference is between “X would be if Y were though it isn’t” and “X is if Y is and it is.”) Saying something “is” when it “isn’t” — though “it would be if it were” — is at the heart of this logical fallacy.

One of the exponents of this view declared that it is analogous to angling: even when a fisher fails to catch fish he is still fishing. This is a misleading analogy. The proper analogy, from the traditionalist perspective, is “sex is to procreation as angling is to catching fish” (i.e., sex and angling being the activity and procreation and catching fish the particular and assumed desired result of that activity). Sex without the possibility of procreation is sex, but it is not procreative. It is nonprocreative sex — whether whatever makes it incapable of leading to procreation is artificial (birth control) or natural (temporary or permanent infertility, or the sex of the members of the couple).

The traditionalists simply want to restrict sex to those who formally embody the capacity for procreation, whether they are actually capable of procreation or not. And that is just another way of limiting sex, and marriage, to a man and a woman: the very premise that needs to be proven. And so the wheel spins another round.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

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Civilized Conversation

I've had several thoughts in reaction to Archbishop Okoh's latest rant.

If procreation is the cornerstone of society, then celibacy is as much of a threat to the world as same-sex marriage.

Such scant attention to the place that celibacy plays in the teaching of Jesus and Paul, and in the history of the church and the world — and his failure to connect with the even more important imagery of adoption that runs through the Scripture, including the foster-fatherhood of Joseph for the Holy Child himself! — offers little to commend in Okoh's understanding. Monasticism preserved much of the world's wisdom during times when the fertility- and inheritance-driven royal families of Europe were laying waste to it. Saying that the biological family is the cornerstone of civilization is simply a falsehood. A better case can be made for monasticism.

It also strikes me that Okoh has misplaced accusations of selfishness and hedonism which he attributes to gay and lesbian persons. Many gay and lesbian Christian couples spend more time and wealth on the church, or on raising children not their own biological offspring, instead of raising their own flesh and blood. Which is more "selfish" in the long run?

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
h/t to the Episcopal Café

Reasonable and Holy Doubt

Recently, Reasonable and Holy has been critiqued on three grounds:

• First, that it is, as Ephraim Radner suggests, "a tissue of maybe," and hence not sufficient to make a case for change.
• Second, that while it may effectively weaken the prevailing arguments against the licitness of life-long monogamous same-sex relationships, and indeed to some extent undermine the traditional limitation of marriage to mixed-sex couples, still, it does not provide an alternative positive theology for this innovation.
• Finally, it is also suggested that the burden of proof lies on my side of the debate.

I see these grounds of complaint as related and I will try to address them in a single response. Part of this is because of the ethical understanding with which I come to the discussion. Not wishing to launch into a long essay on the various schools of ethics, let me just say that I would here espouse the ethical stand in the neighborhood of what are known as Probiliorism and Probabalism — as opposed to the more rigorous and inflexible Tutiorism. I am not alone in this, and in fact my position is the dominant model in contemporary ethics.

Tutiorism is a hard master, and requires that in any doubtful case, one must always follow the more secure or established rule unless the alternative can be shown to be so likely as to be virtually certain. In a legal context we might call that a standard of "clear and convincing" or perhaps even "beyond reasonable doubt." (Much depends on whether one is the plaintiff or the defense; bear with me!)

Probabalism and Probiliorism, respectively, require only that the alternative to following the standard rule be shown to be probable (or in the latter system, more probable) than the standard to allow for liberty. These would be something more like the legal standards of "showing reasonable doubt" or having the "preponderance of the evidence" on one's side.

I realize I'm mixing legal and ethical systems here, but I hope this helps make the distinctions clearer without bringing in too much subtle confusion. But I also do this in part because there is a forensic side to this discussion.

In short, from my perspective, some of my critics are calling for my side to provide clear and convincing evidence of innocence (or licitness) when all I believe we are required to introduce is reasonable doubt as to guilt (or illicitness). We are talking, after all, about the rightness of performing a certain action (or entering a certain estate), which the traditional side sees as a sin if not a crime. As I am on the defense side of the equation, and the burden of the "traditional" side is to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the tradition is correct, I think I have done my job. Even Dr. Radner admits I present effective counter-arguments to much of the traditional case. In short, "maybe" is enough to cast reasonable doubt upon the air-tightness of the traditional case, and acquit those accused of improper action.

Now, when we get to the question of the church's blessing, a positive act on the church's part, the question of theology comes up. First, I must note once again that the church's teaching is that marriage exists prior to and apart from any "blessing" the church may offer. (The ministers of marriage are the couple.)

But when it comes to providing an alternative positive theology for same-sex marriage, I think my critics misunderstand me. I am not arguing for a separate theology of marriage different from the theology we already have for marriage — such as it is. (I add that proviso because any careful examination of the tradition reveals a number of variant theologies from the patristic era and up through the high middle ages and on through the Reformation. Anglicans tended in general to be closer to Luther's "a matter of the town hall" than to the Roman Catholic "sacrament," when they referred to marriage as "an estate allowed.")

However, I deliberately took the exhortation of the marriage rite in the Book of Common Prayer as my model in examining a theology for same-sex marriage. I believe I have convincingly demonstrated that procreation cannot be held to be an essential element in marriage precisely because, according to the church's teaching, marriage is not forbidden to those who cannot procreate. That would seem to me to be a simple bit of logic (i.e., something not required cannot be essential), and incontestable as it stands. I believe I have also shown that all of the other characteristic "goods" or "ends" of marriage can be shared and realized by a same-sex couple. So whatever "theology" you wish to apply to marriage — apart from one that requires the capacity to procreate as essential, in contravention of the church's tradition and law — can be applied to a same-sex as well as a mixed-sex couple.

I hope that goes a bit towards addressing these critics. And I really do wish some of them would read the book instead of relying on Dr. Radner's review.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Up a (Family) Tree

Ephraim Radner has published a typically wordy review of Reasonable and Holy in The Living Church. I have to say I am disappointed, not because the review is dismissive, but because I had hoped for more engagement with the issues and conclusions I present. Instead, Radner spends much of his time dealing with form rather than content. (It is a poor critic who blames another workman’s tools.) Plainly Radner does not like my conclusions, but he addresses only two or three of them in any detail. I will be making a longer response as time permits (I am in the midst of completing several major projects, and will be traveling on Anglican Communion business next week). However, I want here to examine just one of the assertions Radner makes. It is revelatory of the extent to which the heterosexualist mind-set, dazzled and misled by an eisegetical “larger scriptural vision” is prevented from engagement with alternative ideas, or, it seems, the actual text.

Radner states,

The central element of procreation in marriage, for instance, is bound up with the character of Israel’s calling in fallen (and the Fall has no place in Haller’s scheme) human history — genealogy — and ought not simply to be examined in terms of this or that individual person or couple (a rather modern obsession).

I will leave to one side the fact that I examine at some length the traditional imagery of both marriage and harlotry in the role of Israel in salvation history (pp. 53-56). Mindful as well of the apostolic injunction “not to occupy [myself] with ... endless genealogies that promote speculations rather than the divine training that is known by faith,” (1 Tim 1:4), I nonetheless feel it necessary to challenge Radner’s assertion here — or what I can make of it.

For while it is obviously true that procreation and genealogy are linked, the crucial observation from the New Testament, in the two places where genealogies figure, is that procreation — at least heterosexual procreation — is not at issue. Both Matthew (1:1-16) and Luke (3:23-38) reach their climax in an essential subversion of heterosexual procreation: Matthew sweeps aside all of his carefully constructed line of fatherhood to turn his attention to Mary, and then to describe the virginal conception. Luke, emerging from the revelation of Jesus Christ as Son of God at his baptism, presents a reverse genealogy that culminates in the affirmation that the first Adam was also Son of God. (As I note in Reasonable and Holy, the three most important persons in salvation history — Adam, Eve, and Jesus — are not the result of heterosexual sex; and, again contrary to Radner’s careless reading, I cite the traditional patristic and medieval reading of Mary’s role in the reversal of the Fall, as the “new Eve,” as a crucial factor in a sound understanding of the place of procreation in the work of God. See pp. 30-38) Taking all of this, as I do, in the context of John’s words about those who are born “from above” (John 3:3 )and not “of the will of man,” (John 1:13) I think I have expounded a sound biblical picture, consonant with the actual text — even if it must dissipate the Radnerian mirage, typified by his dismissive and anti-incarnational conclusion. Ultimately it is about individual persons — and this is no “modern obsession” but at the heart of the Christian faith.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

A Summary

Over at the House of Bishops/Deputies list I was asked to provide a summary of the arguments in favor of a change in church policy on homosexuality. Having just recently published that fairly long (192 pages of 10pt type) book on the topic, I'm somewhat reluctant to try to wrap it up in a short summary. But I think I can state a few "theses" that I develop in the book.

I believe that marriage is not solely about procreation. The two stories of creation offer two models for loving human relationships: the first focused on procreation, the second on companionship (and most importantly, companionship as judged by the companions). The first account emphasizes the likeness of the man and woman to God; the second account their likeness to each other. The first account emphasizes the capacity to bear fruit and to rule the creation; the second the capacity to love and unite, in service to creation. And I think same-sex couples, while not capable of physical procreation between themselves, are capable of fulfilling the most humane aspect of procreation that takes them outside of themselves (the care and nurture of children) and are fully capable of carrying out all of the other creation ordinances.

I believe that the cultures in which the Scriptures were composed had different understandings of the world from our own, particularly on certain central concepts, including sex and sexuality. For instance, the moral world of the Hebrew Scriptures, and to some extent the Gospels and Epistles, shows a marked asymmetry in regard to men and women. To give just two examples, under Jewish law a man could only violate another man's marriage, a woman only her own; and there is no mention of female same-sex behavior in the Torah — or the rest of the Old Testament. (Nor did the rabbis come to regard it as equivalent to male same-sexuality.) So to read and apply the Scripture without taking note of the cultural differences within the Scriptures themselves (where development of moral thinking is often indicated), and between the biblical and apostolic times and now (in which there have been further developments in ethical and moral thinking, as well as in the social and "hard" sciences), is to treat the Scriptures in a way that distorts the truly eternal message they were intended to convey.

I believe the church has made such movement on other issues, coming to accept and even endorse things condemned in Scripture, and to forbid things commanded there. I argue for applying the same "weights and measures" in examining the question of same-sex relationships.

I do not believe these changes have no application to our present concerns: for example, the change in the dietary law was understood by Saint Peter not to be merely about food, but about all that Jews held to be "unclean" about Gentiles, up to and including their persons.

I believe a close and careful reading of the biblical texts (and the tradition both in later Judaisms and Christianity) does not require a wholesale condemnation of all same-sex relationships any more than it requires wholesale approval of all mixed-sex relationships.

I believe that much of the negativity towards same-sex relationships does not derive from Scripture, but from reflections of the patristic era in their conflict with aspects of Hellenism and paganism, and the emergence of a "natural law" tradition that has its own flaws, prejudices and weaknesses. Ethical thought in that tradition relied more on Aristotle than on Jesus, to its detriment.

I believe that the ethic to which Jesus invites us is not about forbidding specific actions, or pursuing abstract virtues, but is about action in a context based on disposition, intent, relationship, and above all the impulse to give of oneself for sake of the other. He emphasizes the "inside" over the "outside" and calls for a morality that is not about external compliance, but a converted heart.

This is a radical condensation of the many issues that inform the discussion which I think has to take place. My book was offered as a contribution to the "listening process" and I invite those interested in hearing what I have come to understand to take a look at it. I have taken pains, as a result of carefully reading the books and essays of those with whom I disagree, to provide some answers to their objections. I have always said that I learn more from talking with people with whom I disagree than with those who agree and do not challenge me.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Wacky Wisdom of the Ancients

Some time early in the dawn of human culture, people observed that plants grew from seeds. With the rise of agriculture and animal husbandry, they also came to think of procreation as a matter of planting seeds: male animals, and human males, planted their seeds in the fertile soil of the female, where they grew to become appropriately horses or humans. This view prevailed for quite some time, on up into modern times. As late as the 18th century there were still some advocates of the homunculus theory -- that the sperm of animals and humans contained tiny animals or people.

It struck me the other day that giving the name "seed" (zarah, sperma, semen) to the male's contribution to reproduction is actually a mistake. The seeds of a plant are embryos with a bit of starch and protein as a container — the product of the female. The male counterpart to animal "sperm" in plants is not the seed, but the pollen.

Just a thought on how analogies and images can take on a life of their own.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

DOMA’s Irrational Basis

So I was listening to NPR this morning and was happy to hear the news that a federal suit is going to be filed in an effort to overturn DOMA —the fantastically misnamed Defense of Marriage Act. Of course, one of the opponents to a judicial overturn, a member of one of the many conservative groups out there — which one I can’t recall, something with “Alliance” in it — noted that in order to prevent the overturn, all that is needed is to show that there is a rational basis for limiting marriage to mixed-sex couples; and, of course, he said that procreation was such a rational basis.

The problem is that if something is the raison d’être (the rationale or basis) for granting a legal status, the condition for the status and all that goes with it — in this case the rights and responsibilities of marriage — should relate to all who seek that status. Even more importantly, such a rational basis for a status requires a higher standard of proof if you are going to exclude people from that status on that basis.

As I have pointed out many times before, procreation can take place apart from marriage and marriage from procreation. People who are incapable of procreation are not excluded from obtaining the legal status of marriage. In fact, in five states of the Union (AZ IL IN UT WI), the law permits marriage to first cousins only on the conditions either of advanced age or infertility or both — procreation is effectively forbidden in the case of these marriages! So it can hardly form a rational basis for them.

More importantly, many if not most of the benefits and responsibilities of marriage have no necessary connection with procreation: Social Security and disability benefits, visitation rights, pensions for surviving spouses, inheritance rights, tax status, and so on. These things all apply whether one has children or not, and whether one is capable of having children or not.

To argue that procreation is a rational basis for marriage that only applies in certain circumstances (and thus, hardly a basis), or that a factor that applies only in some marriages has greater importance than factors more likely to be important to all marriages (and thus, hardly rational) — is baseless and irrational.

The real rational basis for marriage is far simpler, though the state might want to avoid the religious overtones: it is not good for the human to be alone (Genesis 2:18) and two are better than one. (Ecclesiastes 4:9). Seems rational to me...

— Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

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In God’s Image

[This essay appeared in somewhat different form in Fellowship Papers 1989, the occasional journal of the Catholic Fellowship of the Episcopal Church.]

“Some persons view what is happening as a breakdown in fundamental relations between the sexes. Others view what is happening as a breakthrough to a nonsexist understanding of human beings who are all made in God’s image.” Rachel Wahlberg, Jesus and the Freed Woman (NY/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1978), p.2.

The greatest difficulty in the debate on sexuality is the lack of a rigorous, systematic theology. I will not attempt to develop such a theology here, but offer a possible starting point, in response to one particular flaw in current thought on the subject.

That flaw is apparent in the way in which some have been interpreting a biblical text: “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.” (Genesis 1.27) The interpretation, developed by different authors, can be expressed simply as this: that the image of God is only perfectly reflected in the union of male and female. As one bishop (Bennett Sims) once put it, “. . . the divine image in humanity is incomplete without both man and woman.”

At first glance this seems rather harmless and orthodox. Similar views have been expressed in Jewish and Christian circles in the past. “Said R. Eleazar: A man without a wife is not a complete man, as it is written: “Male and female created he them...” (Yebamot 61f) Karl Barth, adopts the notion that the divine image is only fully present in the relationship of man and woman, which he calls, “the true humanum and therefore the true creaturely image of God.” (Church Dogmatics, III/2, p. 587f.)

In Barth’s case and others, such notions stem from an effort to provide the traditional sexual ethic with a theological underpinning. This working backwards from an evolved cultural moralism to a divine mandate simply will not work. A moral theology of sexuality must respect the theology of the divine and human nature—not the other way around. Such efforts go back to Augustine of Hippo, who wrote,

...the woman, together with her own husband, is the image of God, so that the whole substance may be one image, but when she is referred to separately in her quality as a helpmeet, which regards the woman alone, then she is not the image of God, but, as regards the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined with him in one. (De Trinitate 7.7, 10)

Not only is this view illogical, but it rests upon incorrect reading of Genesis. Moreover, many ideas developed from this starting point are questionable, if not positively harmful. I will try to describe the implications and offer a response.

Looking to the text

The text is frequently misquoted as, “God created man in his image, male and female.” This reading forcibly applies the modifier, “male and female,” to the image of God. It implies an androgynous God, a God both male and female, rather than the God who is beyond and above categories, and Christ “the image of the invisible God,” in whom “there is neither male nor female.” (Colossians 1.15; Galatians 3.28)

A key to understanding the concept of being made “in his image” comes later in Genesis (in a passage that is omitted from the Eucharistic and Daily Office lectionary, and so has probably never been read by most Episcopalians):

When God created man, he made them [singular in Heb.] in the likeness of God. Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and named them [both plural] Man [Heb. Adam] when they were created. When Adam had lived a hundred and thirty years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness, after his image, and named him Seth... and he had other sons and daughters. (Genesis 5.1-4)

Adam is used here both as the name for humanity, and the personal name; it is important to note that the creating and naming apply to the whole species. Now as to Adam’s own fatherhood and image, he had fathered Cain and Abel, both male, and had other sons later, yet only Seth is described as being “in his likeness, after his image.” Seth’s sex therefore cannot be the key to his likeness (since he shared it with others before him), but some other quality (which is not explained). Perhaps the phrase means nothing more than “after his own heart”; that human beings are particularly dear to God, as Seth was dear to Adam. In any case, Scripture makes it clear that while all of God’s children, both male and female, are in God’s image and likeness, in Adam’s case only Seth among his children bore that quality—and it wasn’t because of his sex.

After all, just as Adam had sons before Seth came along, so too God created creatures with sexuality before creating human beings. (Genesis 1.22) If God had intended sexuality—maleness and femaleness (what some people call “gender” but which is better called simply “sex”)—to be especially expressive of the nature of God— it would have been better to save it for humanity.

For if sexuality were somehow chiefly or especially expressive of the divine image then we would be forced to adopt the notion that all of the animals and many of the vegetables are also created in the divine image. There may be some comfort in this for those who see God as a great Life Force rather than as the Creator of all that is, seen and unseen—including the “life force.” But sex isn’t what makes us uniquely God’s children. For what we share with the image of God is something which we believe to be unique to us as human beings—something shared by all of us yet complete in each of us. What is it? The Catechism says it best—and I would refer everyone to it before they make any more comments about our relation to the divine image—“What does it mean to be created in the image of God? It means that we are free to make choices: to love, to create, to reason, and to live in harmony with creation and with God.” Free will and love, not sex, is our share in God’s image.

All and each

Likeness to God is not simply something shared by all of humanity, but is a quality resident in each individual human. Jesus echoes this when he warns, “As you did it to one of the least of these my brethren you did it to me.” (Matthew 25.40) Every person is in the image of God, and we either honor or reject that image in our day-to-day behavior in relation to individual human beings. The plain meaning of our text is this: God created humanity “in his image”; God created both male and female, men and women. Each person is made in the image of God, and shares in a likeness to God that has nothing to do with the individual’s sex. The image is complete in each: it is, if you will, holographic. It is like the presence of Christ in the eucharist, in which the bread, though divided, remains — in each fragment — the whole Body of Christ. Each individual partakes of that Body in the same way that each individual shares in the divine image: wholly.

Generalizing the divine image and dispersing it to collective humanity opens a door for acts of oppression against individuals. Those who say they love God but hate those who bear God’s image are liars. (1 John 4.20) Equally, those who say they love “humanity” while hating individuals have fallen into a theology of the “mass man”—and the idea that God’s image is somehow best expressed by a married couple partakes of this error. It is easy to practice benevolence to groups and societies; it is often difficult to deal with individuals with tolerance and love.

Perhaps the gravest error arising from this identification of sex, or the union of the sexes, with the divine image is the way in which it effectively denies the Incarnation as defined by the Council of Chalcedon (BCP pg. 864). I’m sure Karl Barth would have been appalled to have this pointed out to him. Jesus Christ, in his divine nature, is the image of God. His human nature, which he shares with us completely and perfectly, derives entirely from Mary his mother. If Christ’s humanity is perfect and complete, he encompasses all that is human. He was a man, yet he partakes of human “substance”—that which he shares with all humanity—from Mary, a woman. His sex cannot be an essential or substantial part of his—or our—human nature, but is an instance of the “scandal of particularity” or what the philosophers would call “accident” as opposed to “substance.”

As Irenaeus said in his great work Against Heresies

If [Jesus] did not receive the substance of flesh from a human being, he neither was made man nor the Son of man; and if he was not made what we were, he did no great thing in what he suffered and endured... The Apostle Paul, moreover, declares plainly, “God sent his Son, made of a woman.” [Gal 4.4]... Superfluous too in that case is his descent into Mary, for why did he come down into her if he were to take nothing out of her?” (III.22.1f)

An Episcopal priest once told me Jesus couldn’t have been fully human if he wasn’t married; so, therefore, he must have been married, secretly. One shudders to think what the Council of Chalcedon would have done with that one.

Jesus, a man, in his human nature is of one substance with Mary, a woman, and with every man, woman and child—with all of humanity. Any theology of the imago dei which neglects Jesus Christ as its perfect exposition will be fatally flawed.

Relations and symbols

What does the Scripture tell us about the relations between male and female, on the symbolic level? Paul develops an analogy in Ephesians 5.21-33 between the relationship of Christ with the church and a man with his wife. The unity in love and obedience which exists in the “one flesh” of a man and woman reflects the mysterious relationship of love and obedience between Christ and his body, the church. There is no suggestion that “male and female” (or man and wife) have anything to do with God’s divine nature, or our human nature. Paul is building upon what for him was a natural hierarchy of love and obedience which could lead to a transcendent unity: a man loves his wife because through the sexual act they “become one flesh”; and no one hates his own flesh. Note that in conclusion Paul refers the whole concept to a higher plane, and even implies that sexuality exists merely to provide such a symbol! “I am saying that it [i.e., the “one flesh” of Genesis 2.24] refers to Christ and the church; however, let each one of you love his wife as himself, and let the wife see that she respects her husband.”

To conclude, human nature transcends individual sexuality, which is a part of the physical creation we share with animals and plants, and was created as a means to “fill the earth” (Genesis 1.28). Sex is an attribute of the individual person, not of human nature. Every person is either male or female; humanity as a whole is neither.

The divine nature is beyond sexuality; God is neither male nor female. And we too, when we become children of the resurrection, will be even as Christ is, in the place where there is no more “male and female,” no more “marrying or giving in marriage” because we will no longer need the sexuality that was created for “mutual joy..., help and comfort..., and... procreation.” (BCP pg. 423) “Those who are accounted worthy to attain to that age and to the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage, for they cannot die any more.” (Luke 20.35-36) As Aquinas said, “Types and shadows have their ending... “ When Love comes, and when we are in that Love, we will no longer need sexuality. Because “when the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away.” (1 Corinthians 13.10)

Lest anyone accuse me of dualism, or being anti-body, let me set the point straight right now. Dualism certainly exists in the church: the love-hate relationship theologians have with sexuality and generation (“the realization of the divine image” versus “the root of strife, partaking of the nature of sin”) is an outgrowth of the two creation accounts in Genesis. In the first (1.28) sexuality is part of the blessed order; in the second (3.16-4.1) it becomes tainted with pain and mortality. I do not go along with either of these extreme positions. You want dualism? You want a linkage of sex and original sin? You go to Augustine of Hippo! See, for example, Civ. Dei, XIV.15-26. The unfortunate split between will and emotion, and the linking of sexuality and original sin are both results of the Pelagian-Augustinian debates. Once Augustine decided that sexual reproduction was the means by which original sin was transmitted, it became all too easy to lay the blame for the sin upon the means by which it passed from generation to generation. Augustine goes so far as to say that it is the erect male member which transmits original sin (Sermon 151). For Augustine, sexual activity is still tainted even in a faithful marriage, even when procreation is expressly intended. Besides that, he finds the whole thing extremely distasteful. “I know of nothing which brings the manly mind down from the heights more than a woman’s caresses and the joining of bodies without which one cannot have a wife.” (On the Nature of Good 18)

I feel sorry for Augustine, in a way. He was largely a victim of a neoplatonic view of the world, unable to accept the dynamic tension of life between what St Francis de Sales called the Will of God (what God wills in the depth of God’s being) and the Good Will of God Done (the day to day realities, including the pains and failures necessitated by free will, ultimately redeemed by God). Augustine, poor man, couldn’t help confusing the imperfect with the bad.

God didn’t say creation was perfect. God did not create a perfect world, but a perfecting world. God did not create perfect beings, but created beings that were capable of becoming perfect because they were made in God’s image—having the power to choose. It was in right choosing that the road to perfection lay. Had humanity chosen obedience, they would have achieved perfection. Through the Fall they lost that ability until the time when God too became human. With this redemptive act, human beings once again become capable of reaching perfection in Christ and through Christ. All creation is awaiting the perfection of humanity, for when human beings take up the task for which they were created, the world can then be perfected. (Romans 8.19-23.) The significance of the Incarnation and At-one-ment affirm that the “happy fault” of Adam was not an incidental episode of salvation (or creation) history. Only through “one man’s obedience” could perfection be realized, a perfection realized “once and for all.”

No, God didn’t say creation was perfect; God said it was good, except for one thing: loneliness. (Genesis 2.18)

I think sex and sexuality are great. They are good, a part of God’s creation. But like a lot of other good things they are imperfect, earthly, and transient. That the risen body will be unlike the “body of death” is a promise of hope. Many things that we think are great now, many “creature comforts,” many things valued in the church, like prophecy and knowledge, will pass away. Love will remain.

Tobias Haller BSG

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On Natural Law, Briefly

I have in other posts pointed out some of my difficulties with the Natural Law tradition. I find these to be well summarized in the Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics article on the subject. I will detail my concerns here, briefly, based in part on an earlier comment to another post.

The problem begins as a matter of definition. There are at least three elements to “natural law” which are often rather carelessly confused or confounded in argument. For example, people sometimes use “natural” or “law of nature” to describe “what is” — reality. But it should surprise no one to find that I agree with those who say that “reality” as described by scientific knowledge can tell us what is, but not what should be. Science does not teach us morals. It is not, except in the most skeptical or cynical of moral systems, an instructor in morals at all. In fact, I believe science teaches us that nature is built on a principle that is in some respects the inverse of the guiding moral principle by which I abide: “Love your neighbor as yourself” — for the “natural world” is based on survival through the exploitation and use of other entities to one’s own benefit. As Whitehead observed, “Life is perpetual theft.”

So I do not look to nature for my ethics. Science can not tell us right from wrong: but it can tell us when we have advanced a premise that is discordant or incoherent with reality. For example, “Same-sexuality is wrong because it is ‘unnatural’” is false, if by “unnatural” one means, “contrary to the natural world” — for in the natural world it is quite common. That doesn’t, I hasten to add, make same-sexuality good. I’ve never made that claim; rather I hold it to be morally neutral, just like mixed-sexuality. But it does falsify the premise that it is “unnatural” in terms of not being part of the natural world.

Now, of course, my interlocutor will then advance to the second form of natural law and say, “By ‘unnatural’ I mean ‘not in concert with the ends for which sex is intended.’” This natural law position falls prey to the fallacy of begging the question, in that it rests on two prior premises, neither of which is self-evidently true: “Moral value is to be found in the use of things in advancement of the end for which they are intended” and further, “Sex is intended for procreation.” I have already demonstrated the falsehood of the latter premise, in that while sex may often result in procreation, there is ample evidence that it serves other purposes or ends having nothing to do with procreation. This is, in fact, the position of The Episcopal Church, as enunciated in the preface to the matrimonial rite, where procreation ranks third among the ends of marriage, “when it is God’s will.” It is also the reason marriage, and sexual activity within marriage, are not forbidden to infertile couples, and birth control is permitted.

The first premise, which gives moral value to the employment of organs towards specific ends, rests upon the presumed capability clearly to decide the “end” towards which any given human organ or activity is ordered, a task rendered difficult in face of the biological multitasking most organs serve; and the even greater leap which assigns moral value to such employment of the body. Is it, for example, immoral to eat low-calorie food? If so, how serious is this moral failing?

Finally, my opponent might deploy another form of natural law — “But all people inherently know it to be wrong.” This is, of course, the fallacy of argumentum ad populum, which supposes that ideas commonly held must be true. This is obviously a weak argument since it wouldn’t need to be made if it were true. This obvious weakness has not prevented this premise serving as a basis in a number of different forms of natural law arguments.

The fallback response, of course, is that those who don’t inherently know something to be wrong are morally defective — also a logical fallacy since it again assumes the premise and moreover besmirches those who disagree with it. While there are many social constructs and prejudices common in many people and many cultures, even perhaps in some cases universally (though same-sexuality fails to be indicted in this particular court) this does not make them self-evidently true.

Let me take an example. I think murder is morally wrong. I do not do so on the basis that the Bible says it is wrong, or the Church says it is wrong, or that it is “unnatural” (obviously it occurs in nature), or that all peoples and cultures know it to be wrong (many cultures exclude the willful killing of persons from the category of murder by definitional means). Rather, I think murder is wrong because it violates the premises upon which I base my ethics: Love your neighbor as yourself, and Do to others as you would be done by. In short, I do not need to appeal to any of the apparatus of natural law to tell me I should not murder anyone, as it violates the law of loving reciprocity, a law which I accept not merely on the authority of the One who gave it, but because it appears to be rationally coherent. I know of no serious arguments against it as a governing principle for an ethical system. (If there are any, I’d be happy to engage them; but again, I would want to see the premises upon which they are based laid out first.)

Compare this example of murder with the arguments adduced in the debates over sexuality, and I hope one can see the difference. The natural law approach assumes certain premises to be true, but the premises are the very things that are in question. It may not be naked circular argument, but it is certainly very scantily clad. We are spinning our wheels, and getting nowhere if the same un-agreed-upon assumptions are merely reasserted as conclusions. Perhaps we will not get anywhere except by the slow process of the death of such ideas, whose hegemony is coming slowly to an end. It took over a century for the church finally to abandon the distinction between Jew and Greek; and another millennium and a half to free itself from its unhappy acceptance of society’s division into slave and free; we now find ourselves beginning to grasp, two millennia on, that the difference between male and female is also irrelevant in Christ.

Tobias Haller BSG

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In Response to Rick

Dear Rick,

You misunderstand my point about "Hate the sin; love the sinner." I am not suggesting a simple converse, i.e., that if you love the sinner you must love his or her sin. That is a straw man. What I am saying, based on careful observation of the history of the practice, is that those who say they are merely critiquing the sin quite often end up attempting to take the role of God in judging the sinner, and punishing her. Certainly we are called to work against sin, but Jesus' sole advice on the subject is to work against it in ourselves, not in others.

As to desires, it is perfectly appropriate, as you suggest, for the Buddhist to see all of her desires as something to be suppressed and denied, or even better ignored, as the Zen school might say -- desires need not be wrestled with because they do not exist. ("no mirror, no dust.")

The Christian tradition, beginning with Augustine, appears to make a similar claim -- perpetuated in Anglican formularies -- that concupiscence is itself a partaker in sin. (The Jewish tradition, on the contrary, asserts that desire, while it may be "evil," is actually crucial in building up the world; a notion not unlike that found in Greek mythology and philosophy, in which Eros is the beginning of creation.)

Jesus' counsel is that we work on our own desires rather than trying to fix others; in fact he singled out that one desire -- the urge to "fix" others -- for condemnation. His harshest critique was directed against those who, while not entering the kingdom themselves, obstructed others by establishing a system in which people who were unable to abide by the rules so imposed gave in to despair. To cause despair in others, leading them to come to think they cannot live a Christian life, is a very serious matter. From Christ's standpoint, the most serious. By establishing and perpetuating (on very slim evidence) a tradition that proscribes the fulfillment of human desire in morally analogous ways (faithful, monogamous, permanent), to a large portion of the population (larger than many believe), on the basis of unproven concepts of natural law or the cultural traditions of a pre-scientific world, thereby leading to despair or separation from the Church for many who would seek to live a moral life on the basis of what Christ actually taught, is, as I say, a perilous and un-Christ-like course.

I do not deny that natural law has its uses. But if one is to employ it, one must be very careful that the "nature" informing the conclusions be accurate. Sound principles of logic must come into play. This is where science and human reason come in.

The problem with the Vatican's pronouncements that same-sexuality be singled out as "objectively disordered" is that it assumes to know the "order" or "purpose" for which sexuality exists, and state that same-sexuality of its nature does not fulfill that order.

Science (and human reason) challenge that claim. Leaving aside language of "purpose" (end, or goal) it is at least clear that sex does not in fact have a sole function; and that these various functions are separable in nature and, if you will, by "design." The Roman position, deriving from an inherited faulty understanding of human anthropology and biology (that the male is the "active" principle in human reproduction and the female a passive vessel, to cite only one aspect of the erroneous basis for the so-called natural law tradition), is logically incoherent, and morally flawed. Science will not tell us the "purpose" of a given phenomenon, but it can tell us when there is clearly more than one "function" possible, and logic can then open other possibilities for discussion as to purpose, end, or goal. (Of course, the tradition actually acknowledges multiple "ends" or "goods" for sexuality; but then arbitrarily says they cannot be separated from one another. As I have already shown in my previous articles, not only can they be separated, but they are -- by nature! The mouth is used for eating and speaking, and it is well not to do both at the same time. The male sexual organ also has multiple uses, and I dare say is also best used for one or the other. You see -- there is no logical basis for an "inseparability" of functions.)

I have, as I say, spelled this all out in great detail in the other articles I have posted. I have pointed out precisely why it is logically incoherent to hold that the "purpose of sexual acts is procreation." (When sex was wrongly understood as the planting of a seed in fertile soil, male homosexuality was seen as a grave fault, and female homosexuality went unmentioned -- this in itself reveals a major flaw in the "moral" understanding of sex.) You have responded to these with the same reassertions again and again, never once offering any clear evidence for the truth of the traditional and flawed "natural law" argument other than its mere restatement. I'd be glad just for a simple answer to the question, "Why can the various functions of sexuality not be separated?" or "Why is a same-sex relationship more culpable than an infertile mixed-sex relationship?" I have yet to receive an answer.

By the way, have you noticed how the very notion of "purpose" is itself an instance of concupiscence? A Buddhist, at least of the Zen school, would say that purposefulness is itself a result of desire, and hence flawed. Given we are not Buddhists, I have articulated the "purposes" of same-sexuality as the establishment of stable relationships, the care of children (though the Vatican thinks this impossible, too), the gift of one person to another (also denied by the Vatican, which sees same-sexuality as inherently "selfish" -- though without explanation) and so on. These are all functions and/or purposes. Who is to say these functions or purposes are less "moral" than mere breeding -- which, when separated from these other purposes is hardly commendable in and of itself. (It has long been noted that in elevating procreation to a position of prominence, the tradition inadvertently assigned moral weight to a biological function we share with animals. It is the human capacity for love, fidelity, and self-giving that has moral value, not the capacity to breed. More questions for you: Does breeding gain a moral value when carried out by persons? If so, what is the moral value? What is moral about it?)

Speaking of the Vatican, I reviewed the document "The Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons" yesterday. It is full of logical fallacies and begged questions; assertions dressed as truths. It also indulges in some very questionable theology. (The relation of the society of persons in marriage to the inner life of the Trinity is, for example, a wild notion when applied to sexuality. One would think the suggestion of linking sex with the relationship of the Father and the Son would send up red flags all over the place! Yet this is blandly suggested in the document. The notion that the image of God resides in the society of male and female, also advanced by John Paul II, is a direct contradiction of orthodox doctrine, as spelled out in Aquinas. This is the phenomenon I have noted before: the tendency to do bad theology when seeking to bolster an argument against same-sexuality -- and a sure sign the argument is faulty.)

So, Rick, that is the lay of the land. I reject the Roman teaching on this subject as logically incoherent. That does not mean you and others are barred from accepting it; but you must do so on the basis of faith in the Magisterium rather than on the basis of reason -- unless you can provide a reasonable argument that stands up to examination and doesn't beg the question. If you would like to assay a response to any of the questions I raised above (in boldface), I'd be glad to see what you have to say.

Tobias Haller BSG

God’s Judgment on Heterosexuality

and the Church’s Caring Response

Saturday Satire

by Tobias Haller BSG

[This satirical piece made its first appearance on my Geocities website nearly 15 years ago. Since then it has appeared in a number of forms around the web, including translations into Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and what I think must be Hungarian. A shorter version also appeared in the "Marriage" issue of The Witness in December 1995. It has occasionally been plagiarized. I thought now might be an appropriate time formally to introduce it to the blogosphere. And so, here it is, along with its original short caveat:]

Caveat lector: The following is intended as a work of irony. The author is particularly anxious that readers not impute to him any of the opinions expressed therein. While he agrees with some premises and conclusions advanced, many are far from consistent with his attitude or opinions. The author does, however, feel that what follows is no more selective in its use of Scripture, casual in its logic, condescending in its attitude, erroneous in its conclusions--nor less guilty of asserting bare notions as if self-evident truths--than countless similar essays prepared by the committees, congregations, curiae, and theologians of the numerous scattered members of Christ's church.

Introduction

The church is faced today with a pastoral problem of significant gravity. It has become more and more apparent that many heterosexuals have come to consider themselves to be faithful members of the church, while committing acts at variance with the church's solemn teaching. The problem is far from new; both the Scriptural witness, and the unbroken tradition of the church attest to the ongoing nature of this tragic discontinuity. The matter has only come to the renewed attention of the church in recent years due to the efforts by some heterosexuals who seek not only to defend but to justify their behavior.

Origins in Creation

The inability of heterosexuals to form lasting, stable relationships has long been noted. A survey of the biblical material provides a sad witness to this inability -- and one explanation for its source -- in God's judgment upon Adam and Eve. This judgment provides a climax to the creation account in Genesis (3.16) and may therefore be taken as substantive testimony to God's eternal plan for humanity. This passage explains the tragic inability of heterosexuals to work together as equals: the female is cursed by being placed under male rule, rather than coexisting as the full and equal partner that a healthy and life-giving relationship requires. This divinely mandated order or hierarchy -- which has institutionalized a veritable "civil war of the sexes" -- fosters the incapacity for mutuality that renders stable heterosexual relationships nearly impossible -- a fitting punishment for the failure to act in obedience to the God who welcomed his creatures into a relationship based on mutual trust and responsibility.

The rest of the biblical material portrays the unfortunate consequence of this constitutional incapacity. Even the patriarch Abraham, who in all other respects was a model of fidelity, was willing to deny his wife and turn her over as a potential concubine. (Gen. 12.13) The overwhelming majority of heterosexual relationships portrayed in Scripture are devoid of any appearance of human care, affection, mutuality, concern, or love. Few of the heterosexual relationships that do evince a degree of personal commitment are monogamous. For example, Elkanah shows real fondness for his barren wife Hannah, but not enough to refrain from having a second wife to bear him children. One is hard pressed to find even a handful of faithful, loving, lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual relationships in the whole of Scripture.

We must remember, however, that God's power is perfected in weakness. The people of Israel departed from the true path time and again, yet were capable of repentance and redemption. So too, God will be patient with erring heterosexuals who repent of their sinful behavior and return to God. The analogy between Israel's corporate misbehavior and the personal behavior of heterosexuals is firmly and dramatically linked in Scripture: heterosexual adultery and prostitution are types of idolatry on Israel's part throughout the prophetic and poetic literature, so much so that at times it is difficult to determine if the acts under condemnation are cultic or sexual in nature. The heterosexual activity (real or figurative) is almost always paired with a call to repentance, and an offer of divine forgiveness. A striking example of this in the New Testament is Jesus' forgiveness of the woman taken in adultery. The Lord forgives her, while making it clear he considers her behavior to be "sin." This is one of the few times the Gospel directly and specifically designates any behavior by the title of "sin." Indeed, of all specific individual acts identified in the Gospel as "sin," half are heterosexual in nature; the others relate to the denial and betrayal of Jesus himself. It is a sign of God's great mercy that the former sins are forgiven while the latter are retained: this fact should serve as a reminder of the gravity of heterosexual sin in God's eyes as well as God's patience with the sinner.

Disease and the other consequences of heterosexual acts

It is incumbent upon the church to avoid suggesting that the high frequency of infant mortality, death in childbirth (which until the introduction of antiseptic procedures was common worldwide), and sexually transmitted disease represent in some way God's specific punishment of individual heterosexuals for their sinful behavior. All human beings share in common mortality, fall prey to disease throughout their lives, and ultimately suffer death. Disease and death may therefore be seen as a tragic consequence of Original Sin rather than of the particular sins of any individual or group.

However, we would be negligent in our task were we to fail to note the biblical witness on this matter. The "knowledge" of good and evil that results from tasting the fruit of the forbidden tree is intimately linked with the shame in nakedness that leads to the effort to conceal the secondary sexual characteristics that distinguish heterosexuals. The taking of the fruit of knowledge leads almost immediately to Adam's first heterosexual experience after the Fall, in which he "knows" his wife. The Fall also results in God's double curse upon Eve: sexual longing for her husband coupled with submission to his domination, rendering a mature love based on equality virtually impossible.

In God's judgment upon Eve, travail in childbirth is singled out as a means to punish womankind for having led mankind astray (Gen. 3.16). It is true that this judgment is partially deferred in the Deuteropauline literature, where it is promised that a woman believer will be "brought safely through childbirth"; that is, a woman's faith will preserve her through this difficult trial, her faith serving as a balance to Eve's primal infidelity. (1 Tim. 2.12-15) Finally, though we refrain from making any direct connection at this point, it must also be acknowledged that at least one instance of child mortality is explicitly related to heterosexual sin: the death of the child born of the illicit heterosexual liaison between David and Uriah the Hittite's wife. (2 Sam 12.14)

Thus procreation, while necessary for the continuance of the human species, is forever tinged with shame, imbalance, and danger as a result of the actions of the first heterosexuals. Heterosexuality is shot through-and-through with mortality, and in the New Testament becomes a type for the world that is passing away. Jesus affirms, in Luke 20.34-35, that heterosexuality -- "marrying and giving in marriage" -- belong to this age, and that those who are worthy of a share in the life of the world to come do not become entangled in the snares of this sort of behavior. While the church has not gone so far as to take Jesus literally at his word on this point, a degree of caution is nonetheless prudent. Jesus' preference for and counsel to celibacy is both a choice and a sign of the Kingdom in which heterosexuality will cease to exist, and, in his words, those worthy of resurrection will be like angels, freed from the mortality for which heterosexual procreation was the remedy. (Luke 20.36)

Moreover, it would be irresponsible of the church not to warn heterosexuals of the dire medical consequences their behavior might cause. When medical conditions (childbed fever, sexually transmitted disease, ectopic pregnancy, cervical cancer, and so on) can clearly and directly be linked with a preventable form of behavior the church is obliged to provide at least warning and counsel to avoid such acts, if possible.

Relevance of biblical material

Many today would argue that the injunctions placed upon heterosexual contact in the Law of Moses are no longer relevant to a discussion of heterosexuality. We must point out, however, the general ritual opprobrium attached to heterosexual acts. All heterosexual acts render both parties unclean at any time, due to emission of semen (Lev 15.18), and abominable at other times, due to contact with menstrual blood. (Lev 15.24, 20.18) The continued fervent condemnation of the latter abomination in the prophetic literature (Ezek. 18.5-13; 22.10), and in church tradition down through the ages (e.g., the Didascalia, Jerome, Clement of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, and Thomas Aquinas) warrants our caution in discarding the Mosaic material as simply "cultural baggage."

Heterosexual Behavior vs. the Heterosexual Condition

Some argue that while heterosexual behavior is sinful, the heterosexual condition is not, and that heterosexuals are capable of leading normal, full, and happy lives within the moral framework determined by the church.

While this is to a large extent an accurate understanding, the church must also warn of the dangers of sin at the level of volition that precedes action. Both the Old and New Testaments warn of the insidious nature of such heterosexual sin. The Tenth Commandment (Exod 20.17) clearly places the mental act of coveting one's neighbor's wife in the same moral universe as outright adultery. Jesus repeats and emphasizes this connection in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5.28). Given this Scriptural witness it is difficult to see that heterosexual inclination is in any way less culpable than heterosexual action, unless involuntary and immediately rejected by an exercise of the will and moral judgment. Such an understanding must rule as sinful, therefore, all pornographic or semi-pornographic material so widely available in our society. (The latter includes much advertising that appears, at first, to be completely unrelated to heterosexuality, but uses a heterosexual subtext in order to market a product.)

The church may be informed, if not guided, by the findings of science on this issue. However, the scientific community is not yet in full agreement as to the etiology of heterosexuality, or the treatment of its more egregious manifestations. While it appears that heterosexual behavior is to a large extent genetically conditioned, and early environmental factors play a significant part in its development -- for neither of which an individual could be held responsible -- still the possibility to refuse to engage in heterosexual acts is always available to the adult person capable of exercising reasonable and free choice. Despite the intensity of the heterosexual inclination, the exercise of the will and moral judgment can assist all but the most clinically unstable heterosexual from committing acts judged to be immoral by the church. Because of this, there can be no question about the position the church must take when dealing with unrepentant, avowed, overt and open heterosexuals who not only commit such acts, but go so far as to brag about the number of their sexual liaisons (many of them made through contacts in such sordid institutions as "singles bars"). The danger to the young -- quite apart from the risk of becoming objects of predatory heterosexuals, and perhaps by this means being recruited to their ranks -- is multiplied by the bad example heterosexuals might present if their behavior were to be mistakenly considered worthy of emulation. For this reason, any toleration of heterosexuals or heterosexuality must be examined with great care and precise clarity, lest the wrong message be sent to our young people, who represent the future of the church and society.

The marriage of heterosexuals

Given the statistics on infidelity, divorce, abortion, rape, the abuse of spouses and the predatory assault upon children by heterosexuals, it would appear that few heterosexuals are capable of the fundamental, mutual self-giving required to support a lifelong, committed relationship. The biblical material on this matter is again unambiguous. When Jesus told the disciples that the only permissible exercise of heterosexual behavior was within the context of a lifelong, faithful, monogamous marriage, his disciples exclaimed that it was impossible. Jesus went on to assert that while not impossible, it was a supernatural gift only a few could be expected to accept. (Matt. 19.10-11)

The Pauline material does not forbid heterosexual marriage, but certainly does not encourage it. Paul's preferential option is for abstinence. Paul spent much of his ministry dealing with the weaknesses of heterosexuals in the early church, counseling them, if at all possible, to avoid entering marriages he knew few of them would be able to sustain, yet allowing it for those unable to control themselves. (1 Cor 7) At the same time, Paul warned against any heterosexual activity outside marriage. Clearly this creates a pastoral dilemma for the church, and an opportunity to exercise forgiveness for those incapable --through no fault other than the constitutional weakness that afflicts so many heterosexuals -- of achieving the highest standards of Christian behavior.

The ordination of heterosexuals

The question of the ordination of active heterosexuals is not a new one. While it appears that some apostles were married (Mark 1.30), Paul clearly regards the practice with unconcealed condescension. (1 Cor 9.5) The Deuteropauline material relents slightly, and allows bishops to be married "only once." (1 Tim. 3.2) The early church allowed married persons to be ordained, except those who had gone so far to marry twice, even after being widowed; and any ordained person who sought to marry was deposed. It was soon found that stricter regulation of heterosexual tendencies was required, and the catholic church, in its wisdom, determined within a few centuries of its institutional life that bishops (and in the West, all clergy) should permanently abstain from all heterosexual activity. Since the Reformation, some churches have decided once again to permit avowed, open and active heterosexuals to serve as ministers, often with disastrous consequences, as the natural tendency toward infidelity and instability evinced by so many heterosexuals emerges in socially and morally inappropriate ways.

The heterosexual agenda

Even considering the church's call to forgiveness and understanding, it would be highly inappropriate to support the so-called "heterosexual agenda" in the secular arena. The church was, to a certain extent, taken unawares when the greatest victory of the heterosexual special interest group was achieved: the liberalization of divorce laws in many parts of the world. Similarly, heterosexual lobbyists have been hard at work mounting efforts to decriminalize heterosexual acts still forbidden by statute in many states, to lower the age of consent for sexual activity between persons of the opposite sex, and to legalize prostitution and the distribution of pornography. Heterosexuals are also fervent in their efforts to retain the special rights that they have managed to secure, rights not afforded to other citizens.

The heterosexual lobby operates politically, but a more insidious influence may well be through the disproportionate heterosexual representation in the entertainment field and in the media. Heterosexuals hold tight control over almost every communications medium, and the proportion of content favorable to heterosexuality is overwhelming. Scarcely a television program or film is released to the public without at least one major heterosexual character, often the hero or heroine, and the effects of this culture-war are already becoming evident in moves towards greater toleration of heterosexual excesses. A sign of the influence of the heterosexual movement is the growing use of the term "straight" to describe heterosexuals. This novel meaning given to a perfectly ordinary word is an example of the attempt to "mainstream" the heterosexual lifestyle, and it is fundamentally misleading -- relationships as intricate, complicated and twisted as those of most heterosexuals would scarcely be called "straight" in the ordinary sense of the word.

The church and the heterosexual

The church is not only competent to forgive the moral error involved in heterosexual acts, it is also able to appeal to the state for mercy and some consideration of the broken condition of the heterosexual offender. The church should model its behavior on Christ, who while acknowledging the sinfulness of the woman taken in adultery, enjoined the crowd to remit the punishment justly due to her. However, it would be improper for the church to seek completely to prevent the exercise of secular law, which may serve--if not as a corrective--at least as a warning of the consequences of immorality.

Conclusion

After all is said and done, we continue to affirm that heterosexuals, despite the sinfulness of their behavior, are children of God, and worthy of our care and pastoral concern. They are more to be pitied than censured. With the pastoral care and counsel of the church, firm in its resolve that there will be no outcasts, they may grow to that "full stature of mature manhood in Christ" promised to all faithful believers.

Promulgated by the Sacred Congregation for the Defense of What I Say is True is True Because I Say It

Copyright © 1994 T. S. Haller BSG

7. Remedial Reading

Previous articles in this series (The Sex Articles — see the links in the sidebar) examined the various “causes” or goods or ends of marriage, as laid out in the preface to the marriage liturgy in the Book of Common Prayer, and how these same goods or ends might conceivably find a place within the context of a same-sex relationship. I have argued that such a relationship is capable of providing mutual joy, comfort, and human society no less than a mixed-sex marriage, and is capable of fulfilling some of the ends of procreation, certainly no less than an infertile mixed-sex marriage. In the previous article I addressed the symbolic weight assigned to marriage in the Christian tradition and explored a number of ways in which similar symbolic value can be borne by a same-sex relationship that is equally loving, permanent, and faithful.

I have noted that our present Prayer Book marriage liturgy reintroduces these arguments in favor of marriage — arguments which had been removed in the 1789 revision (the prevailing rationalism of the day felt a supporting case for the institution was unnecessary). However, one of the “causes” from the 1662 version (in use at the time of our ecclesiastical and civil independence) was not restored. This is ironic, because it is the “cause” with a strong scriptural basis, playing a significant part in the most extensive biblical reflection on the institution of marriage, and offering a rationale for the continuance of an institution to which the apostolic church in general gave otherwise only luke-warm endorsement. This is marriage as a “remedy for fornication” — as described in Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians (7:1-9, which I cite here from the Authorized Version):

Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me: It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. Let the husband render unto the wife due benevolence: and likewise also the wife unto the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife. Defraud ye not one the other, except it be with consent for a time, that ye may give yourselves to fasting and prayer; and come together again, that Satan tempt you not for your incontinency. But I speak this by permission, and not of commandment. For I would that all men were even as I myself. But every man hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that. I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn.

This passage is significant for a number of reasons, not least for the way Paul describes celibacy as a gift not all possess. Paul recognizes that sexual desire is not only powerful, but that it has an appropriate outlet for those who lack the gift to contain themselves in celibacy: marriage. It is in large part from this biblical source that we see marriage described in the Anglican tradition (Articles of Religion XXV, XXXIII) as a state of life allowed in Scripture. The purpose of the authors of the Articles of Religion was not to find Scriptural validation for an institution that had existed in most human cultures in one form or another (validation was dealt with in the expansive Preface to the marriage rite); rather it was to distinguish marriage from the Two Sacraments of the Gospel, and to assert that it was permitted to clergy.

Paul similarly explicitly permits, rather than commands, marriage, and clearly wishes all could be celibate, as he is. But he recognizes the inappropriateness of demanding celibacy from those incapable of living within its constraints.

From the Pauline perspective, then, marriage is, among other things, a license to have sex. It authorizes something that without such authorization would be sinful. It is, in short, for the vast majority of people, who approach the altar as former virgins, a way of blessing sin — and thereby removing its sinfulness. They are permitted to perform (or continue to perform) what before would have been (or was) sinful. Marriage may not cover a multitude of sins, but it covers at least one: fornication (loosely, and from a biblical perspective rather incorrectly, defined as “sex outside of marriage.”)

Stopping the allowance

So can a similar allowance be made for same-sex relationships? Some will at this point say that same-sex relationships cannot be permitted now because they were not “allowed” in Scripture then. They hold that the prohibitions on homosexuality render such an approbation permanently impossible. I will address these negative texts more extensively in the following reflections; here I want to deal with the absence of approbation rather than the purported prohibition.

To understand the biblical (especially the Pauline) view, we must recognize that marriage was a civil institution, a civil option for Jews and Christians. Paul, in particular, recognizes it as the civil option, as well as the moral one, as it counters promiscuity and prostitution (both legally permitted and regulated under Roman law, though widely held to be moral failings). Paul allows participation in this civil institution of marriage even if he does not encourage it.

Same-sexuality fell into the same category as prostitution under Roman law — regulated and in some cases permitted, but seen, especially by Stoics and other moralists, as a failing. Same-sex marriage was not a civil norm in the cultures amongst which Judaism and Christianity came into being. Although same-sexuality existed in many cultures of the ancient world with which Judaism and Christianity were familiar — including, in spite of the protests, Jewish cultures — the phenomenon of lifelong and exclusive same-sex relationships was very rare (or to be more precise, rarely recorded, so that there is little evidence of it), and civil recognition in the form of marriage even rarer. Mixed-sex marriage, on the other hand, was a recognized institution — and although the differences between Jewish, Roman and Christian marriage customs were in some conflict (as Jewish law allowed polygamy and divorce, and Roman law forbade polygamy though it allowed concubinage and divorce), the early Christians accepted the Roman rule and Jewish ideal of monogamy, but frowned upon concubinage and divorce, largely following the opinions of the more moralistic philosophers and legislators of the time.

Thus the marriage of which Saint Paul speaks is marriage as it existed in the civil state, under Roman hegemony, which in the time of Augustus and Tiberius exalted values of hearth and home — even if the emperors themselves often failed to live up to the principles in practice. There was, in Paul’s time, no equivalent for same-sex marriage, even had he been of a mind to recognize it.

Applying old advice to a present situation

So it is very unlikely that Paul understood or grasped the possibility of people wanting to live in a life-long same-sex union. Some have suggested that Paul was aware of sexual orientation, but I find there to be little evidence to support even this claim, let alone any awareness of whatever same-sex marriages might have existed. There are still, after all, a few skeptics around even today who deny that sexual orientation exists, or who say that there is no need to grant “special” recognition to same-sex relationships since all people are free to marry a person of the opposite sex. (It is especially ironic that some who on one hand will deny same-sex orientation exists will on the other posit that Paul knew about it and rejected it.)

Regardless of such glib dismissals, many others have recognized that homosexual orientation, and the desire to which it gives rise to express one’s a love for a person of the same sex in a physical way, is not any more likely to be combined with a gift of celibacy than is heterosexual orientation. (Some conservatives claim that homosexual men are “by nature” more promiscuous than heterosexuals. Their evidence derives largely from anecdotal evidence, or discredited research.) But many have noted — even among the conservatives who reflect upon this issue — that it is irrational as well as unjust to suggest that gay and lesbian persons should be held to a standard in effect stricter than the one applied to heterosexuals; that is, to demand permanent celibacy for all gay and lesbian people, especially while tolerating less than punctilious observance of the same biblical standard for mixed-sex couples, many if not most of whom engage in premarital sex, occasional affairs, or serial monogamy through the unbiblical provision of divorce. For even if many people are promiscuous, there are others who wish to be faithful.

A more tolerant view within church or state does not necessitate the recognition of same-sex relationships as either marriage or matrimony, that is, as either civil or sacred in exactly the same way and to the same extent as mixed-sex marriage. But some form of recognized permanent commitment can be seen to be appropriate as an application of Paul’s teaching that “it is better to marry than to burn” to a situation which Paul himself may well have found inconceivable. Some, such as the Rev Fleming Rutledge, have reflected on the question in this way:

I have great respect and reverence for people who maintain celibacy if they are unmarried, divorced or widowed. This certainly remains the classical Christian standard. However, I do not believe that many people are granted the gift of celibacy. Even St. Paul, who put a high value on celibacy, recognized this in his teaching on marriage. I therefore believe we must find a way to support healthier lifestyles for Christian gay people who are beset every day by invitations to participate in the anonymity and promiscuity of the street, the bathhouse, the bar and the club. We will do well, I think to make an honored place for the devoutly Christian gay people who sincerely want fidelity and stability in their lives insofar as that is possible for them. These couples are in the distinct minority and it seems to me that we should support them in their wish to carve out a more responsible style of life. I therefore agree (I think) with those who say that we should be discussing the possibility of some sort of blessing for gay couples who fit this description not because the culture is demanding this, but because the church has been thinking about this for some time now. (From a December 2003 presentation to a parish facing division on the issue of homosexuality).

Although she stops short of supporting same-sex marriage, then, Rutledge is willing to recognize the human damage caused by unreasonable expectations or requirements, and the moral danger of a double standard (as evidence shows only a “distinct minority” of heterosexuals actually adhere to the rules of stability and fidelity). However, if “marriage” can be understood in the many forms the institution has taken (some of which would now be held to be immoral if not illegal) it appears to me that it is quite possible to apply Paul’s allowance — “If they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn” — to a situation he would not have been capable of imagining — at least in his own time.

WWSPD

What would Saint Paul do — today? Is this a reasonable question, and to what extent are speculations about what Saint Paul might have thought or done — apart from what we actually know he said or did — relevant to the present discussion?

We do not know what Saint Paul would say today, assuming he were supplied with all the relevant information concerning human sexuality and psychology of which he was ignorant. Doubtless Saint Paul, in his own culture and time, would not have applied this rule of “let them marry” to same-sex couples. There is no evidence that he had any awareness or understanding of sexual orientation. On the contrary, his only extended comment on male homosexuality in Romans 1 describes it as an unnatural perversity attendant upon idolatry. (Aside note: I follow Saint Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.20, in thinking “their females” who have “exchanged the natural use for the unnatural” are not lesbian. Rather, they are women who allow their husbands to use the opening that is “along side the natural” i.e., generative, one; the husbands then, having abandoned what is “natural with females” turn on each other and “similarly” take advantage of this newfound versatility. This is how Augustine reads the passage, and in support of this reading I suggest it to be unlikely for a biblical or rabbinic Jew — and Paul was both — to think lesbian sex and gay sex are “similar” — one was subject on rabbinic grounds to chastisement, the other on biblical grounds to capital punishment. Saint Augustine himself regarded lesbianism as a far less serious matter than male homosexuality: see Letter 211.14 where he refers to women’s “shameful frolic and sporting with one another” as unseemly for married women and thus much more out of place in nuns! Similarly, the [vague and inaccurate] term sodomy classically referred to all sorts of non-procreative sexuality whether between men and women or only between men, or men with animals — but with very few exception not generally to lesbian sex. “Homosexuality” as a category including men and women is a relatively modern invention; the Mediterranean cultures of the ancient world regarded lesbian sex as in quite a different category altogether from male homosexuality — as, indeed, these cultures regarded women and men very differently in most aspects of life.)

Still, some argue that Paul knew about homosexual orientation and intended explicitly to reject it. Those such as N.T. Wright and R. Gagnon, who argue that Paul must have been familiar with Plato’s Symposium, and Aristophanes’ myth to explain varieties of sexual orientation (or at least preference), are on very shaky ground, as Paul’s writings reveal little or no familiarity with Plato — as if he would take such pagan (and satirical) speculation seriously even if he were familiar with it! However, Paul may have known nothing of Plato at all, as Plato was, outside of Alexandria, long out of fashion in the philosophical world with which Paul was likely familiar — including that of the Stoics, whose thinking is consistent with (though not necessarily a source for) what Paul concludes in Romans 1.

Rather than making questionable surmises about what Saint Paul might say, given his particular gifts and limitations, we should instead look to him for the moral value of what he said, concerning the role of sex within the context of the only kind of faithful, life-long sexual relationship with which we know he was familiar, as a means to cement the relationship and prevent wandering outside it.

Now that we have a better and more accurate understanding of the reality of sexual orientation (quite apart from whether it is genetic — which is actually irrelevant to the discussion), it makes more sense to apply the underlying principles of Paul’s teaching accordingly, much as we apply other underlying principles of scriptural wisdom to changed cultural contexts.

It seems to me that it is better for the church, and for society, to encourage the recognizable biblical virtues of fidelity and mutual support in same-sex relationships, than to hold all gay and lesbian persons to a rigid standard few heterosexuals are able to maintain.

A summary

Thus far I have examined the traditional rationale for Christian marriage and sought to examine the ways in which this rationale can be applied to same-sex relationships. There should be no doubt that from the secular perspective of civil marriage, the state has no compelling interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage any more than it would have in prohibiting mixed-sex marriage in which the couple is incapable of having children. On the contrary, the civil interest in a stable society represents a positive rationale for the provision of civil marriage to same-sex couples, as a preventative to promiscuity (to the extent, of course, that people remain faithful to their vows: no covenant will of itself cause obedience).

When it comes to children, there is no indication (on the basis of many studies and meta-studies) that same-sex couples are any less able to raise their own, adopted or foster children than mixed-sex couples, regardless of any biological connection with the parents. Society provides ample role models apart from biological or foster parents — and in any case many children spend much of their childhood and infancy under the care of adults other than their parents. Need I also note that Scripture provides one particularly striking example of foster-fatherhood. Clearly an increase in the number of stable same-sex couples could be a boon to finding loving homes for unwanted or orphaned children.

When it comes to the religious and moral values imputed to marriage, I have shown that the ability to bear children is universally held to be optional — that is, no Christian tradition of which I am aware requires fertility prior to allowing marriage, or childbirth within marriage as a condition for its continuance. Procreation is thus not an essential element of marriage.

I have demonstrated that the concept of fleshly union is ambivalent, and that the argument against same-sexuality from a purported complementarity of the sexes is specious; and that same-sex couples can enjoy a mutual union that expresses joy, delight, and the self-giving love that is the object of marriage. I have shown that such relationships are capable of bearing symbolic weight in reflecting the goodness of God in relationship to the church, but more importantly the ideal of Christian love within the church. Finally, in this essay, I have reflected briefly upon the stabilizing influence that the recognition of same-sex relationships might provide within ecclesiastical as well as social contexts.

Although I have touched upon them briefly in these essays and in the responses to the many comments these articles have elicited, I have not directly addressed the purported scriptural objections to same-sexuality, which some would hold to render moot all of the discussion up to now. In the next sections of this reflection I will address the content and force of the scriptural case — both against and for same-sexuality — at greater length.

Tobias Haller BSG

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The Scriptural discussion begins in the next section of this series, Scripture and its Witness.

Further Update: This post and those that follow, expanded and supplemented with much additional material, form part of Reasonable and Holy, published by Seabury Books and available on order from Church Publishing Incorporated.