A different slope

Last week I was drawn into a Facebook conversation with an English Evangelical. As always, I found it helpful and informative, not the least for confirming my sense that the general trend of my thinking is in the right direction.

The conversation arose in response to a recently publicized instance of polyamory — a trio of women whom the press said had “married.” This led to some “I told you so” fulfillment of the slippery slope: the promise that permission for same-sex marriage would open the floodgates to all sorts of other sexual variations. I’ve addressed this argument, and the logical fallacy of which it is an instance, elsewhere, and won’t repeat my comments here beyond the simple evidence that polyamory made its first appearance in the seventh generation from Adam, so blaming the gays seems an effort to close a barn door opened by someone else.

However, this was not the thesis that engendered the discussion. It was the more nuanced suggestion, “The arguments used in support of same-sex marriage can also be used to support polyamory.” This is a slope of a different slip, a logical fallacy so far as concerns addressing the validity of the arguments in question. That does not mean the phenomenon does not happen — a logical fallacy may still describe a true situation; but it remains a fallacy because it does not address the underlying argument.

As I noted on Facebook,

The thesis takes the form: Argument X in favor of Y is wrong because it can also be used in favor of Z. In the present instance, the claim is that arguments advanced in favor of same-sex marriage fail because those same arguments can be used to support, in this case, polygamy.
There are a number of problems with this thesis. Most importantly, it does not in fact disprove the validity of Argument X, but merely observes that the same argument may be employed in another case. Mere antipathy to that other case (which may reflect antipathy towards the first case) is in itself irrelevant. In reality, arguments that support things one holds to be good can also be used to support conclusions one feels are bad.

Let me raise a case where I think the thesis is true, even if fallacious. The libertarian argument in favor of same-sex marriage (or anything else, as it is less an argument than an ideology) takes the form, “People should be allowed to marry if they love each other and are doing no harm to others.” The same argument can be applied to polygamy, and very likely has been. But even though that is the case, it doesn’t actually prove the argument to be wrong, in either case. A whole separate debate on the virtues of libertarianism would need to be entered; and I think most people are neither fierce absolute libertarians nor equivalently doctrinaire authoritarians. In practical terms most people would, I think, given the popularity of another ideology, utilitarianism, home in on whatever alleged “harm to others” might result from any given action. (And however popular and common, a debate on the virtues of utilitarianism would also need take place!) So I concur that a libertarian argument may in fact have wider application than intended — but it may still apply in relation to the action and the harm that are the real subject of debate. If one wishes to debate the principle of liberty or utility themselves, that will have to be a separate discussion.

Getting back to arguments that I have actually encountered in the same-sex marriage debate, one of the principle arguments against it revolves around procreation. Again, I’ve dealt with the merits of that argument elsewhere at considerable length and won’t repeat it here except to note that the overlap between procreation and marriage is incomplete, on both sides.

But the proffered example of procreation can serve as a case in point in the larger question of arguments in favor of things one likes being used to support things one does not. For while procreation is cited as one of the “causes” for marriage, it can also be used as an argument in favor of polygamy.

This is not an abstract thought experiment, but a reality. Jewish law holds the command to “be fruitful and multiply” as binding on all men and women. This leads directly to polygamy in the case where a man’s wife cannot conceive (or has not conceived); Scripture provides case studies as with Elkanah, Peninnah and Hannah, and also that of Abraham (although Hagar remains a concubine rather than a formal wife). The necessity to procreate also leads to the Levirate law in which a childless widow is to be impregnated by her brother-in-law. This law figures in salvation history in the person of Ruth and Boaz; and when the question of the Levirate law is raised to Jesus by the Sadducees, he does not speak against it, in principle, though he does aver that marriage is a thing of this world. Closer to the Anglican homestead, observe the extent to which Henry Rex’s concern for the succession led him to employ, and then reject, the Levirate law; and even briefly, so it is said, to contemplate plural marriage — precisely what the pope accused him of undertaking when he married “Anne of a thousand days.”

On the other side, a negative argument involving procreation is often advanced against same-sex marriage, as a kind of Kantian categorical imperative: that if everyone practiced it the human race would cease to exist. However, the same argument can be advanced against celibacy. Again, this is not merely theoretical, but (in keeping with the understanding of the "first commandment" to multiplication of the human species) forms part of the groundwork for the opprobrium attached to celibacy in mainstream rabbinic Judaism.

Ultimately we owe to the scholastic church the fine argument that the command to procreation is addressed to the species as a whole, not to all individual members of it. This let the celibates off the hook, but the application to family planning has run aground on the shoals of natural law — another example of the fact that arguments can be applied to different concerns with very different results.

In summary, then, it would appear that arguments ought to be weighed on their own merits, not on ancillary or subsidiary possible circumstances. Those represent slopes down which it is not at all necessary to slip.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Of Fallacy and Falsehood

One of the things I have found so unsatisfactory in discussions on sexuality is the fallaciousness that makes up so much of the argument from the conservative perspective. I am not saying that the conclusions the conservatives reach are necessarily false — but that their arguments often are not really arguments. That is, they may begin with true premises and reach true conclusions, but the mode of getting from one to the other is not properly formed, and fails to prove what it intends to prove. One can, after all, reach a true conclusion by faulty means — but proof of the truth of a conclusion must rest on a train of what Hooker called “demonstrative reason.”

Let me give a simple example of a fallacious argument with a true conclusion. Let us for the sake of simplicity accept A and B as true. (It is admitted that a cat can lose a leg or two and still be a cat!)

A: Cats have four legs.
B: Augusta has four legs.
C: Augusta is a cat.

I hope you can see the problem with this syllogism. C is quite true (you can see from the photo!) but it does not follow from A and B by legitimate logic. It happens to be true, but not because of the argument! The proper syllogism, reaching a true conclusion if both A and B are true would be:

A: Cats have four legs.
B: Augusta is a cat.
C: Augusta has four legs.

So the problem with logical fallacies isn’t that they might not express a truth from time to time — much like Alice’s stopped clock which is right twice a day.* The problem is that a fallacious argument doesn’t actually prove anything, does not establish a truth by reasonable means.

There are, of course, literally dozens of logical fallacies — and you can find helpful summaries of them, with all their fancy Latin names, on any number of web-sites simply by searching for the terms logical and fallacy. Those who have followed the debates and discussions on sexuality will no doubt see how often certain of these fallacies are employed.

Perhaps the principal fallacy is the one that assumes the conclusion as a premise: “Same-sex marriage is impossible because marriage requires a man and a woman.” This may simply be a prevailing weakness of being a “reasserter” — some of whom become quite defensive when asked to do more than simply to reassert, and to demonstrate the truth of their premises as well as their conclusions.

Also common are the twin fallacies of reliance upon length of time a belief is held, or the number of persons who hold it. Neither, of course, proves something to be true; the antiquity or popularity of a tradition may simply show just how wrong people can be, once a truly reasonable examination of the premise or conclusion is undertaken.

The reason I raise this is that I long for a decent argument, but often find myself caught up either in a Monty Python-like cycle of mere contradiction, or facing a tangle of assorted logical fallacies.

Nor, of course, does simply noting the fallaciousness of an argument disprove the truth of a proposition; the problem is that argument requires more than a simple train of assertion and contradiction, but engagement with the substance of the premises to test their soundness. This is to say nothing of the occasional actual falsehood, or distortion of the facts either by carefully ignoring any evidence that doesn’t agree with the premise, or amplifying the evidence that goes beyond what is warranted. That is another difficulty entirely.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

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*Update: the famed clock is described in one of the "Difficulties" Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) prepared for The Rectory Umbrella, a miscellany of short occasional pieces and drawings. It is, of course, exactly the sort of clock that Alice would have. I believe it can be seen in Tenniel's illustrations of her entry into Looking Glass House, on the chimney piece. The LGH version has a very snarky expression, no doubt very satisfied with itself at its precise accuracy twice a day. The advantage, of course, to Alice, is that between them she has the ability to be sure of the time precisely four times a day. How to do that? In LC's example, the clock says 8:00, and all you need do is "keep your eye fixed on your clock, and the very moment it is right it will be eight o'clock." To further protests, he advises, "That'll do... the more you argue the farther you get from the point, so it will be as well to stop." Which indeed sounds familiar.

Thought for 2.1.11

It’s one thing not to be able to see the forest for the trees, and another not to be able to see the trees for the forest. 

The first is a metaphor for getting so caught up on details as to miss the big picture. The latter, a more pernicious illness, is getting so caught up in a Big Idea (or worse, a Big Lie) that you no longer can see the details that refute the idea. 

This is a prevailing fault of those who misunderstand the adage, “The exception proves the rule” to mean the opposite of what it means to those who understand that proves means “tests.” If there are exceptions, it’s not a rule.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Reasonable and Holy Doubt

Recently, Reasonable and Holy has been critiqued on three grounds:

• First, that it is, as Ephraim Radner suggests, "a tissue of maybe," and hence not sufficient to make a case for change.
• Second, that while it may effectively weaken the prevailing arguments against the licitness of life-long monogamous same-sex relationships, and indeed to some extent undermine the traditional limitation of marriage to mixed-sex couples, still, it does not provide an alternative positive theology for this innovation.
• Finally, it is also suggested that the burden of proof lies on my side of the debate.

I see these grounds of complaint as related and I will try to address them in a single response. Part of this is because of the ethical understanding with which I come to the discussion. Not wishing to launch into a long essay on the various schools of ethics, let me just say that I would here espouse the ethical stand in the neighborhood of what are known as Probiliorism and Probabalism — as opposed to the more rigorous and inflexible Tutiorism. I am not alone in this, and in fact my position is the dominant model in contemporary ethics.

Tutiorism is a hard master, and requires that in any doubtful case, one must always follow the more secure or established rule unless the alternative can be shown to be so likely as to be virtually certain. In a legal context we might call that a standard of "clear and convincing" or perhaps even "beyond reasonable doubt." (Much depends on whether one is the plaintiff or the defense; bear with me!)

Probabalism and Probiliorism, respectively, require only that the alternative to following the standard rule be shown to be probable (or in the latter system, more probable) than the standard to allow for liberty. These would be something more like the legal standards of "showing reasonable doubt" or having the "preponderance of the evidence" on one's side.

I realize I'm mixing legal and ethical systems here, but I hope this helps make the distinctions clearer without bringing in too much subtle confusion. But I also do this in part because there is a forensic side to this discussion.

In short, from my perspective, some of my critics are calling for my side to provide clear and convincing evidence of innocence (or licitness) when all I believe we are required to introduce is reasonable doubt as to guilt (or illicitness). We are talking, after all, about the rightness of performing a certain action (or entering a certain estate), which the traditional side sees as a sin if not a crime. As I am on the defense side of the equation, and the burden of the "traditional" side is to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the tradition is correct, I think I have done my job. Even Dr. Radner admits I present effective counter-arguments to much of the traditional case. In short, "maybe" is enough to cast reasonable doubt upon the air-tightness of the traditional case, and acquit those accused of improper action.

Now, when we get to the question of the church's blessing, a positive act on the church's part, the question of theology comes up. First, I must note once again that the church's teaching is that marriage exists prior to and apart from any "blessing" the church may offer. (The ministers of marriage are the couple.)

But when it comes to providing an alternative positive theology for same-sex marriage, I think my critics misunderstand me. I am not arguing for a separate theology of marriage different from the theology we already have for marriage — such as it is. (I add that proviso because any careful examination of the tradition reveals a number of variant theologies from the patristic era and up through the high middle ages and on through the Reformation. Anglicans tended in general to be closer to Luther's "a matter of the town hall" than to the Roman Catholic "sacrament," when they referred to marriage as "an estate allowed.")

However, I deliberately took the exhortation of the marriage rite in the Book of Common Prayer as my model in examining a theology for same-sex marriage. I believe I have convincingly demonstrated that procreation cannot be held to be an essential element in marriage precisely because, according to the church's teaching, marriage is not forbidden to those who cannot procreate. That would seem to me to be a simple bit of logic (i.e., something not required cannot be essential), and incontestable as it stands. I believe I have also shown that all of the other characteristic "goods" or "ends" of marriage can be shared and realized by a same-sex couple. So whatever "theology" you wish to apply to marriage — apart from one that requires the capacity to procreate as essential, in contravention of the church's tradition and law — can be applied to a same-sex as well as a mixed-sex couple.

I hope that goes a bit towards addressing these critics. And I really do wish some of them would read the book instead of relying on Dr. Radner's review.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

God of Love or Logic?

SJF • Lent 4c 2010 • a sermon by Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
The son came to himself and said, “How many of my father’s hired hands have bread enough to spare, but here I am dying of hunger!”

The Parable of the Prodigal Son is one of the great, memorable passages of the Gospel, familiar even to many who may never crack the pages of a Bible — it was even made into a ballet with music by Prokofiev, first performed in Paris by the Ballet Russe in 1929, and at the New York City Ballet many times since!

But in spite of how familiar it is, this parable still bears our close attention, as our familiarity can cause us to miss details revealed by taking more time with it.

We’ve just heard it, so I won’t repeat the story. But I want to remind you of where it comes in the Gospel of Luke. This will help us to understand who Jesus is speaking to, and what he is getting at, why he told the parable, and what he means by it.

The fifteenth chapter of Luke begins with Jesus teaching and preaching, and tax collectors and sinners are gathering round eagerly to hear him, like people starving and thirsting for a gracious and generous word. The Pharisees and scribes, with their focus on salvation through personal propriety and righteous observance of the law, grumble among themselves and tsk-tsk that “this fellow welcomes sinners and eats with them.” In response to these clucking tongues, Jesus launches into a series of three parables — all three of them dealing with recovery of something that has been lost: a lost sheep, a lost coin, and a lost son. All three accounts end with a celebration — though in the parable of the lost son, the most elaborate and detailed of the three, the celebration comes in the middle.

For though the celebration begins shortly after the prodigal son’s return, and the recovery of “the lost,” that isn’t the end of the story. There is an additional character, mentioned only in passing at the beginning of the tale, but making his full appearance at the end: the angry elder son. He complains about the celebration, and the manner of his complaint suggests he’s stored up quite a few resentments about how he feels he’s been treated by his father. And yet, the father assures him that he loves him as well, and that his inheritance is secure — but that they must celebrate and rejoice at the repentance and return of the younger son, rather than grumbling about it.

Now, given the placement of this parable in the gospel, and those to whom it was told, and why, it is abundantly clear that Jesus intends the younger son to represent the sinners who have turned their lives around and come to hear his preaching, and the older son to represent the scribes and Pharisees themselves, with their grumbling complaint about the “sinners” being paid any mind at all, including Jesus eating with them.

This is perhaps the gentlest rebuke to the scribes and Pharisees in the whole Gospel — certainly unlike the strong condemnations with which Jesus greeted them a few chapters earlier. Here the parable presents even the Pharisees with some Good News, assuring them that they too are “always with the Father,” and that “all that is his is theirs.” Perhaps this is Jesus’ last effort to reach out to them, to get them to see that they do not need to occupy themselves with judgment of those they deem unworthy, they need not be lost in their own self-righteous anger but can break free of it and find their way home, and come to join the celebration, rejoicing in the breadth of salvation, in which all who are lost are ultimately found!

+ + +

That is an important lesson in itself. However, I’d like to note one more thing about this parable. We tend to romanticize the younger son — even if we don’t make his story into a ballet! We tend to see him as a figure of heartfelt sorrow and repentance. But look closely at the text and I think you’ll see instead something more like calculation than sorrow, even if it leads him to change his mind and come back home. He’s spent all his money, taken the lowest job you could imagine for a Jew — feeding pigs! — and realizes what a mistake he’s made, comparing himself to the hired hands back home and seeing how miserable he is. He is sorry — but mostly because of the mess he’s in, sorry about his own discomfort more than for the pain he caused his father, more sorry for the consequences of his action than for the act itself.

So he makes an entirely pragmatic and practical decision to go back home — motivated not so much by love for his father, as by hunger in his belly. He makes a quick calculation that he couldn’t be any worse off as a hired hand, so it’s well worth taking the chance of returning home.

+ + +

The thought of calculation reminds me of another young man’s story — a real one this time, but with a similar theme. Blaise Pascal was a 17th-century French scientist and philosopher, famous among other things for inventing one of the earliest mechanical adding machines before he was twenty years old. He is also known for his having undergone a religious conversion and for his adherence to a strict sect of very pious Roman Catholicism.

Now, as you know, it is not common for scientists to be fervently faithful or embarrassingly pious, so it is no surprise to find that in addition to his fervor and mysticism there is also a more calculating and rationalistic side to Pascal’s faith. He knew as a scientist that he could not prove that God exists, but as one of the originators of probability theory, he had to admit that God might exist. And so, in what came to be called “Pascal’s Wager” he calculated that if God exists, it is wisest to win eternal life by placing your bets on God — for, if God doesn’t exist, you’ve lost nothing, but if God does exist you stand to win everything! It’s a compelling notion, and it has held up well for over 300 years. A modern form of this wager is the comment of a believer to an atheist: “If I am wrong about God and life after death, I will never know; but if you are wrong, you will!”

There is a similar kind of calculation in the younger son in our parable. “Better take a chance on my father welcoming me back, rather than starve to death for certain, here.” But you can also hear the wheels clicking in the mind of the older brother, too — though to a different calculation: not the younger brother’s “it can’t get any worse so what the hey, let me go home”; but the colder calculation of the older brother’s carefully tabulated column of resentments — “Working like a slave for years, never disobedient, never got so much as a goat to have a party with my friends...” I can picture him, red-faced and angry, perhaps about to burst into tears. How long has this good obedient son been holding in this catalogue of resentments and injuries? Storing up all the debt he things the father hasn’t paid him?

+ + +

And perhaps that touches something in the father, too. But it is not simply a response to the calculus of resentment, any more than his response to the younger son was based on a calculus of repentance. This isn’t about calculus, or logic, or anything like that. It is about love.

The father doesn’t love the younger son because he repents, or the older son because he remains loyal, but because they are his sons. It is not about calculation: either the calculation of a gamble that you might be forgiven, or the calculation that if you tote up enough obedience and loyalty you will get a rich reward. Like the generous employer who gave the workers in the vineyard the same wage regardless of how long or short their work-shift, the generous father in this parable loves his sons not on the basis of what they’ve done or failed to do, but because they are his children. It is not about calculation, but relationship; not about logic, but love.

This, ultimately, is the message Jesus wanted to get across to those scribes and Pharisees, the message the tax-collectors and sinners had already understood, the message that the God of Love intends for us. God’s love is not based upon what we do or fail to do; God’s love is not something we earn by being good or lose by being bad. God’s love is a gift that came to us, reconciling us and the whole world to God, even while we were yet sinners — not counting our trespasses but forgiving them, wiping the slate clean and cancelling the debt, hitting the delete key on the whole spreadsheet of human sinfulness.

Christ did not save us because we were good, or because we repented, but because we needed saving and he loved us so much that nothing could stop him from saving us, even at the cost of his own life, by which he showed us the greatest love.

This is how the lost are found, how the dead are restored to life; this is how new life begins, how new creation starts, and this is why we celebrate — as we must — and keep the feast, through Jesus Christ our Lord.+

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Musings after Repose

Well, I’m back from Convocation, none the worse for the restful time, but facing all of the usual residua to which that meeting gives rise: photos, videos, minutes, reports, updates, usw.

Meanwhile, over at the Old HoBD Corral, I’ve been having a discussion on the Prevailing Issue, and why it (discussion) is so difficult. I’ve observed that many among the “Reasserter” side of things seem content to reassert what they believe to be the True Answer to the problem; and rarely seem willing to discuss the issue in anything approaching a rational argument, moving from agreed upon premises to conclusions in logical steps. As the name implies, they usually articulate a reassertion of the premise/conclusion in circular form. And that is a logical fallacy. (It may be true, but it is illogical).

If this leaves us at an impasse, it is because the reasserters are unwilling to “do the theology,” as they often accuse the progressive / reappraiser side of doing. In fact, what I’m suggesting is we all need to do some reappraising together. When folks simply forbid reappraisal, we end up with a situation such as that in the Roman Catholic Church, which in regard to the ordination of women has confessed that the theological rationale of previous years was insufficient, and recognized that the more recent theological arguments were tending towards dodgy ground; and so finally ruled, “End of discussion.”)

In our situation, I think it is more helpful to engage the issue, as indeed I have gone to pains to do in Reasonable and Holy: to look at the various tele* or goods of marriage, as variously defined in the tradition, to see if a same-sex couple is capable of achieving those ends or enjoying those goods. It is, it appears to me after my study, possible to answer that question in the affirmative.

It is also helpful to look at the larger question, “What is the telos of the human being?” — about which there is considerable consensus in the Christian tradition, from both sides of the Catholic/Protestant divide: to know, love, serve and glorify God and to enjoy him for ever. And we have been taught that we achieve or thwart that end in connection to how we treat other human beings, likewise made in the image of God. This is why the theology of the imago Dei, and the recent distortions in that theology (in an unwise attempt to frame a theological defense of traditional marriage) are so important.

Now, this is not to place all of the blame on one side. Much of the argument on both sides has consisted in people talking past each other, mouthing their conclusions and waving their catch-phrases as if they were self-evident truths. This is why I try to engage people in going back to the first principles upon which we actually agree and then working forward in stepwise fashion, to see where we might end up. This necessitates a willingness to adopt up front the Anglican doctrine of humility: that we have no doubt erred, and may well err again.

For some on both sides, as well, the topic is ended, the book closed, there is no further reason for discussion. In the face of that reality, there can be any amount of dust shaken from plenty of heels, a parting of the ways — or a willingness to agree to disagree. Many in the Anglican Communion seem willing to adopt that kind of “watchful waiting” approach; it seems to be the hope of the Archbishop of Canterbury (more on this later) and the sense of “moratoria” (instead of “prohibitions”). Still, even in holding out this possibility for change Canterbury and the communion moderates are offending both those who want to see the church adopt an amended view on The Subject, and those who see such an adoption, or even its entertainment, as departure from the faith once given.

One of my interlocutors at HoBD suggested I was unwilling to adopt “first principles” myself, but I suggested that what he was offering as premises looked like conclusions to me. I rejoined that to find common ground we must get behind those conclusions to find something more basic. He offered one such principle, upon which I can agree as a basis for discussion, a classical concept well in keeping with the style of first principles: “The scriptures are ‘God’s word written’ and therefore normative for matters of salvation and Christian life.”

Although this statement itself requires a good bit of unpacking (and I look to Richard Hooker for the classical version of that task) it is something I can and do fully accept and affirm. In similar language it forms part of the Lambeth unpacking of Chicago’s Quadrilateral.

Where he and I part company is not on this fundamental premise, but on the conclusions we draw from it. So examining the arguments by which we reach these conclusions, the logical steps and inferences (and the related and sometimes unstated premises upon which they rely), would be a helpful form of engagement. Of primary importance is getting those other unstated premises out on the table. Sometimes these unstated premises are seen to be self-evident, but my experience is that they form another part of the obstacle to clear thinking.

One of the things we clearly disagree about is not whether the Scripture is a “normative” (I prefer the old language of “sufficient”) guide to salvation and moral living, but whether Scripture actually addresses The Issue upon which we disagree: is same-sex marriage possible, and if so, is it moral?

These are not easy questions, and any argument from Scripture or Reason or Tradition is going to be complex, as there is no explicit prohibition (or approbation) of same-sex marriage in Scripture; Reason alone is unlikely to provide a clear answer acceptable to those who think Scripture is clear; and Tradition, while generally tending one way, is also mixed. This is why a glib conclusion, either way, while tempting, will not settle the argument.

I am content to continue the discussion. As a starter, I want to comment briefly on one of the unspoken corollary premises of the reasserter position: that Genesis offers us a “one size fits all” divine pattern for all human sexual relations.

I address this assertion at some length in R&H, as well as the discontinuities of this premise with significant aspects of the tradition, but I want to raise an additional question here, concerning taking Genesis as a template at all, that is, questioning the very premise. Why is Genesis seen as a template for all sexual relations but not for any or all other human activities? Why, for example, do we allow other forms of industry than agriculture? (Given that was Cain’s metier and industry was the invention of the offspring of Lamech’s polygamous unions.) Why do we allow women to use anaesthesia in childbirth? (Roundly opposed on biblical grounds in the Victorian era, until Victoria herself made use of it.) Why aren’t we all vegetarians? (Yes, I know God changed the rules in Genesis 9, but if we were so keen on living in accord with God’s original intent, vegetarianism is the most biblical answer.) More importantly, Why, if the subjection of women to their husbands is a result of the fall, has it taken the church so long to recognize women as restored to their antelapsarian state as equal collaborators?

These seem to be to be questions worthy of reflection in opposition to the view that the patterns laid out in Genesis are necessarily the only options available to the children of Adam and Eve, the children of God and siblings of Christ.

However, if there is no willingness to engage these questions, if we are simply at a standoff — none of us able to convince the other of the truth of our position, or even to discuss the matter with some degree of mutual care and willingness to perhaps change our minds — then our challenge is to see if we are able to live together in harmonious disagreement, and wait for time itself slowly to winnow truth. I am certainly willing to do so, as I think there are far more important matters facing us, about which we do have significant agreement, and our efforts and resources would be well spent in their pursuit. Such as the mission of the church to restore people to unity with each other and God in Christ.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

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* A helpful correction from Bill Carroll

Thought for 06.27.08.2

Few things are as revealing of the depth of one’s failure to grasp a concept as the inappropriate analogies one brings to bear in the discussion.

Tobias Haller BSG

On Natural Law, Briefly

I have in other posts pointed out some of my difficulties with the Natural Law tradition. I find these to be well summarized in the Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics article on the subject. I will detail my concerns here, briefly, based in part on an earlier comment to another post.

The problem begins as a matter of definition. There are at least three elements to “natural law” which are often rather carelessly confused or confounded in argument. For example, people sometimes use “natural” or “law of nature” to describe “what is” — reality. But it should surprise no one to find that I agree with those who say that “reality” as described by scientific knowledge can tell us what is, but not what should be. Science does not teach us morals. It is not, except in the most skeptical or cynical of moral systems, an instructor in morals at all. In fact, I believe science teaches us that nature is built on a principle that is in some respects the inverse of the guiding moral principle by which I abide: “Love your neighbor as yourself” — for the “natural world” is based on survival through the exploitation and use of other entities to one’s own benefit. As Whitehead observed, “Life is perpetual theft.”

So I do not look to nature for my ethics. Science can not tell us right from wrong: but it can tell us when we have advanced a premise that is discordant or incoherent with reality. For example, “Same-sexuality is wrong because it is ‘unnatural’” is false, if by “unnatural” one means, “contrary to the natural world” — for in the natural world it is quite common. That doesn’t, I hasten to add, make same-sexuality good. I’ve never made that claim; rather I hold it to be morally neutral, just like mixed-sexuality. But it does falsify the premise that it is “unnatural” in terms of not being part of the natural world.

Now, of course, my interlocutor will then advance to the second form of natural law and say, “By ‘unnatural’ I mean ‘not in concert with the ends for which sex is intended.’” This natural law position falls prey to the fallacy of begging the question, in that it rests on two prior premises, neither of which is self-evidently true: “Moral value is to be found in the use of things in advancement of the end for which they are intended” and further, “Sex is intended for procreation.” I have already demonstrated the falsehood of the latter premise, in that while sex may often result in procreation, there is ample evidence that it serves other purposes or ends having nothing to do with procreation. This is, in fact, the position of The Episcopal Church, as enunciated in the preface to the matrimonial rite, where procreation ranks third among the ends of marriage, “when it is God’s will.” It is also the reason marriage, and sexual activity within marriage, are not forbidden to infertile couples, and birth control is permitted.

The first premise, which gives moral value to the employment of organs towards specific ends, rests upon the presumed capability clearly to decide the “end” towards which any given human organ or activity is ordered, a task rendered difficult in face of the biological multitasking most organs serve; and the even greater leap which assigns moral value to such employment of the body. Is it, for example, immoral to eat low-calorie food? If so, how serious is this moral failing?

Finally, my opponent might deploy another form of natural law — “But all people inherently know it to be wrong.” This is, of course, the fallacy of argumentum ad populum, which supposes that ideas commonly held must be true. This is obviously a weak argument since it wouldn’t need to be made if it were true. This obvious weakness has not prevented this premise serving as a basis in a number of different forms of natural law arguments.

The fallback response, of course, is that those who don’t inherently know something to be wrong are morally defective — also a logical fallacy since it again assumes the premise and moreover besmirches those who disagree with it. While there are many social constructs and prejudices common in many people and many cultures, even perhaps in some cases universally (though same-sexuality fails to be indicted in this particular court) this does not make them self-evidently true.

Let me take an example. I think murder is morally wrong. I do not do so on the basis that the Bible says it is wrong, or the Church says it is wrong, or that it is “unnatural” (obviously it occurs in nature), or that all peoples and cultures know it to be wrong (many cultures exclude the willful killing of persons from the category of murder by definitional means). Rather, I think murder is wrong because it violates the premises upon which I base my ethics: Love your neighbor as yourself, and Do to others as you would be done by. In short, I do not need to appeal to any of the apparatus of natural law to tell me I should not murder anyone, as it violates the law of loving reciprocity, a law which I accept not merely on the authority of the One who gave it, but because it appears to be rationally coherent. I know of no serious arguments against it as a governing principle for an ethical system. (If there are any, I’d be happy to engage them; but again, I would want to see the premises upon which they are based laid out first.)

Compare this example of murder with the arguments adduced in the debates over sexuality, and I hope one can see the difference. The natural law approach assumes certain premises to be true, but the premises are the very things that are in question. It may not be naked circular argument, but it is certainly very scantily clad. We are spinning our wheels, and getting nowhere if the same un-agreed-upon assumptions are merely reasserted as conclusions. Perhaps we will not get anywhere except by the slow process of the death of such ideas, whose hegemony is coming slowly to an end. It took over a century for the church finally to abandon the distinction between Jew and Greek; and another millennium and a half to free itself from its unhappy acceptance of society’s division into slave and free; we now find ourselves beginning to grasp, two millennia on, that the difference between male and female is also irrelevant in Christ.

Tobias Haller BSG

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In Response to Rick

Dear Rick,

You misunderstand my point about "Hate the sin; love the sinner." I am not suggesting a simple converse, i.e., that if you love the sinner you must love his or her sin. That is a straw man. What I am saying, based on careful observation of the history of the practice, is that those who say they are merely critiquing the sin quite often end up attempting to take the role of God in judging the sinner, and punishing her. Certainly we are called to work against sin, but Jesus' sole advice on the subject is to work against it in ourselves, not in others.

As to desires, it is perfectly appropriate, as you suggest, for the Buddhist to see all of her desires as something to be suppressed and denied, or even better ignored, as the Zen school might say -- desires need not be wrestled with because they do not exist. ("no mirror, no dust.")

The Christian tradition, beginning with Augustine, appears to make a similar claim -- perpetuated in Anglican formularies -- that concupiscence is itself a partaker in sin. (The Jewish tradition, on the contrary, asserts that desire, while it may be "evil," is actually crucial in building up the world; a notion not unlike that found in Greek mythology and philosophy, in which Eros is the beginning of creation.)

Jesus' counsel is that we work on our own desires rather than trying to fix others; in fact he singled out that one desire -- the urge to "fix" others -- for condemnation. His harshest critique was directed against those who, while not entering the kingdom themselves, obstructed others by establishing a system in which people who were unable to abide by the rules so imposed gave in to despair. To cause despair in others, leading them to come to think they cannot live a Christian life, is a very serious matter. From Christ's standpoint, the most serious. By establishing and perpetuating (on very slim evidence) a tradition that proscribes the fulfillment of human desire in morally analogous ways (faithful, monogamous, permanent), to a large portion of the population (larger than many believe), on the basis of unproven concepts of natural law or the cultural traditions of a pre-scientific world, thereby leading to despair or separation from the Church for many who would seek to live a moral life on the basis of what Christ actually taught, is, as I say, a perilous and un-Christ-like course.

I do not deny that natural law has its uses. But if one is to employ it, one must be very careful that the "nature" informing the conclusions be accurate. Sound principles of logic must come into play. This is where science and human reason come in.

The problem with the Vatican's pronouncements that same-sexuality be singled out as "objectively disordered" is that it assumes to know the "order" or "purpose" for which sexuality exists, and state that same-sexuality of its nature does not fulfill that order.

Science (and human reason) challenge that claim. Leaving aside language of "purpose" (end, or goal) it is at least clear that sex does not in fact have a sole function; and that these various functions are separable in nature and, if you will, by "design." The Roman position, deriving from an inherited faulty understanding of human anthropology and biology (that the male is the "active" principle in human reproduction and the female a passive vessel, to cite only one aspect of the erroneous basis for the so-called natural law tradition), is logically incoherent, and morally flawed. Science will not tell us the "purpose" of a given phenomenon, but it can tell us when there is clearly more than one "function" possible, and logic can then open other possibilities for discussion as to purpose, end, or goal. (Of course, the tradition actually acknowledges multiple "ends" or "goods" for sexuality; but then arbitrarily says they cannot be separated from one another. As I have already shown in my previous articles, not only can they be separated, but they are -- by nature! The mouth is used for eating and speaking, and it is well not to do both at the same time. The male sexual organ also has multiple uses, and I dare say is also best used for one or the other. You see -- there is no logical basis for an "inseparability" of functions.)

I have, as I say, spelled this all out in great detail in the other articles I have posted. I have pointed out precisely why it is logically incoherent to hold that the "purpose of sexual acts is procreation." (When sex was wrongly understood as the planting of a seed in fertile soil, male homosexuality was seen as a grave fault, and female homosexuality went unmentioned -- this in itself reveals a major flaw in the "moral" understanding of sex.) You have responded to these with the same reassertions again and again, never once offering any clear evidence for the truth of the traditional and flawed "natural law" argument other than its mere restatement. I'd be glad just for a simple answer to the question, "Why can the various functions of sexuality not be separated?" or "Why is a same-sex relationship more culpable than an infertile mixed-sex relationship?" I have yet to receive an answer.

By the way, have you noticed how the very notion of "purpose" is itself an instance of concupiscence? A Buddhist, at least of the Zen school, would say that purposefulness is itself a result of desire, and hence flawed. Given we are not Buddhists, I have articulated the "purposes" of same-sexuality as the establishment of stable relationships, the care of children (though the Vatican thinks this impossible, too), the gift of one person to another (also denied by the Vatican, which sees same-sexuality as inherently "selfish" -- though without explanation) and so on. These are all functions and/or purposes. Who is to say these functions or purposes are less "moral" than mere breeding -- which, when separated from these other purposes is hardly commendable in and of itself. (It has long been noted that in elevating procreation to a position of prominence, the tradition inadvertently assigned moral weight to a biological function we share with animals. It is the human capacity for love, fidelity, and self-giving that has moral value, not the capacity to breed. More questions for you: Does breeding gain a moral value when carried out by persons? If so, what is the moral value? What is moral about it?)

Speaking of the Vatican, I reviewed the document "The Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons" yesterday. It is full of logical fallacies and begged questions; assertions dressed as truths. It also indulges in some very questionable theology. (The relation of the society of persons in marriage to the inner life of the Trinity is, for example, a wild notion when applied to sexuality. One would think the suggestion of linking sex with the relationship of the Father and the Son would send up red flags all over the place! Yet this is blandly suggested in the document. The notion that the image of God resides in the society of male and female, also advanced by John Paul II, is a direct contradiction of orthodox doctrine, as spelled out in Aquinas. This is the phenomenon I have noted before: the tendency to do bad theology when seeking to bolster an argument against same-sexuality -- and a sure sign the argument is faulty.)

So, Rick, that is the lay of the land. I reject the Roman teaching on this subject as logically incoherent. That does not mean you and others are barred from accepting it; but you must do so on the basis of faith in the Magisterium rather than on the basis of reason -- unless you can provide a reasonable argument that stands up to examination and doesn't beg the question. If you would like to assay a response to any of the questions I raised above (in boldface), I'd be glad to see what you have to say.

Tobias Haller BSG

An Immodest Proposal

In my previous post, O Theophilus, I wrote concerning what I perceive as the failure of the Episcopal Church to make an adequate, concerted, and persuasive case for steps in the direction of affirming persons in same-sex relationships. A number of people have commented on this post, and I have responded; but I would like to raise and address some of those concerns here before continuing with my proposals.

A few have suggested I have fallen into the liberal fallacy of “if only you will listen to me you will agree.” This was very far from my intent; in fact, it was this very liberal tendency I was addressing. I do not believe that reason alone will convince everyone of the rightness of my point of view; but I do believe it is incumbent upon me to make the best use of reason I can, in order to reach those open to such a reasonable approach.

It is the large number of undecided, moderate Anglicans who are hungering for a better case from the progressive side — and it is to these I am hoping we might address our arguments, as they are crafted and refined. There will be those who are beyond reason; real homophobia and bigotry — and let us be honest and acknowledge they exist — require therapy, not mere discourse.

At the same time, I by no means intend (as some have suggested) to abandon the “incarnational approach” that is so important in bringing people to a change of mind or of heart. (I was encouraged to hear our Primate reflect a similar note in her address to the staff at 815.) But I must point out that the incarnational approach — if it assumes, “once you get to know me you will accept me” is also false. I’m sure we’d all like to think, “To know me is to love me.” And personal presence can be a very powerful — and I would say essential — part of the ongoing process of engagement; but that presence must also be combined with a willingness to debate and defend on the topic at hand.

An incarnational presence is not always going to convince, even when it is accompanied by eloquent teaching. You will all recall, no doubt, that an incarnational presence can lead to a crucifixion. Moreover, Jesus noted, in his parable of Lazarus and the rich man, that those who have not heeded the weightier matters of the law inherent in such notions as “love your neighbor as yourself,” and the prophetic call to justice, will be unmoved even by the resurrection.

I can give one concrete example from my own experience. At the last General Convention I had an extended conversation with an English Evangelical who began the conversation by saying to me, “Some of my best friends are gay; but you are wrong, and you are going to hell.” My response was an aggressive: No, I am not wrong; but you are, and you will go to hell yourself if you persist in judging others; and here is why. As the evening wore on, I was able not only to reject his premise, but challenge every argument he brought to the fore — clearly not to the extent of convincing him, but to the extent of making him realize his arguments were not nearly so airtight as he had supposed.

It was also helpful to be able to say, “You are talking about me when you make these accusations.” However, if that is all I had said, I doubt it would have shaken his thinking; after all, he said right at the beginning that some of his best friends are gay; it’s just that we’re going to hell. It was the willingness to argue as well as be a presence that made the difference. He said he’d never been confronted in this way before, and made to think about what he was so blithely saying about who was going to hell, as well as a number of his other favorite arguments. I heard the next day from several people who know him that this conversation was profoundly important for him — and he was grateful for thechallenge as well as for the presence.

In short, we need to do both. We are in a Hillel moment here: it isn’t just about us, but about others, too. The “easy” ways at either end, capitulation or revolt, seem to me to lead in the wrong direction. How can we speak to and for the gay and lesbian persons suffering real persecution in so much of the world (far worse than not being allowed to be a bishop, or have their relationship blessed!) if we either give in completely, or separate off into our own private sanctum. “If I am not for myself, who will be? But if I am only for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?” So what do we do?

A sketch of a response in four movements

1. Of the Process of Engagement

1.0. I have never cared for the language of “the listening process.” It sounds altogether too passive and casual. So I prefer to call for a process of engagement. This has several elements.

1.1 Assemble a theological critique of the current position on same-sex relationships. You will see that I do not frame this as a defense as much as a re-examination of the case made by the prosecution. I take as my basic stand the notion that guilt must be proven, not innocence; and as the Archbishop of Canterbury has acknowledged this week, in some even of the best of the traditional argumentation there are rather significant lapses in logic and theology. It is these lapses and inconsistencies that can and should be exposed and corrected, for in some cases the whole argument hangs by a slender thread indeed.

1.2. Develop a positive theology of human sexual relationships built on the unitive function of human sexuality (which is universal and lifelong and eternal) rather than the traditional approach based on procreation (which is neither universal nor lifelong nor eternal). There is ample Scriptural, traditional, and theological material to support such a theology.

1.3. Insist and mandate that in any discussion of the issue of same-sexuality, in any parochial, diocesan, provincial or international forum, gay and lesbian persons, both lay and ordained, be involved. It will be necessary for the Executive Council or the General Convention to assemble a team or bureau of such persons, equipped with the material produced in steps one and two above in order to carry out this mandate.

1.4. As these steps will require funding, I suggest that a portion of the funds formerly committed to the Anglican Consultative Council be directed to this effort. As the “listening process” is a mandate of the ACC, this use of funds is in keeping with the importance of addressing an issue that, if nothing else, is capable of leading to the utter collapse of the Anglican Communion as we know it. If the Anglican Communion is worth the effort, it is also worth the expense.

1.5. Insist that representatives of The Episcopal Church, or the church itself, not be threatened with dismissal or exclusion from any of the councils of the Anglican Communion, or the Communion itself. Such exclusion is both repugnant to the Gospel, and the common sense that if we are to reach a common mind it will only be through the meeting and engagement of those who disagree. Peace achieved through the excision or exclusion of persons with whom we disagree is reprehensible.

2. Of Lambeth and the Primates

2.0. I trace the current division and turmoil, and the beginnings of the tearing of the fabric of the Communion, not to the General Convention of 2003, but to the Lambeth Conference of 1998. There, through a manifestly disordered process, in which both members and the chair acted inappropriately, a resolution was adopted that did not represent the true mind of the Anglican Communion in its present lack of consensus. Moreover, since its passage, resolution 1998.1.10 — which itself uses the language of recommendation and advice — has been treated by some of the Primates and others as if it represented a unified “teaching” — rather than a statement of a traditional view that is no longer universally ascribed to, and which is under discussion. This unilateral transformation of the Lambeth Conference into a magisterial body is contrary to its charter, and lacks the consent of the various Provinces of the Anglican Communion. I therefore suggest:

2.1. The Primates and Bishops of the Anglican Communion be invited to express their repentance for having breached the bonds of affection that constitute the historic basis for this fellowship of autonomous churches, in having sought to substitute coercive constraint, violation of provincial autonomy, and threats of exclusion in their place.

2.2. That pending such an expression of repentance, The Episcopal Church continue to work with those Primates and Bishops who wish to continue in such a fellowship, in keeping with the historic constitution (in large part unwritten) by which the Anglican Communion has heretofore exercised its unique ministry in the whole Body of Christ.

2.3. That if it is desired to assemble a teaching body for the further exploration of a pan-Anglican doctrinal statement on any matter, and recognizing that not only do the ordinals of the 1662 Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England and the 1979 Book of Common Prayer of the Episcopal Church both confer the office of teaching to the presbyterate, but that many of the greatest theologians of the church’s past have been laity, and that the diaconate is charged specifically with bringing the needs of the world to the attention of the church: that any teaching body so assembled consist of priests, deacons and lay persons as well as of bishops; and that any decisions or positions reached by this assembly receive the assent of each and every constituent Province of the Anglican Communion (alike working through provincial assemblies consisting of all orders of ministry) before being considered to be “the teaching of the Anglican Communion.”

3. Of ordination and election of bishops

3.0. I do not believe anyone has a need or a right to be a bishop. I also believe that the episcopate is for the good order of the church. At the same time, it is unjust to exlude persons or classes of persons without good cause. I recommend:

3.1. That the Episcopal Church commend and urge its Bishops with jurisdiction and Standing Committees to withhold consent to the consecration to the episcopate of any person whose manner of life is inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

4. Of the blessing of same-sex unions

4.0. The church teaches that the nuptial ministers are the couple themselves, whose vows are blessed, not constituted, by the church. One of the earliest western marriage liturgies, in the sixth century Gallic tradition, consisted of a blessing of the couple in their home. I therefore suggest that:

4.1. Until a wider consensus is achieved on the rightness of blessing same-sex relationships in an ecclesiastical setting, The Episcopal Church not proceed with the development of a liturgical rite, or its authorization.

4.2. Recognizing that priests are ordained to pronounce God’s blessing, and that no further authorization is needed for a priest to bless than there is to preach; and that the liturgy “The Celebration of a Home” in the Book of Occasional Services is authorized for use in this church, without further permission from the Bishop being necessary; and that this liturgy provides for the blessing of the residents of the household; that it be recognized that the use of such liturgy is within the ambit of pastoral care.

4.3. The the church include in its studies and discussion the issue of the role of the church in those civil jurisdictions in which same-sex relationships are licensed, and the larger issue of the interaction between civil and ecclesiastical law in this area.

I realize that this first draft of proposals may not please everyone. I am not sure it pleases me entirely. But it is a good faith effort to lay out a way forward that is, I think, far more in keeping with the traditional Anglican way of working than is evident in the statement from Dar es Salaam.

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Beginnings, Ends, and Friends

a sermon first preached at the Church of the Ascension, Manhattan, on the Feast of St Aelred 2004

Paul wrote to the Philippians, “Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others.” And Jesus told his disciples, “This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.”

In all the struggles with which the church has struggled during the last few decades, nothing has stirred the pot so much, raising it from a simmer to a boil, as the vexed matter of human sexuality. The problem with our vexation is that we have focused so much on the aspect of humanity which is not uniquely human — sex — and largely ignored the aspect of human nature that is (as far as we know) unique to human life: the capacity for self-giving and self-sacrificing love. This vexation and ignorance are no help in keeping our kettle from boiling over and making a mess of our ecclesiastical stove-top.

For conservatives in particular sex is almost always “the problem” — for at the same time they want to talk about what is “natural” they also want to preserve a strong distinction between humanity and the rest of nature. Thus, as archconservative Archbishop Akinola of Nigeria said concerning homosexuality just a few months ago, “Even animals don’t do such things.” Obviously the arrogant Archbishop is ignorant of the well-documented same-sex behavior among scores of animal species. But then, he and those who take his point of view aren’t interested in nature and whatever truth it might reveal to us; for they are quite content, upon being shown that animals do engage in such behavior, to turn around and accuse gays and lesbians of being “inhuman” for acting like animals — so I suppose in their view we really are neither fish nor fowl — nor human! — and shouldn’t even exist. As the wife of one of the bishops at Lambeth put it, that would be the final solution to the whole problem — “We don’t have homosexuals in Africa,” she said, “because we kill them.”

Though they might reject such genocidal homophobia, even more moderate conservatives display a similarly perverse exaltation of natural law that takes no account of real nature. For instance, as Roman Catholic moral theologians put it, Human sex is distinguished from animal sex in that only human sex leads to the birth of human beings. This surely qualifies for the theological “Duh” award of the decade. And while those who advance this triviality as if it were a helpful insight do so to preserve the dignity of human personhood — which of course only exists in human persons — in the end they are left with a dehumanized biological determinism, in which the primary good about a married couple is their fertility. This reasoning ignores the facts that not all heterosexual sex (even in the most loving of marriages) leads to the generation of new human beings — nor do we grant marriage annulments at menopause; nor are all heterosexual relationships loving; and some of those that are least loving may be the most fertile. It is not our capacity to breed — even to breed humans — that makes us human.

When one thus eliminates fertility and the creation of new human beings from the discussion, the conservative argument shifts in an enthusiastic appeal to a surmised “complementarity.” This circular argument limits the only legitimate human “other” for appropriately human relationships solely on the basis of the so-called complementarity of the sexes. In doing so it again reduces all human beings, male and female, to the status of mere prongs and holes, as if we were nothing more than the loose ends of biological extension cords, plugs and sockets designed to pass along some kind of live current, without regard to what that current is or is for. One conservative writer waxes eloquent on the imagined “fit” of male and female, which he says is like the fit of hand and glove: of course, notice who the glove is, and who the hand; women sure must get tired of being portrayed as accessories! So this supposedly noble effort to exalt human nature also ultimately undercuts human dignity.

These arguments also betray a kind of genealogical fixation— as if what most makes us human is our birth, rather than our life, as if the beginning of human life is all that counts, and not the human life lived to its human end; as if Genesis were the end of the story rather than the beginning. And it is this story which I wish to revisit and comment upon today.

I do this, in part on the basis of an appeal to our animal past, and the claims of nature, but more on the basis of the Gospel, and its supernatural claims upon our human present for our human future.

For what the Gospel shows us is the astonishing truth that love is unnatural. I’ll say it again: love is unnatural. Put another way, love doesn’t come naturally: perhaps that sounds less threatening! Love has to be urged and commanded. You have to work at it. Left to our own devices, our animal natures, the drive for life we share with all living things, we would seek only our own self-interest, only our own wants and needs, or at best the wants and needs of our species, as if human life were only meant to produce more human lives; as if we were nothing more than organic copy machines driven by our DNA to produce more DNA-producers, in some ways no better than a particularly large and noisy virus infecting the surface of the globe.

This driving energy, what the romantics used to call the “life-force,” is not love. On the contrary, “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower,” and drives the upbuilding of the universe is love’s opposite: self-interest, self-preservation, the survival of the fittest, call it what you will; this is the force that drove the rise of the universe from quarks to dust to stars to cells to animals and finally to us; it is this property of self-cohesion and self-preservation, the redundancy that what endures endures, and (as Doris Day sang) what will be will be, and that only what can reproduce will reproduce, that drove and drives the natural world. And although this leaning towards self-interest can take evil forms — Saint Augustine once said if you needed any proof of original sin, just watch a baby for a while — the tendency to self-interest is not evil in itself, even in human beings.

God, after all, created it as the means to build up the creation. God created the natural law of self-interest that alone could lead to the complexity capable of sustaining life. God provided nature with this inclination to self-preservation, and we have inherited it as part of our nature. So it is not evil in itself: as the rabbis taught, were it not for the yetzer ha-ra, the inclination towards self-interest, no man would build a house, or take a wife, or start a business.

But, as we know, when this drive predominates we get into trouble: and we’ve been troubled by it for a long time, from the moment we became aware of it. As the old, old story goes, it was the impulse to self-preservation that both drove Adam and Eve to their primal act of self-assertion, and convicted them with the knowledge of what they had done, when they fell into the knowledge of good and evil, the naked consciousness of the needy and assertive self, and knew what they had done, and what they had lost.

But they also learned what they still had. For in their fall they became aware that God had already given them something else, the good they weren’t aware of before they chose the evil, indeed before they knew the difference. God had balanced the force that launched the world at its genesis with another more personal gift.

God had imbued human hearts with love: which is not a creature, but the image of God’s self. Love is the gift which gave us the capacity to see and feel beyond our needs, beyond the needs even of our family or clan or society, the knowledge that we are not simply creatures living off each other, but creatures living for each other; that life is not based ultimately upon need but upon gift, and that life is not about the accumulation of assets and the preservation of the self or the species, but about the compassionate generosity that sacrifices even life itself for the sake of the beloved. God made us human, when to us, out of all creation, he gave this incredible energy that goes by the name of love. It is love itself, unnatural and counterintuitive love, which at its greatest sacrifices even its own life so that the beloved might live; it is love, the gift of God and the supernatural spark of the divine likeness that glows within each human soul, that makes human life truly human and most truly alive. It is love beyond price that makes life worth living, and worth giving up.

And when the time was ripe, God showed us this love in person, perfected in Jesus, who commands us to love each other the way he loved us: which is to say, not for what he could get out of us, but for what he could give us. God’s love is not based on need — God doesn’t need anything — but is rather God’s gift, stemming from God’s own nature, God who is love. The natural law of self-interest was merely God’s creature used to build up creation. But love is God’s self: and the love of God is not about transaction, but incarnation.

And when he had taught us this, we ceased being mere servants — who do as they are told but do not know why — and became friends, who do as they are commanded not in ignorance or out of fear, but out of trust, and in the knowledge of the love of God, who gave us life at our genesis, and gave us life again in the revelation of the Son of God, the beginning and the end, who became not only our savior, but our friend, who shared our life and of his great mercy allowed us to share in his.

* * *

This is the gospel truth as Jesus spoke it, the gospel truth that Saint Aelred of Rievaulx preached and lived. He did it in the setting of the monastery, among men committed to a life of common prayer and work, and most of all of unnatural love: the deeply unnatural love that Jesus commanded, the love that gives itself up and places others first, that sees other people not as means to an end (however good or exalted that end might be) but as ends in themselves, icons of Christ and images of God, and above all, as friends.

Now, let there be no doubt that whatever the experiments of his youth, in his later years we can rest assured that Aelred took the vows of celibacy seriously, both for himself and for the monks under his charge. But he also knew that human affection is a great gift, a gift that requires expression, and allowed his monks the familiarities of friendship that sterner ascetics would have found scandalous. Aelred walked that middle way between the biological determinists who saw human beings only in terms of their capacity for breeding, and the gnostic dualists who — misunderstanding the incarnation itself — wrongly thought they could escape the realities of their own embodiment. And so he allowed the signs of friendship to flourish in his monastery. And the monastery, the school of charity, became in its time, the preserver of the world. Not because it set out to do that, not as a means to an end, but because it was full of the love of God.

* * *

Today we have a great opportunity, not just to keep our ecclesiastical kettle from boiling over, but to preserve the world anew, and to teach the mystery of charity to a world hungry for love but steeped in self-interest. Our world has forgotten Sirach’s wisdom, that true friendship is beyond price and cannot be bought or sold in the marketplace.

And I firmly believe that gays and lesbians — whether they have legalized their domestic partnerships, had their unions blessed, or gone off to Canada to get married — can be teachers in this new school of charity for the church and the world, to offer a teaching as powerful as what the monastery taught in the days of Aelred.

And I don’t just mean more Queer Eye for the Straight Church — we’ve been there and done that for centuries; writing the hymns, playing and singing the music, crafting and leading the liturgies, designing the buildings and generally making the church more attractive than it would have been without us. No, what I mean is far more serious and far more challenging. I’m talking about the practice of the presence of God, who in Jesus Christ commands us to love each other as he loved us, with the love that does not abide in relationships built on quid-pro-quo or cost and benefit.

For I believe with all my heart that same-sex couples not only can show forth the great mystery of mutual love as well as different-sex couples do (or fail to do), but may well be able to do it better, and with greater freedom. Free from the shackles of biological determinism by which human cultures have falsely and conventionally come to believe that men and women are naturally and separately suited only for particular roles and destined as means to particular ends, we can emphatically declare and show forth in our lives that human beings are not roles, nor are they means to an end: whether that end be the brief spasm of sexual release or the procreation of a family, the maintenance of a home, or of a society. For as long as marriage is seen primarily for what one gets out of it: as a contract for the interchange of property or the grant of rights, for the building of a family or a home, for the maintenance of the social status quo — rather than for what goes into it: as a covenant of the mutual gift of two persons to each other for no reason other than for love, as long as we see the union of two hearts and minds primarily for its extrinsic worth rather than for its intrinsic value, it will be branded with the hallmark of commerce, rather than blessed as the sign and sacrament of generosity.

Such true freedom and mutuality are difficult when church and society still harp on what they call “appropriate” roles for men and women, when they place their trust in a nuclear family that even at its best was not the means by which God chose to enter creation when the time came to come among us as one of us. True freedom and mutuality are difficult when people talk the talk of self-sacrifice, but walk the walk of imposing sacrifice on others — and how many women have been told it is their natural lot to suffer in silence when men take advantage of them or neglect them, all in the hopes that it will make those men more “domesticated.” True mutuality is most difficult precisely when people are perceived to be unequal, complementary or incomplete.

And this is why gays and lesbians, free from any necessary or conventionally preassigned roles, can staff the school of truly mutual love and friendship, most especially love nourished by friendship.

And, my friends, the greatest irony of all is that such loving relationships, same-sex and different-sex, will save the world, just as the monasteries did through the troubled times of the middle ages, not because that is what they set out to do, not as means to that end, but because God wills it so, and has willed it so from the beginning, when he saw that it was not good to be alone. For just as only self-interest could build the world, only love can finally save and preserve the world. The rabbis were right: the yetzer ha-ra, the inclination to self, plays its role in building up the world; but love is at the heart of tikkun olam, our partnership with God our friend in preserving and bringing to perfection the great work of creation. As Saint Paul’s spiritual grandfather Rabbi Hillel, reflecting on both the inclination to self and the love of others, said, “If I am not for myself, who will be? But if I am only for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?”

Christ has done us, you see, the great honor of calling us friends, friends of God in Christ and friends of each other. Friends, not servants: no longer in the dark about our friend Jesus’ plan, no longer fallen but raised to new life in him. As God is our true beginning, so too this is our true end: to honor and love God in each other and to find ourselves transformed in this honor and this love. Out of this love a broken world is pieced together, and all illusory divisions lose their capacity to divide — all of them — each and every one: and there is no more slave or free, or Jew or Gentile, or male and female, but all are one in Christ our friend. With this powerful and God-given spirit of friendship, this spirit of encouragement, this consolation and compassion, let us, at the commandment of Christ and following his example as friends together, of the same mind, having the same love, heart to heart and hand in hand, show the world, beloved, what love means. And if not now, when?

---

— Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Drama Queen

I'm getting very weary of the histrionics from Ambridge. Before the terrorist bomb (read, nominees in California), there was the relatively mild imagery of the Titanic and the Carpathia (read, General Convention and the rest of the Communion).

Now it's the SA and the Creature from the Black Lagoon. I begin to wonder about Dean Zahl's rationality at this point. Seriously. Is he literally seeing monsters where none exist? It is astounding to find in one short essay such a raft of argumentum ad misericordiam combined with the relatively more recent argumentum ad Nazium. Certainly he is prosecuting a "Cause" here which was settled 2000 years ago on the hill of Calvary, and which does not need his sense of persecution and threat to complete what is lacking in the suffering of Christ. That Paul can, from the relative comfort and security of his Deanship, portray himself as persecuted — while gay and lesbian people are threatened with prison sentences merely for associating in public or speaking out for civil rights (threats supported by his Nigerian ally +Peter); while gay and lesbian people are beaten to death or executed, by true believers nursed on the toxic teaching of homophobia cloaked under the vestments of religious faith, Christian or Muslim — almost beggars imagination.

But I have a good word for Dean Z. Paul, the strife is o'er. The proof of your faith will lie not in the extent of your purity, or the depths of your sense of persecution, but in how you love your sisters and brothers.

—Tobias S Haller BSG

Some Issues with Some Issues...

Some Issues in Human Sexuality: A guide to the debate. London: Church House Publishing, 2003.

A review with comments by Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

A bit over a year ago, I was asked by my Bishop to take a look at the publication from the Church of England, Some Issues in Human Sexuality, and to offer some detailed comments on it. I would like to share my observations in this forum. I wish I could be enthusiastic concerning this publication, as it is clear that a good bit of work went into it; but I’m afraid that on the whole it is extremely disappointing. I say this not simply because the document reaches a status quo conclusion, but because in large part it appears that that is what it was designed to do: it is a particularly good example of “begging the question” — the conclusions are assumed as premises. Over and over when objections to a traditional view are raised, they are first to some extent misrepresented, and then “refuted” largely not by argument but by an appeal to the very consensus they challenge. The so-called consensus or mainstream thus becomes unassailable, and always has the last word.

Another major problem is the tendency to cast the net very broadly to find anything against a more liberal view of homosexuality, while presenting a very selective, and not very representative or well-represented response from the “revisionist” position. (I note in passing I’m also troubled by the use of certain code words such as this; “lifestyle” is another.) This is typical in the work of Robert Gagnon, who takes a maximalist view by reading an anti-homosexual meaning into texts few before him ever read in that way, and heaping criticism (sometimes fallacious and often irrelevant and ad hominem) on the various straw men he sets up, as well as the scholars whose work he misrepresents (or at least misunderstands) and impugns.

On a related note, one of the major flaws of this book is simply poor scholarship: it has the appearance of scholarship (footnotes, bibliography, citations, etc.) but the footnotes and citations often do not refer to the subject at hand.

I’m also troubled by the “soft” anecdotal “Voices from the debate” — these subjective elements add little to the discussion, and Bishop Forster, an ardent supporter of ex-gay ministries, sees to it that this aspect of the debate receives a disproportional representation, along with all of the demonizing language of “the strategy of the enemy.” In addition, although I understand the rationale for lumping bisexuality and transsexualism into the debate concerning secular issues and civil rights, I find that the attempt to deal with these issues in the present volume clouds the theological debate, as the issues are rather different.

My Notes on Some Issues in Human Sexuality

1.1.5 the last sentence articulates the mythology of the universal consensus on sexual morality through Christian history.

1.1.10f the use of “lifestyle” in this argument is insulting and beside the point

1.1.16 wrongly suggests that the industrial revolution is a major cause in the “breakdown of traditional forms of socially imposed morality.” Adultery was both common and condemned long before the industrial revolution.

1.1.23 this whole section about autonomy fails to address the Christian notion of love as the gift of one person to another.

1.2.7 states that the Protestant reformers argued for “equal importance of marriage and celibacy as forms of Christian discipleship.” The English reformers at least were not as enthusiastic about either as their catholic predecessors; they were suspicious of celibacy, and tolerated marriage as “an estate allowed.” The idealization of marriage is a relatively recent phenomenon and derives from largely secular sources (“marriage as the basis of society” etc.)

1.2.9 here we get the first reference to the problematical notion of complementarity. The definition of complementary as “differences between men and women ... intended for the mutual good of each” is not particularly truthful, nor does it relate to the dictionary definition of complementary as the lack of one made up by the other.


1.2.17 Aquinas’ argument is only hard to follow because it is a circular argument; it also partakes of an “ends justifies the means” ethic

1.2.21 again misrepresents the Protestant view of marriage and celibacy; Karl Barth harshly criticized celibacy in Church Dogmatics III, particularly celibacy in community, which he saw as a rejection of the “opposite”

1.2.24.2 this is a misreading of Ephesians 5.32; the great mystery is the relationship between Christ and the church, as Paul says (“but I speak of Christ and the church”).

1.2.25 this is the first of several misrepresentations of Boswell’s thesis. Boswell’s conclusion was not about the intent of the rites so much as how they were used. That variant sexual relationships have been tolerated (if not affirmed) at various times in Church history is obvious. That the rites Boswell describes were used for same-sex blessings is evident in that this is one of the main reasons given for their suppression. Note also an example of faulty scholarship is SIHS: the footnote refers to a book published 12 years before Boswell’s work was published. While a number of scholars have disagreed with Boswell’s conclusions, SIHS fails to recognize is that that’s what scholarship is all about: scholars often disagree about any number of things but that doesn’t necessarily settle the question; on many of these issues the jury of history is still out. The search for consensus is at fault here. In cultural history (as in science of all sorts) the mainstream or consensus often awaits correction by the new discovery and understanding.

1.2.26 it is typical of a Roman Catholic document to say that tradition has always declared something which was only stated explicitly in the 1990s, i.e., that homosexual acts are “intrinsically disordered.”

1.2.34 the forward thinking American BCP of 1785/89 also challenged the reasoning behind the so-called ends of marriage by removing reference to them from the rite

1.3.6 Gagnon has not advanced beyond the point of seeing the sexual organs as some kind of proper fit; in reality they aren’t particularly “well-fitting” as any woman whose husband knows nothing of sexual relations beyond “insert tab a into slot b” will attest; moreover, there is a whole field of science dedicated to the evolution of the form of the sexual organs, which in many species are intended to make fertilization difficult, not to promote it

1.3.8 it is interesting to see that the British in 1954 were aware that national servicemen “living in a predominantly male service community” might need some protection from each other.

1.4.11 needs to ask why “the official teaching about homosexuality in both the Church of England and the Anglican Communion in general has remained more conservative than it has on other subjects connected with sexual morality.” Might that not be prejudice rather than adherence to some pure truth?

1.5.2 how true for instance that “on some issues, for example, the need for faithfulness within and abstinence outside of marriage, its (the Anglican Communion) beliefs have not changed” except to the extent the provision for divorce and remarriage constitutes what many of those who opposed it considered a formal blessing of adultery.

2.1.4 it should be noted that authority as such is not in the Scripture but in the interpretation and explication and application of the Scripture.

2.2.15 what Hart fails to recognize is that even those who think they are doing type 1 interpretation are really doing type 2, because meaning does not reside in text.

2.5.12 citing Article VII on rites and ceremonies, I simply note that ordination and marriage are exactly that

2.5.16 it is not at all evident that the requirements of the council in Acts concerning food strangled or blood or meals associated with idolatry “relate to specific cultural and historical circumstances that have no direct parallels in this country today.” Scripture assigns these conclusions to the Holy Spirit, not societal or cultural pressure.

2.6.5 “the final point we need to note is that we cannot simply reduce the Bible’s ethical instruction to the command to love” suggests that Jesus didn’t know what he was talking about when he did exactly that.

2.7.4 Barton’s suggestion that “rather than biblical interpretation preceding and shaping Christian ethics and practice, it is the ethics and practice of the Christian community that needs to (and in reality does) precede and shape its biblical interpretation.” This seems a truism; we know the community came before the Scripture was written, and subsequently interprets what it wrote; only a certain class of biblical fundamentalists imagine the Scripture is the source rather than the product.

2.7.6 notice in this translation of 2 Timothy 3.16-17, the whole clause is in apposition to what precedes. “Every Scripture inspired by God is suitable for instruction....”

2.7.9 how to determine what reading is true to text? Whether The Merchant of Venice is a comedy or tragedy depends on whether you are Shylock or Portia.

3.1.2 “the biblical text nowhere identifies the image of God with some inherent human capacity to be or to do certain things.” On the contrary, the Johannine tradition locates this precisely in the capacity to love. (e.g. 1 John 4:16)

3.1.3 Genesis 1 analogizes the creation with the construction of a Middle Eastern Temple, in which the image of the deity is placed in the sanctuary in the center of the Temple. Thus God creates humanity in his image as the finishing note in his work, just as the builder of a Middle Eastern Temple would create the image of the god to place in the sanctuary.

3.4.7 John Stott disregarded the plain sense of Gal 3.28 because the plain sense of it would require of him something that he would find too difficult, that is, to overlook sexual differences within the church, including in its ministry and in its rites.

3.4.8 notice the disappearance of the idea of each person being made in the image of God from the previous section.

3.4.9 again this begs the question by saying that the Genesis accounts established something permanent about human sexual relationships rather than about their beginnings; this transforms a Creation account into a settled "thus and always so" (c. Titus 1:14-15; 1 Timothy 1:4)

3.4.17 the 2 quite distinct Genesis accounts (which are incompatible from a narrative standpoint) have been blurred together; that Jesus did this as a midrash to make a point about the indissolubility of the marriage bond is no reason to do it on a narrative level

3.4.23 the import in Genesis 2 is not that Eve is female but that she is human — it is her “likeness” to Adam, not her difference from him that is important

3.4.27 one could just as easily add same-sex covenant to marriage, community, etc., as a means of dealing with the fact that it is not good to be alone

3.4.35 circular reasoning: of course Anselm couldn’t have been homosexual because Anselm couldn’t have been homosexual as he understood homosexuality; so therefore all of the language he uses, that to any other person would mean homosexuality, couldn’t possibly mean what it appears to mean when Anselm uses it

3.4.50 this section is very poor; it stresses complementarity when Genesis 2 is about similarity

3.4.53 repeats the old heresy (yes, from a Christological standpoint) that “from now on neither is complete without the other. The man needs the woman for his wholeness, and the woman needs the man for hers.” This ignores the fact that Jesus Christ is perfect man complete in himself. Each human being is created in God’s image, and each person is complete and full in him or herself: the Chalcedonian definition declares that Jesus derives his human nature entirely from Mary, and she could not bestow what she didn’t possess, which is a full and complete human nature in all its perfection.

3.4.65 another circular argument

3.4.72 the married state is not exalted, even in the here and now, in the NT

3.4.74 it is specious to generalize that the first three chapters of Genesis provided some kind of “basic conceptual framework within which to understand and assess all that follows in the Old Testament” largely because the first three chapters of Genesis date from a later period than much of the rest of the Old Testament and can hardly be held to be constitutive. Otherwise those who composed the older sections of the Scripture wouldn’t have understood what they were saying! (This is a kind of pre-critical thinking here; surely the SIHS authors know the Scripture wasn’t written in the order in which we now have it bound in a single volume.)

3.4.75 the exclusiveness of the union between Adam and Eve is a result of the fact that there wasn’t anybody else. There is no suggestion whatsoever in the Old Testament that polygamy is sinful, though it may fall short of an ideal. It is explicitly provided for in the Law of Moses. (Dt 21:15f)

3.4.76 this does not answer Vasey’s critique. Jesus’ teaching is not pro-monogamy but anti-divorce; he is most likely responding to the rebbinic tradition that mandated the divorce of infertile wives (after ten years) in fulfilling the commandment to “be fruitful and multiply”

3.4.77 the New Testament does not affirm monogamous marriage; it allows it. The references in Timothy and Titus to one wife refer to being married only once; it is a proscription of remarriage in widowhood

3.4.78 if marriage is relevant within the context of “the new community created in by Christ” then where are all the married couples? There is no case in which marriage is seen as preferred rather than as allowed.

3.4.79 what Genesis 2 teaches about marriage is that it is permanent, not that it is the only human relationship

3.4.80f all of this could apply to same-sex couples as well

3.4.83 back to the circular argument

3.4.89f this pattern of argument is repeated: a good point versus opposition based on specious arguments

3.4.91 rejects “other forms of family life” as “at variance to God’s plans for human life” — why then did God choose to become incarnate in such an irregular variety of family life --- a woman pregnant (not by her husband) prior to marriage, and foster-fatherhood?

3.4.92 “the traditional pattern of family life is the best environment for the raising of children because it provides them with the greatest degree of security and stability.” Not only is this not borne out by studies but it overlooks the rich Christian metaphor of adoption --- starting with Joseph. The biological family is sometimes not the best place to raise a child. This is another example of the tendency towards misplaced and ill-informed idealism that afflicts this whole study.

3.4.93 now we are on to the well-being of society as a whole; this is plain and simple utilitarianism

3.4.96 here we have Karl Barth’s heresy in full, “real man, genuine fellow humanity, man and woman as they truly are.” Overlooking that Jesus Christ is true and perfect man. A man and woman do not become more complete as creatures through sexual union.

3.4.98 fails to meet the standards of Gal 3.28 — all that stems from race, status, or sex is of no import in Christ.

3.4.100 celibacy is not an option; it is presented by Christ as eschatological sign of the Kingdom

3.4.103 we get some real confusion here about the difference between singleness and celibacy. In this paragraph we seem to see a difference between the provisionality of singleness and the permanence of celibacy. But then celibacy is seen as something where marriage is “often” permanently renounced. Temporary celibacy is singleness.

3.4.108 now singleness is being talked about as a vocation. This language of call returns in 3.4.10, 3.5.5

3.5.4 assumes the mainstream interpretation must be right, ipso facto

3.5.8 obviously it would be much easier if gay and lesbian people didn’t exist since they are so hard to “fit into this picture.” Maybe the picture is wrong, or the viewers of it?

3.6.11 overlooks the fact that the same-sex relationship that is faithful without the external needs of a family or society might in fact be morally exemplary and superior to the “ends”- based marriage that stays together because of the external concerns such as the children, the house, the business, etc.

3.6.36 I don’t understand why Coakley is brought in at this point; the argument seems irrelevant.
Chapter four, voices: at the end of citation two this poor young man seems not to be able to distinguish his own “stubborn intellectual integrity” from the “willful interpretations” of the people who might have led him to some kind of healing or reconciliation. Who, in short, is willful here?

4.2.3 the traditional Jewish understanding of the visit to Sodom has nothing to do with homosexuality; this is clear from the Talmud
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4.2.7 this time the consensus or the mainstream does appear to be on the liberal side. However...

4.2.8 it is now convenient to undercut this consensus with specious arguments. The unambiguous verb for sex is not yada but shakav.

4.2.9 the sin of Sodom was antecedent to the visit of the angels — so the sin for which the city suffered was not homosexual rape

4.2.11 here we have Gagnon at his worst; the Ezekiel passage simply because it uses the word abomination must be referring to homosexuality, even though Ezekiel never uses the word abomination in this sense elsewhere. As to Jude and 2 Peter texts — they refer to slander and malice, not sex. “Going after someone’s flesh” is a metaphor for slander, not lust. (For example, in Daniel 3:8 and 6:24/25 the idiom is simply accepted as such by the translators, and the colorful image of the Chaldeans “chewing on the Jews’ parts” becomes simply, “they denounced them” and those “who chewed on Daniel’s parts” becomes “who accused him.”) The slander of “the glorious ones” — whether angels or the rightful leaders of the congregation, is the focus of Jude’s rhetoric.

4.2.14 in an astonishing misuse of evidence, even though they state that “the texts we have just looked at say nothing directly about this topic” they immediately refer them to “sexual relationships that fall outside the limits the God has laid down”!

4.2.16 this whole section completely misreads Leviticus and its context

4.2.21 only raises one of Milgrom’s three objections; the others are more significant

4.2.23 totally misrepresents the use and significance of the word abomination; the citations from Proverbs are irrelevant — this is wisdom literature not legal code, from an entirely different era, and figuratively expands the concept of abomination; it is only in Proverbs that the phrase “toevah adonai” is used; and all other uses here are metaphorical as in “righteousness is abominable to the sinner”

4.2.24 completely overlooks Milgrom’s very serious observation that lesbianism is not covered by this commandment; while the commands on bestiality do cover both men and women. The complete absence of a Levitical proscription on lesbian sex should indicate that this is a social/cultic matter, not a divine command, unless one wishes to take this literally and believe that God only forbids male homosexual acts (between Jews in Israel, as Milgrom notes)

4.2.25 fails to observe the difference between ritual and cult

4.2.27 it is not that “Commandments regarding human sexuality are intended to prevent the violation of the boundaries between natural and unnatural laid down by God in creation.” It is because they were practiced by the Egyptians and the Canaanites. That’s what the text says. If we take the text literally, then, there is nothing unnatural about lesbianism.

4.2.30 Deuteronomy 25.5, raises the whole issue of the levirate law. I take it there is not desire to affirm this part of God's ordinances. (Note to England: this is an issue of some relevance to Henry VIII.)

4.2.33 whatever else it is this is clearly a cultic regulation

4.2.28 Gagnon is wrong again: the rejection is not of homosexuality or of prostitution but of cult; the verses are about men and women, hetero- and homosexual, and the only common factor, which is the reason for the condemnation, is the cult. Milgrom notes (Lev 17-22; p 1789) that Temple prostitution is a bad translation for this phenomenon

4.2.39 it’s not homosexual prostitution that is condemned, but cult prostitution by either sex

4.2.40 appears to reach a conclusion when it hasn’t understood the evidence

4.2.41 what does Deuteronomy 25.5 say about God’s intention for human sexuality?

4.2.45 is begging the question ever valid?

4.2.49 the Old Testament is severe because it is protective of the cult; the cult preserves the cult-ural division of Israel from its neighbors

4.3.2 the whole section on Romans 1 confuses punishment and crime

4.3.6 the very important observation of the rhetorical relationship between chapters 1 and 2 is never taken up again until page 264 in section 8.4.17; this rhetorical device is crucial to the proper understanding of Romans as a whole

4.3.12 other recent scholarship supports the view that the "unnatural" female sexual activity referred to irregular heterosexual intercourse. This was Augustine’s view. (De nup. 2.20)

4.3.14 Barrett rightly notes that the sexual practices are a consequence of idolatry

4.3.17 when Paul talks about shameless acts in Rom 1.27 if he was thinking of Leviticus 18 and 20 as Dunn suggests, he would not have been thinking about the abomination; the shameless acts (aschemosunen) described in Leviticus are heterosexual. Aschemosunen means “making naked” — the “uncovering of the nakedness of your mother, sister, etc.”

4.3.21 Gagnon again — para phusin may simply mean “alternative use”; and all of this talk about the glove-like fit and the lack of mutual pleasure is simply ignorance. Not all penile-vaginal sex is mutually pleasurable, and there are numerous forms of sexual behavior practicable by homosexual and heterosexual people alike that are!

4.3.23 the section ends without noting the significance of Romans 2 for the impact of the rhetorical argument

4.3.28 would St. Paul have appealed to the law?

4.3.29 Hays cites Scroggs but then misuses his argument

4.3.33 note that Genesis 1 and 2 might well be qualified as Jewish myths. Neither will stands as a literal historical account --- and they cannot stand together as literal because they are contradictory in detail, narrative and sequence.

4.3.37 Orthodox rabbis precisely narrowed the meaning of the critical proscription to anal intercourse

4.3.39 male homosexual acts would not constitute adultery under Jewish law. A man can only violate someone else’s marriage.

4.3.41 implies that somehow only the same-sex regulations of the old covenant are still binding on God’s people under the new covenant, without explaining why

4.3.52 the refutations are extremely weak and offer no real evidence

4.3.60 it is not a “logical conclusion” but a reductio ad absurdum

4.3.61 Gagnon once more makes a false summary: “No first century Jew could have spoken of porneai (plural) without having in mind the list of forbidden sexual offenses in Leviticus 18 and 20.” In Mark 7.21 all of the sins are in the plural, it is the NRSV that renders them as singular. No Jew would read Leviticus 18-20 into porneai: even the root of the word is rare in the Torah (in the LXX), and in Leviticus it only refers to actual prostitution. The LXX only has one use of the plural form of which Gagnon makes so much, in 2Kgs 9.22 — the “harlotries” of Jezebel -- which are metaphorical.

4.3.63 utterly fails to understand celibacy not as a mere option but as an overturning of the first commandment to “be fruitful and multiply.” In this Jesus “undoes” Genesis’ first mandate to humans, because he is inaugurating a new creation for the new humanity.

4.3.64 Gagnon again: there is no “uniform opposition within the Judaism of [Jesus’] day” — homosexuality is hardly mentioned in rabbinic Judaism. And remember there is nothing whatsoever in the Torah against lesbianism. Rabbinic Judaism does not treat a married woman caught in a lesbian relationship as an adulteress. She is punished for disobedience, but not executed.

4.3.71 the lifestyle again; what about the prostitute it Luke 7

4.3.77 the Acts Council is not about accepting certain people, it is about not restricting certain actions.

4.3.78 begs the question

4.3.79 but we don’t observe the blood prohibition which is one of the four specifically binding rules on the alien: Leviticus 17.10; see also 24.16: Lex talionis is binding on all.

4.3.81 tries to have it both ways; it is hard to read the Jewish attitude towards homosexuality into the apostolic ban since it isn’t part of the apostolic ban.

4.3.82 the blood prohibition is not one of the Jewish food laws; it is in a different class altogether; it is Noachide in origin and thus not “Jewish” and held (in Rabbinic Judaism, derived from Genesis) as biding on all human beings. And if the food laws aren’t important (as in binding on the alien) then why did the authors bring them up at 4.3.70?

4.4.3 since “this general agreement has ceased to exist,” where is the so-called consensus

4.4.5 offensive use of the phrase “takes seriously” as if other views don’t

4.4.10 apparently to “take seriously” means to take the traditional view

4.4.21 because it is convenient to argue that the idea that “there was no awareness in the ancient world of the idea of homosexuality as an innate or congenital orientation,” the authors attack this straw-man. But what could all of the “change” language that they take such pains to develop in sections 4.3.16 to 22 possibly mean — Paul’s language of change. Change from what? If Paul did not believe that people were naturally heterosexual, why would he have all of that language of how people had changed their natures.

4.4.23 “While we should certainly take people’s sense of themselves with the ‘utmost seriousness’ it would mark a radical break with the Anglican theological tradition if it were to be accepted that this should be given priority over the witness of holy Scripture when making moral decisions.” God forbid we should actually believe people's accounts of their own experience! This contradicts the part of Lambeth Resolution 1.10 that called for listening to the experience of gay and lesbian people. If the evidence of personal experience is to be dismissed beforehand as irrelevant, or even more insultingly listened to and then ignored, then why bother? Indeed, some have expressly rejected this portion of the resolution.

This is not just about some alleged new leg to the “three-legged stool” called “experience.” The issue here is the nature of revelation: the initiative is entirely from God’s side, but the perception/reception is entirely on our side, thorough and with human experience. The Holy Scripture itself is the result of human response to God’s revelation. Whether the burning bush, the resurrection appearances, or Paul on the road to Damascus, the experience of the individual in the face of God’s revelation is the primary evidence whose authority we either trust or dismiss: they become the entry points for God’s action in the world.

The church is badly in need of an Emmaus experience to have its heart warmed and eyes opened. Otherwise the church falls into the trap it did when the Apostles refused to believe thewomen who had personal experience of the risen Christ: “But it seemed to them to be an idle tale.” (Luke 24:11) How many resurrection appearances does it take before a “consensus” is reached that Christ is truly risen?

4.4.24 listening to people, it appears, is simply an “attempt to relativize the witness of Scripture” — again notice that people who disagree with the premises of this paper are assumed not to take Scripture seriously. But why do we listen to the witness of the people who wrote the Scripture in the first place?

4.4.26 while they seem strained to “admit that there is an element of truth in his argument” actually it is evident; the Scripture emerges from a sexist and heterosexist milieu and worldview; it is not above and beyond human culture. It is no more troubling to think that those who recorded the Scriptures lacked a full and complete understanding of human sexual dynamics than to admit that they had a less than perfect understanding of human reproduction or the solar system.

4.4.27 “the biblical vision for the relationship between men and women is fundamentally patriarchal in nature; patriarchy is as much about fertility as it is about power” — the question is not hierarchy but procreation. They really want to have it both ways, missing the fact that you can’t say marriage is for procreation and then say that it isn’t about patriarchy, which in the world of that time only knew that as a way of determining parenthood.

4.4.40 is needlessly obtuse. Although Christ comes to us mediated through the Scripture he also comes to us in the sacraments and the teaching of the church. This section veers dangerously close to sola scriptura

4.4.43 more begging the question: “I think homosexuality is a sin and God came to deliver us from sin and that includes homosexuality.” That is not a conservative approach to the debate; that is a tautology.

4.4.48 “once we accept that gay and lesbian people are the objects of God’s creative activity this means there is no fixed order of creation in the light of which we are called to live.” Unless gay and lesbian people are indeed part of that fixed order, but those who wrote Genesis were not aware of this reality. What if God’s fixed order has nothing to do with the sex of people? How “fixed” is it if in Christ there is “no more male and female”?

4.4.49 we are in the world here of “any change in the moral teaching” equals “no fixed morals.” This slope isn’t just slippery, it is vertical. This seems to be innocent of awareness of much of the change in moral teaching over the last century. To change something does not necessitate changing everything.

4.4.51 confuses Alison’s reading of the text with the text itself. It is ultimately only God and not any part of creation that is natural in every sense of the word.

4.4.52 once again we hear how important Jesus’ teaching about men and women being meant to be “joined to each other as one flesh for life.” One wonders why this paper isn’t about divorce rather than about homosexuality.

4.4.53 by placing our concept of what is “natural” in the place of God we commit idolatry — that is Alison’s point

4.4.57 I would say that the existence of controversy is exactly why we cannot always have unequivocal teachings about the subject. The fact is, “that some people have either misread them, or simply do not wish to accept what they are saying.” However, I believe it is the conservatives who have misread and do not wish to accept the true reading which is even now emerging as greater understanding is brought to the texts.

4.4.60 while “the jury is still out on the causes of homosexuality” — whatever the causes, homosexuality is natural, for it exists widely in nature. As someone once said, if you can do it, it is natural. We don’t know what “causes” heterosexuality either.

4.4.66 why in these discussions do they always talk about “other human problems, such as drunkenness and violence” — this begs the question by assuming that homosexuality is a problem. Why not talk about other human gifts, like musical talent or the ability to be charitable?

4.4.70 “taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that the Bible would cease to have a normative function in our ethics and merely be used to affirm what we already believe on other grounds.” Ironically, the authors here have named the very process by which they are working, and by which the church has always worked. The church always ignores the things it no longer finds convenient. The Bible does not, in the life of the church, have normative function: rather, the church uses selective portions of the Scripture to validate what it wishes to enforce in each era. This is how earlier generations were able to justify slavery and condemn divorce.

5.2.18 “the right to pursue personal happiness in this way has come to be widely regarded as integral part of people’s human rights” — maybe it makes sense then, given the Declaration of Independence, which substituted “pursuit of happiness” for Locke’s “property,” that Americans should take the lead.

5.2.22 “as we noted in Chapter Three, Christians have held that the traditional pattern of family life is that which is most conducive to the flourishing society as a whole.” Putting aside the question as to whether the traditional pattern of any life is in fact the most beneficial to society, Jesus and Paul both supported celibacy as opposed to the traditional family. Where your heart is, there is your treasure! If it is the family you idealize, that is where you will worship. This is simply a statement of a kind of revisionist secular humanism. The authors see themselves justified “in rejecting patterns of sexual relationship that they see as undermining family life.” A good look at divorce would be in order -- but faithful same-sex couples can only help to build up society by their fidelity.

5.3.38 now they’re defining complementarity as “equality in difference” — this definition, which differs from the one at 1.2.9, is no more reasonable than the one outlined there.

5.4.6 we got this far and there’s been no mention of David and Jonathan.

5.4.7 finally Boswell’s claim is articulated correctly, that the “brother-making ritual” had functioned as a same-sex union.

5.4.8 this misrepresents Boswell’s claim that the rite functioned — for some — as a means to sanctify their relationship — whether erotic or not.

5.4.24 not proven; the passage about women in Romans 1 may refer to anal intercourse, or to a woman in the “dominant” position.

5.5.10 I’d rather take the minimalist view and look only at particulars rather than generalities. There are ultimately only persons. This is the difference between spirit and law. The spirit looks to individuals as such, the law sees only classes of behavior — not the persons made in Christ’s image in whom there is “no more male and female” i.e., no more of that “Genesis stuff.” Christ does not simply restore paradise, he makes a new creation. See below on 5.6.2

5.5.18 human care is indeed the litmus test for holiness. And it is always specific: it is no coincidence that a casa, while a home, is also a case — an actual occasion

5.6.2 Paul explicitly uses “no more male and female” in Galatians 3:28 as a direct rebuttal to Genesis 1:27; his is speaking of a realized eschatology. If the church is not to be the sign of the eschaton — which is end both in terms of goal and accomplishment --- what use is it? It is then just a benediction of secular society. (Is the establishment role of the Church of England showing here?) I’m sure the authors of True Union in the Body would not like to think that the nuptial imagery in Revelation describes bestiality — the marriage of the Lamb with the New Jerusalem could hardly be described as “one man, one woman marriage.”
The available evidence supports Freud’s claim; in reality most people are capable of bisexuality and culturally geared towards heterosexuality. The British Public School system, as C.S. Lewis described it in his autobiography, is a good example.

If we don’t insist on some component of friendship in marriage, then what about marriage after menopause? If we only see marriage as the means for the fulfillment of external ends (children, a good society, etc.) rather than as the locus for the self-giving love exemplified in Christ and the Church, in which the beloved is the end and not the means to some other end, then we have an ethically defective and essentially mercenary view of human relationships.

The authors see “the danger that a focus on friendship as a controlling metaphor for God will lead to a sidelining of other biblical images that stress the sovereignty and authority of God over human beings” — in response I note that it was God’s idea to become our friend, as spelled out in John 15:15. Some people would rather have the stern disciplinarian rather than the loving Father.

6.4.3 again disvalues personal experience, as if reality should have no impact upon our understanding. When reason trumps Scripture, reason wins. Always. And so it should.

6.4.8 the slippery slope argument appears once again; if we allow for bisexuality it “means moving to a position in which all forms of sexual activity are to be accepted if they meet the needs and desires of the people concerned.” That is not what is being said. We see here again the ongoing struggle between idealism (which soon becomes idolatry) and realism — the latter is based on the Incarnation, the former on too much reliance upon a “doctrine of creation” which overlooks the significance of the new creation in Christ
Chapter eight, “Voices” page 252: the quote that ends at the top of the page is from an ex-gay who notes that not all gays are able to “be healed” — “in the end healing is a mystery, and we must trust in the righteousness of God’s way for each individual.” — unless of course God means the person to be gay. Could it be that God intends some people to be gay?

In the next to the last quote we have the unfortunate language about the “strategy of the enemy.”

8.2.7 betrays the logical slip between bisexuality, and bisexual sexual activity.
The final point, about sexually active relationships among the clergy being rejected: another circular argument

8.3.5 Vibert says, “Paul is calling for a greater exemplification of the one standard amongst those who were going to lead the flock, not a lower standard for the laos.” But doesn’t it amount to the same thing: if one is higher then aren’t the others automatically lower, whether you’ve lowered them or raised the other? It is all relative.

8.3.6 again it is assumed that those take a liberal view are “ignoring biblical principles” — what it all really depends on which biblical principles you are talking about

8.4.17 “there is a need to avoid the hypocrisy of singling out homosexuality as a particular bar to participation in the life of the church while conveniently overlooking forms of sin to which others in the church may be subject.” This is however exactly what has happened regarding ordination.

8.4.19 Atkinson can only state that the first word a homosexual person “seems to hear from the Christian Church is one of moral rebuke.” Seems?

8.4.24 the Catch-22 reappears: a more liberal approach conflicts with the majority of Christian opinion. Perhaps the majority opinion is mistaken.

8.4.25 “the line on sexual morality taken in Issues in Human Sexuality still reflects the consensus of typical scholarship and the prevailing mind of the Church of England, and it would be both wrong and impossible for the church to move officially to a more liberal position as long as this remains the case.” But to what extent — as in this document — is the mere existence of a tradition used as a means of perpetuating the tradition.

8.4.27 Genesis 1-2 does not mention the civil phenomenon called marriage.

8.4.31 note that the question in the ordinal of the Book of Common Prayer calls upon the ordinand to frame his or her life according to the doctrine of Christ, not the doctrine of Saint Paul

8.4.39 to allow faithful homosexual relationships on the basis of Paul in 1 Corinthians 7.9 would be in line with what Paul may have meant, since civil marriage is the only marriage that existed in his time; in verse 7.10, 28, 34, 36 and 39 gameo can apply to the wife as well

8.4.43 indeed, if the church has weakened on divorce given the greater explicitness of Scripture and tradition, homosexuality should be easier, not harder

8.4.44 unfortunately we are back to the Catch-22; paragraph b completely misses the fact that only male homosexual acts are referred to as an abomination; and not “before God” by the way; and in the last line in this paragraph Sibley engages in mind reading about what St. Paul’s original intent may or may not have been

8.4.45 “the Bible and the Christian tradition allow for the possibility of divorce and even remarriage, whereas they give no such support to same-sex relationships.” How easily the camel enters the gateway of an open mind! No citations, no argument, just an assertion of a notion contrary to the tradition until about fifty years ago.

8.4.47 now it’s only “perhaps the majority” who regard Jesus’s teachings on divorce as clear

8.4.72 this paragraph is a consequence of confusing mandatory abstinence with charismatic celibacy

8.4.74.a confuses revelation with one’s own understanding

8.5.4 homophobia is not just about violence, but about a psycho-social attitude, much like racism

9.3.2 fails to notice that because opinion “remains divided” on the subject of homosexuality it can scarcely be “a position” — one cannot claim to have the consensus one lacks, unless the consensus is that we don’t agree.

9.3.4 refers to “those who accept the authority of Lambeth” — a very important point, since Lambeth from its very foundation rejected taking the position of authority

9.6.3 this whole section is simply an embarrassment, and seriously misrepresents postmodernism

9.6.8 Postmodernism is not self-refuting; there is a difference between a logical conclusion and a reductio ad absurdum. In the third paragraph the authors have confused the distinction between context and substance — not surprising since they are in fact essentialists. The point of postmodernism, that “timeless truths” are not necessary, is incarnational: truth exists in every time suitable to the time and to the occasion. A close reading of the church’s record, and how many “timeless truths” have later been shown to be in error, is in order. Galileo would remind us that it is all about worldview.

9.6.59 there is significant debate as to whether “ex-gays” were ever really gay, and to what extent those who were gay are really “cured.” Some conservatives even deny that there is a "gay identity" and that is it only a lifestyle choice. Mere choice should be easier to change, and the fact that it isn't easy to change seems to point to the fact that this is not a mere matter of behavior.

9.6.62 “those who take a more conservative approach would note, however, that there is also a danger of confusing the spirit of God with the prevailing attitudes of contemporary culture.” The point is that God has given us a way to tell the difference — the fruits of the spirit. And what of those who confuse the spirit of God with the prevailing attitudes of past cultures?