Showing posts with label general convention. Show all posts
Showing posts with label general convention. Show all posts

May 2, 2016

Great Cloud of Confusion

There is a good deal of confusion in some quarters concerning the status of the commemorations in Holy Women, Holy Men and the forthcoming Great Cloud of Witnesses. This confusion stems in part from the commendable desire felt by many clergy obediently “to conform to the ... Worship of the... Church,” and uphold the principle of common prayer. The confusion enters in due to the habit of General Convention of authorizing various liturgical resources for trial use over the years, and Great Cloud of Witnesses has not been presented in that way.

That need not be a concern. The reason commemorations listed in Lesser Feasts and Fasts went through “trial use” was their inclusion on the Calendar of the BCP (only alternatives or revisions to the BCP actually require trial use; the Bishops of the Episcopal Church, and even single diocesan bishops, can authorize additional liturgical resources as they will, per both the Constitution and the BCP). HWHM was originally to be an extension of Lesser Feasts, and so was offered for trial use due to the changes in the Calendar it would have presented, but GCoW is offered as a resource for congregations to do what the BCP already allows; it does not need “trial use” because the rubrics of the BCP already "authorize" such commemorations, for which GCoW supplies proper collects and readings. The resolution enabling the publication of GCoW states this clearly: “That the 78th General Convention make available for publication and distribution by individuals and in congregations and other church groups for devotional or catechetical use, or use in public worship subject to the provision for optional commemorations on page 18 of the Book of Common Prayer, the liturgical resource entitled, ‘A Great Cloud of Witnesses...’” (emphasis mine). The language is a bit tortured, but “use in public worship subject to... the BCP” is crystal clear.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

January 24, 2016

Church Management

The leadership of the Church of England, and by extension (since the majority are relatively recent products of English missionary efforts) many of the Primates of the Anglican Communion seem to have taken a managerial approach to the development of doctrine and polity within Anglicanism. One might observe this is better than the almost impossibilist approach of the Eastern Church or the heavily top-down of the Roman, but in recent years these leaders seem to have taken their cue more from those directions than from the more traditionally Anglican model of provincial autonomy to innovate and the process of reception over time.

This is not meant to give unqualified endorsement to the Gamaliel principle ("If it lasts, it is of God") if for no other reason than that things of God don't always last, and many things that are downright ungodly seem to endure very well! The danger in the "wait and see" approach lies in the fact that deferring action on what is later judged to have been unjust or immoral puts one in a bad light under that later judgment. C. S. Lewis long ago, in a children's book of all places, denounced the danger of taking a wait and see attitude in which, "The dwarves are for the dwarves." They end up unable to see, having refused to act.

Nor am I endorsing a free-for-all adoption of anything new because it is new. Both antiquarianism and novelty are poor guides to rightness. What I am suggesting is that rather than attempting to manage the process, the Primates and the members of the various Anglican churches allow the process of reception -- or rejection -- to take place over time. We are dealing, after all, not with a core doctrine of the faith, but a matter of marriage discipline -- and one far less troublesome than that of remarriage after divorce which the churches managed to gulp (with some discomfort) while gasping at the "bulk" of the recent gnat.

In the long run, the call to submit to such managerial policies runs counter to the history of how the church has worked over time. Almost exactly a decade ago (June 2006), I assembled the following "chain of events" that explores what might have happened had various parties given in to the putative authorities urging their submission. I don't think anything need be added:

  • The General Convention should have listened to the clear directions of the Primates and repented and repudiated all that had been done to offend.
  • The Episcopal Church should have ignored the tradition of national church polity and remained as a missionary arm of the Church of England even after the Revolution.
  • The Church of England should have listened to the pope and never separated from Rome.
  • The Eastern Orthodox should have done the same and submitted to Rome so as not to sever communion.
  • The martyrs should have followed Saint Paul’s advice to obey those in civil authority.
  • Saint Paul, in the interest of not tearing the fabric of the early church, should have acceded to the circumcision party instead of trusting to his own private interpretation of Scripture.
  • The Jerusalem Council should have ignored the anecdotal evidence of Paul and Barnabas — which could only serve to make Law-abiding Jewish converts uneasy.
  • Saul should have ignored his personal “experience” on the road to Damascus and followed his orders from the Sanhedrin.
  • The other apostles should have ignored Peter’s “dream” and stuck to the letter of the Law.
  • Jesus should have heeded Peter’s advice and turned back from Jerusalem.
  • He might also have considered more seriously the various options presented to him in the Wilderness Report.
  • Joseph should have ignored the “personal revelation” he received — again in a dream, no less — and acted in accordance with the Law, and when he found Mary to be with child by someone other than himself, had her stoned to death, and her unborn child with her.
  • Then we wouldn’t be having all these problems with the Anglican Communion.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

July 1, 2015

Comprehension not Compromise

The resolutions concerning liturgies and canonical amendments that will provide for marriage equality have been adopted by the House of Bishops, and will head to the House of Lay and Clerical Deputies by this afternoon. Both resolutions were adopted by very wide majorities in the House of Bishops.

Some have characterized these resolutions as compromises. I prefer to see them as comprehensive. The resolution on liturgies authorizes trial use as provided for in the Constitution, with the mandate that bishops will see to it that all couples have access to the liturgies, while at the same time affirming that the bishop is responsible for directing and permitting these liturgies. This may be too subtle for some, but I believe it will allow the minority of bishops who are personally opposed to marriage equality sufficient conscientious cover, while at the same time requiring them to find ways to provide for couples in their dioceses who wish to make use of the liturgies. This will be a time for creativity and generosity.

The canonical amendment, in the drafting of which I participated, is, in my likely not sufficiently humble opinion, simultaneously orthodox and comprehensive. I challenge anyone opposed to it to point to any line in it that contradicts the teaching of the church. It is true that it omits reference to "man and woman" -- but omission does not constitute denial. Again, some may find this too subtle, but it is true. For on the contrary, this amendment accomplishes exactly what the Task Force on the Study of Marriage was charged with providing: a canonical way to provide for marriage equality, but it does so without contradiction to the opinion of those who oppose such equality. The revised Declaration of Intention is perfectly consonant with the traditional teaching of the church, but equally applicable to all couples. It also implies openness to adoption as well as procreation -- thereby including an extremely important theological, biblical, (and perhaps more importantly) actual reality. And it is, in my opinion, suitable for framing.

The Deputies will have the opportunity to amend these resolutions, but I hope and pray that they will accept them as adopted by the Bishops, and concur. Amendment will mean sending the resolutions back to the Bishops, who may not have the interest or the time to take them up again.

So I beseech all involved to accept this moment of gracious generosity, as the collect for Richard Hooker says, not as "compromise for the sake of peace, but comprehension for the sake of truth." It is true that this comprehension will not satisfy everyone: there are hurting people on both sides; though strangely enough likely in the same dioceses -- where the bishop is uncomfortable to have to implement something he opposes, and couples may have to find creative ways to solemnize their marriage that falls short of their ideal.

I also acknowledge that the pain felt by traditional colleagues -- many of whom I regard as personal friends beyond seeing them as brothers and sisters in Christ and children of God -- cannot be compared with the suffering of gay and lesbian Christians down through the ages and to this day, even in parts of our beloved Anglican Communion. I think I can guarantee that no bishop will be beaten to death for his opposition to marriage equality.

But now is not the time to compare pain with pain, or hurt with hurt. Now is the time for healing, and grace, and with grace it will come. Many of my friends, and I myself, have been recipients of the "generous pastoral response" of this church over the last three years. It is time for the "liberals" among us to be willing to show the same generous pastoral response to those who no doubt feel their world (both sacred and secular) collapsing around them; and I can empathize with that pain, and its depth and reality. I call on all my brothers and sisters to show the same loving toleration that they expect to receive.

For I believe that some day all of us children of God will sit on the great front porch in the kingdom, and like old war veterans roll up our sleeves and compare our scars, and say, "This wound I got me at the Great Salt Lake." Until, that is, our friend comes by -- you know, the one with the wounds in hands and feet and side -- and he gives us that look, and we lower our heads, and quietly roll down our sleeves, and turn to our brothers and sisters, and take them in our arms.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 28, 2015

Progress on Marriage

I served on the Task Force on the Study of Marriage that made two proposals to the General Convention; and I'm now serving on the Special Legislative Committee on Marriage to which these and all other resolutions concerning marriage were referred. The Legislative Committee has now reported out all of the resolutions but one (that we may eventually recommend be discharged if the others are adopted).

I'm happy to report that the resolution A037 to continue and expand the work of the Task Force (and its membership) has passed in the House of Bishops and will head to the Deputies shortly.

More importantly, in my opinion, we have amended and greatly improved resolutions A036 and A054. The first of these is the canonical amendment that will bring the canons into full conformity with the Book of Common Prayer while also allowing for marriage equality. This is no mean feat, but I am very happy with the work we did, which involved a good deal of listening and comprehension. Most importantly, the resolution provides language for a new Declaration of Intention that expresses the Church's teaching on marriage in a way that is both beautiful and inclusive. It is cast in the first person plural, and speaks of God's purposes for "our marriage" -- which I think brings it home.

The second resolution will, if adopted, authorize a number of liturgies for trial use under the terms of the Constitution Article X as alternatives to the BCP marriage liturgy. Among these is a version of the 1928 BCP liturgy suitable for same-sex couples. Again, a lot of work went into these liturgies, and the work is bearing fruit.

Both of these resolutions should arrive in the House of Bishops shortly. My prayer is that they pass as they are, without much tinkering in either house.

To those who might think we are moving too fast just to keep abreast of the times, I note that for the Church, the question isn't whether we are married to the spirit of the age, or widows to the spirit of some long-gone age. The question for us is, Are we faithful to our true spouse, Jesus Christ, who is the same for ever and ever? Being true to him may mean growing in unexpected ways to meet the new demands he places before us. God be praised for life and the opportunity to serve!

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

June 10, 2015

One Last Question on the Canon Change

Continued from here

Bishops Benhase and McConnell have posted an essay concerning the proposals coming to the General Convention. They are very concerned about the proposed Canon change, and observe this:

We focus here on good order. Resolution A036 proposes that all clergy will henceforth conform to “these canons concerning the solemnization of marriage,” rather than to “the laws of this Church governing Holy Matrimony.” The manifest problem that this revision seeks to get around is that the Episcopal Church will continue to have contrary laws governing Holy Matrimony in the Book of Common Prayer, a constitutional document. There are constitutional provisions for revising the prayer book. Perhaps that is the conversation we really need to have, but it is hard to see how a canon that directs clergy to disobey the prayer book might help that discussion.

This represents an almost compete inversion of what the proposed canon change will do. Far from "directing clergy to disobey" the BCP, the canon change addresses the current situation, in which we have clergy, operating under "generous pastoral provision," solemnizing same-sex marriages in those states in which the civil law permits, in violation of the current canon, and, if you accept the logic of Benhase and McConnell, in conflict with the BCP as well. It is true that the canon change will do nothing to change the BCP -- or to authorize any other liturgy, for that matter -- but it will remove the problem of clergy being in violation of the canons. And it is only the canon we are proposing to change.

So if the bishops are interested in "good order" as they say, this is a step they should applaud. It introduces no new conflict with the BCP -- that conflict is already there, if you accept their logic -- but it does remove the canonical dissonance, which is actionable under Title IV, in spite of the wink and nod of "generous pastoral provision." That no one is going to take clergy to ecclesiastical court, in those dioceses in which the bishop has permitted use of provisional rites for solemnizing same-sex marriages, is a nice promise, but from a canonist's perspective it is disorderly. We desire good order rather than ambiguity.

For there is no need for such ambiguity. The canon change will not alter the BCP, or the status of the BCP, but it will remove a conscientious burden for those clergy, and some bishops. This was, after all, one of the explicit charges to the Task Force, and the proposal offers a canonical solution to a canonical problem. There will be plenty of time to consider amending or supplementing the BCP, including at this session of General Convention.

When it comes to that liturgical side, the proposed canon change restores language that was part of the canon during the last cycle of prayerbook revision (in 1973), precisely to provide for the use of the trial rites that were issued as part of that process (the earlier form of the canon limiting the rite to the one in the BCP.)

So this canon change actually advances the "good order" the bishops are calling for.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE

And, by the way, the BCP is not "constitutional." Only the Constitution is constitutional. The BCP is sometimes mistakenly called "constitutional" because its amendment process takes two conventions -- but unlike the Constitution itself, amendments to the BCP can be "tried out," as the Constitution describes. Amendments to the Constitution itself, however, are null until approved by two conventions, then they are the law.

This problem arises when people treat the BCP as a law-book instead of a liturgical book. (It has some legal standing where the rubrics are concerned.) Moreover, the BCP itself provides (on page 13) for other liturgies to be authorized. These liturgies would not be needed if they were not in some way different to the BCP, so to argue that such liturgies have to be congruent to the BCP doesn't stand. Besides that, the provisional liturgies for same-gender blessings do not "contradict" the BCP; they simply offer a liturgy for something the BCP did not conceive. The BCP is descriptive, not proscriptive, when it comes to marriage -- otherwise all second marriages (permitted by canon) would be ruled out because the BCP says marriages are "life-long."

TSH

May 30, 2015

Being and Doing: A Response to an Essay on Marriage

A few weeks ago, John Bauerschmidt, Zachary Guiliano, Wesley Hill, and Jordan Hylden published a response to the report of the Task Force on the Study of Marriage (TFSM), titled “Marriage in Creation and Covenant,” henceforth MCC. This essay appeared on the Anglican Theological Review website along with three responses from Scott MacDougall, Kathryn Tanner, and Daniel Joslyn-Siemiatkoski. The three responders took up some of the serious problems with MCC and I commend their essays to your attention.

As one of the authors of “Essay 1" (Biblical and Theological Framework) in the TFSM report, I had hoped for a better level of engagement than MCC demonstrates; it is largely and off-handedly dismissive, but also mistaken in some of its characterizations of content, leading me to the conclusion that the MCC authors do not actually understand the argument. I have long been an advocate of the position that one can only truly have a meaningful discussion when you can state your interlocutor’s position in language she can recognize and affirm. MCC fails that test, even to the slight extent it engages with Essay 1 at all — the authors spend most of their time disagreeing with the essay on history, and I leave it to the author of that essay to address their concerns.

MCC to a large extent follows the method of questioning motives and form rather than engaging deeply with the content of the TFSM report. Interestingly enough, this seems to me to reflect the deeper issue of what constitutes marriage: MCC expounds a thesis about the form of marriage as a male-female bond that serves as an icon of the relationship between Christ and the Church in a constructive sense (I hope I’ve understood and stated their thesis correctly); whereas the TFSM focuses on the content of the marriage relationship as expressed in the vows, and in the spouses’ living out the loving mutual self-offering inherent in those vows, as an iconic realization of the relationship between Christ and the Church. Some might say, What’s the difference? We are dealing, to some extent, with the old perceived conflict between being and doing. (It also likely reflects the distinction in the honor given to icons as dulia rather than latria. Some, it seems to me, want to exalt marriage to a place it does not belong. However, in the present context, this also reflects the old difference of opinion as to what constitutes marriage: consent or coitus.

Which gives me the opportunity to correct a misapprehension of MCC, one of the few observations about Essay 1. On page 4, in the context of bemoaning the lack of references to the literature, the authors state,

...Brundage's work makes a brief appearance in "Essay 1" (13), where an incorrect citation is provided, making unclear the reference to a definitive "papal ruling" on the significance of consent and consummation in marriage. Perhaps it refers to Alexander III's Veniens ad nos or Innocent III's Per tuas? It is hard to know; neither said quite what the essay states nor offered a final word.

First, the citation is only “incorrect” to the extent that it fails to include “ff” after the page indicated — the page which marks the beginning of a subsection of a chapter dealing with this issue. More importantly, however, is the coy, and erroneous, rejection of what Essay 1 says, which is, “The eventual papal ruling settled the debate (for Roman Catholics) by taking a middle ground: consent makes the marriage, but consummation seals it.” It is true that “seals” is my language for the more convoluted “renders indissoluble by any human power.” But this is the conclusion reached by Alexander III (not in a single decree but in a process of development through many rulings) and enshrined in the Roman canons to this day (see CCL 1141-42.) As George Hayward Joyce, S.J., put it, in a work written long before our current controversies,

Alexander III... settled the dispute between the Schools of Paris and Bologna about the essentials of marriage. He approved the teaching of the Paris doctors that marriage is effected by the consent of the parties..., rejecting that of the Bolognese canonists who held that until consummation the partners were not strictly speaking married. Yet he did not accept the Paris teaching in its entirety, but retained one important feature of the Bolognese system.... Alexander III, though pronouncing consent to be the effective cause of marriage, taught that until consummation the bond was capable of dissolution. (Christian Marriage: An Historical and Doctrinal Study, Second Edition. London: Sheed and Ward, 1948. pp 430-431.)

Now, this may seem trivial, but it appears to me to indicate a problem that the MCC authors, and many others, have when wrestling with the issues surrounding marriage — same-sex and otherwise. There is a reluctance to place the locus of marriage in the action of marriage, the exchange of vows that makes the marriage, as an act of self-dedication through the human faculties of will and love. Instead there is a repeated retreat — often rhapsodically articulated — to the formal biological reality of male and female. With Augustine, and many since, they emphasize that which is shared with the animal realm rather than that which is uniquely human. (The reponses to MCC detail a few of the other problems with their use of Augustine. I would add to that, their failure to distinguish between sacramental marriage as Augustine understands it, as only existing between Christians, and what is often called “natural marriage” — a point I think fatal to their thesis about the constitutional nature of male-female marriage in and of itself. But that is a point for another essay.)

Of course, the TFSM does not deny this formal reality. However, what we do attempt is to articulate the reasons for our emphasis on the vows rather than the “purposes” of marriage — recognizing that the Episcopal Church did without an articulation of these “purposes” in its marriage liturgy for almost 200 years. But even here MCC misunderstands. For instance, on page 18 they state,

The very idea that marriage is a social form with ends (or purposes, teloi) given by God is not grasped at all; rather, such ends are described as "extrinsic" (perhaps better put, heteronomous) and so run afoul of Kant's categorical imperative never to treat persons as means rather than ends (21, 24). By this argument, we are told that the marriage vows are what really count, as they represent the moral "commitment" that two make to one another, and that the opening exhortation describing the ends of marriage is extraneous to this deeper reality (20-25).

The last sentence approaches but misses an accurate grasp of our position, though why commitment is in scare-quotes escapes me. However, the first sentence here not only misstates the TSFM position, but presents a thesis Essay 1 explicitly rejects as mistaken. Here is what the report says about “extrinsic” and the way in which the TFSM proposes to balance the Kantian ethical concern with the role of the “ends” of marriage (page 23):

Procreation can become a problematical cause or purpose when it is understood primarily as an extrinsic end, rather than as the natural outgrowth of the loving couple treating each other as ends in themselves. It is acknowledged that as the end in this case is a human life, it has its own inestimable worth. It must also be noted that many, if not most couples, desire this end and work together toward its accomplishment; and that the generation of new life is a tangible expression of their mutual love.... Children are a gift and a grace and a hope — but ought not be understood as an extrinsic expectation or demand, in the absence of which a marriage is deemed to have failed in some intrinsic way. Moreover, the greater and more fully realized the love of a couple for each other, the more likely any child who becomes part of the growing family, by birth or adoption, will be nurtured and raised in a way that expresses the familial virtues.

What the TFSM essay does is attempt to give procreation in marriage its proper place and role as reflected in the Prologue to the marriage liturgy: as a positive good (when possible, and “when it is God's will” or as the older (1946) canon put it “if it may be”). This stands in opposition to the rhetoric advanced in some circles that it is an "essential element" of marriage. This has never been the teaching of the church. The confusion arises precisely when one drifts from the language of "goods" or "fruits" into “ends,” "causes," or "purposes." The issue is that the institution of marriage (as the Prologue puts it) may have purposes which never are realized in a particular marriage — and that should not be seen as a reduction in the value of that marriage. The traditional position — which the TFSM paper supports — is that procreation should take place within a loving marriage; not that any given marriage must lead to procreation in order to be a valid and loving marriage that reflects God’s love and generativity.

I hope I’ve adequately addressed these two problems with MCC. A more general concern is that they seem to think that the proposed canon change undercuts the church’s teaching on marriage, and I hope I’ve addressed that in the previous posts on the topic of that change. Obviously, the canon change will remove an obstacle (in some minds) to authorizing liturgies for solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples where it is permitted by civil law, but that in no way alters the teaching concerning the nature of marriage — merely refocuses it on the moral center of marriage, which the tradition holds lies in the couple’s mutual consent to live by the vows they make to each other; not on their capacity to fulfill a “purpose.” It is, in short, the content of marriage, not its form, that ought to be the focus of our canonical, liturgical, and theological attention.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

May 28, 2015

Marriage Canon Q and A Part 2

...continued from Part 1.

Doesn't the canon change stand in conflict with the BCP? Since the BCP supersedes the Canons doesn't this set up a conflict?

As noted in the earlier round of questions, the proposed canon does not change the doctrine of the church on marriage, nor is that the point of the canon change. The issue isn't that "the BCP supersedes the Canons" -- but they are different documents governing different aspects of marriage. For example, the canons provide for remarriage after divorce -- something which is nowhere mentioned as possible in the BCP, which on the contrary (in the Catechism) describes marriage "as life-long." One could see this as a conflict, or recognize that the intent of the two authorities is different. The purpose of the canons is not to lay out a doctrine of marriage, but to describe procedures and rules and requirements for marriage. It is not about "what marriage is" but what the cleric and the couple must do in order to marry. If -- and it is an "if" -- the church continues to authorize liturgies for same-sex marriages, then the canons need to provide procedures that address that reality. The TFSM was charged with the task of addressing this pastoral reality in states where same-sex marriage is legal, and the proposal offers a response, removing the obstacle some feel the current canon presents.

Why do you propose removing the requirement to sign the Declaration of Intention from the Canon?

It's probably helpful to begin by understanding how this requirement to sign a document got into the canons in the first place, as that in part explains why it is no longer necessary in that form (a document is still required, but the content is changed).

The requirement that the couple sign a declaration was introduced to the canons in the late 1940s, as part of the gradual accommodation of the church to remarriage after divorce. As a common ground for divorce (or annulment) is "defective intent," having a couple sign a declaration of their "intent" was felt by many to be a safeguard against later claims on that ground. This language was originally in the canon on divorce, rather than the canon on marriage.

The other circumstance at that time was that the marriage liturgy in the 1928 Book of Common Prayer lacked any of the language now found in the prologue to the current (1979) marriage rite concerning the institution of marriage. So having this repeated in the canons is, to some extent, redundant, as these purposes are now spoken publicly in the sight of the congregation. Perhaps needless to say, the church had functioned quite well without any such statement of purposes for marriage in either the liturgy or the canons for over a century.

Still, to cover the legal ground, some form of declaration is still desired. The one remaining difficulty with the current declaration, as the Task Force essay on the canon notes, is that it is cast in a creedal format: the couple must attest that they "believe" certain statements about God's intention and will concerning the institution of marriage. This creates a practical problem in some circumstances, to which I can speak from personal experience. As a priest, I am regularly faced with having to instruct people about marriage. That includes addressing the allowance, under the canons and the rubric, for the marriage of a Christian to a non-Christian, who could be a Buddhist or an atheist. One can presume that the non-believing or other-believing partner is marrying in a Christian ceremony for the sake of the conscience or wishes of her spouse (or family). She may not believe in God or that "God" has "intentions" or a "will" for either the institution of marriage or her own particular marriage. Should she be required to sign a declaration stating belief in that which she does not believe? Should the cleric refuse to solemnize the marriage if she is unable to affirm "belief" in an arguably un-scriptural notion -- at least as some understand it? I would add that the BCP description of marriage is not even exactly the same as that of the Roman Church -- so should a RC spouse be forced to affirm a description of marriage that is not what her church teaches?

These are real questions and the Task Force has sought to remove this obstacle from the path of a couple in such a situation. Unlike in 1949, the causal language is part of the liturgy -- publicly stated as an exhortation -- but no one is required to subscribe to it as a statement of belief. As the official explanation in resolution A036 says, the current wording of this declaration

...is to some extent problematical when one member of the couple may not be a “believer” at all or may come from a tradition with a different theology of marriage. It should be sufficient that the couple be instructed in, and understand the rights, duties, and responsibilities of, marriage as expressed in the marriage vows; and attest to that understanding as well as to their legal competence to marry.

Finally, as already noted, this declaration forms one of the obstacles to conscience some have felt in extending the generous pastoral support to solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples in places where the bishop approves and the civil law allows. This is an obstacle the Task Force was explicitly asked to address in its charter, so that is an additional reason to remove a statement which some, in conscience, would find very difficult, if not impossible, to sign.

So what about "defective intent"?

As noted above, this remains a reality. So to meet the legal concern about defective intent, the couple is asked to sign a declaration that, in addition to covering all of the canonical requirements (including competency, formerly solely the responsibility of the cleric, and now offering the cleric some cover should the couple later be found to have presented inaccurate or false evidence of competence), states

Sec. 3. Prior to the solemnization, the Member of the Clergy shall determine, and shall require the couple to sign a declaration attesting

(a) that both parties have the right to marry according to the laws of the State and consent to do so freely, without fraud, coercion, mistake as to the identity of either, or mental reservation; and

(b) that at least one of the parties is baptized; and

(c) that both parties have been instructed by the Member of the Clergy, or a person known by the Member of the Clergy to be competent and responsible, in the rights, duties, and responsibilities of marriage as embodied in the marriage vows: that the covenant of marriage is unconditional, mutual, exclusive, faithful, and lifelong; and

(d) that both parties understand these duties and responsibilities, and engage to make the utmost effort, with the help of God and the support of the community, to accept and perform them.

I'm more than happy to answer any further questions that come up, so please post comments here if you have any other questions.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: The questions continue...

May 27, 2015

Chaste Convention

This ember season, Brother Ed, the Minister Provincial of the BSG Province 2, set us the task of meditating on the Brotherhood's vow of chastity. It reads, in part,

Chastity is the decision to live with all in love, with respect for each person's integrity. ... in order to be free to love others without trying to possess or control."

This could not have come at a better time for me, in the run-up to General Convention, to which I am a Deputy from the Diocese of New York, and a member of the special Legislative Committee #20 on all resolutions touching on marriage. As I was also a member of the Task Force for the Study of Marriage, and worked on one of the proposals coming to the Convention, you might think I had a particular horse in this race.

And to some extent I do. All of the Task Force worked hard; and I am disappointed that the work we did has gotten so little close attention -- not to say it has not been responded to, but with vague and mistaken responses that seem to take little account of what the work actually proposes. But when all is said and done, I am resolved not to let whatever happens in Salt Lake City -- either in debate or in decision -- get me down or entangle me in "the desire to possess or control." I resolve to "speak the truth in love" and treat all with whom I disagree or agree with respect for their integrity, and to stand as a witness, not a prosecutor.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

May 18, 2015

Marriage Canon Change Q&A (Part 1)

The A050 Task Force on the Study of Marriage has proposed (in resolution A036) that General Convention amend Canon I.18. The proposal has sparked some conversation and many questions. Some of the conversation is less about the proposed canon change and more about the theological and historical papers that accompany and inform it, and I will address some of those issues separately. But I would like to answer some of the questions, and correct some of the misapprehensions, concerning the proposed canon change, as best I can.

First, though, a disclaimer. Although I served as a member of the Task Force (and as its secretary) I am writing here solely on my own initiative, and other members of the Task Force may have opinions different to mine. But as I was one of the members most closely involved in the creation of the "Biblical and Theological Framework" and the wording of the canon, I think I can offer some perspective concerning matters of "original intent" whatever interpretation another may choose to give to any particular wording.

So, with that established, on to the questions. (And I will present what follows in dialogue format, which is much how it happened in the various threads, blogs, and listservs in which much of what follows originally appeared.

Does the proposed canon change alter the church's teaching on marriage?

The canon does not alter the teaching on marriage as it appears in the Book of Common Prayer. In fact, the proposed change removes the one clause in the present canon that does conflict with the Book of Common Prayer, that "Holy Matrimony is a physical and spiritual union ... entered into within the community of faith." The BCP maintains that marriage involves a "union... in heart, body, and mind," not "spirit" -- and traditional sacramental theology holds that spiritual union is engendered in Baptism and nourished in the Holy Eucharist. This is not to say that a Christian couple may not find their life -- as Christians -- enriched by their marriage, just as the witness of their marriage may inspire others to "find their lives strengthened and their loyalites confirmed." (BCP 430) But since both the BCP and the canons allow a marriage in which one of the spouses is not baptized (and, according to traditional sacramental theology, the particular marriage is therefore not sacramental) any reference to "spiritual union" or "community of faith" does not apply.

So what does the canon change accomplish?

One of the charges to the Task Force was to "consult with the Standing Commission on Constitution and Canons and the Standing Commission on Liturgy and Music to address the pastoral need for priests to officiate at a civil marriage of a same-sex couple in states that authorize such." Part of the consultation revealed a consensus that the present wording of the canon made it difficult to exercise this civil function; so an effort was made to remove the language that was perceived as an obstacle. However, nothing in the proposed canon in itself authorizes or requires clergy to officiate at same-sex civil marriages, or blessings of such relationships, unless and until the church provides liturgical texts that allow it. This has happened provisionally, and this provisional status will likely continue for some time.

This opportunity to reshape the canon also allowed for some clarification and more orderly description of the canonical process. The proposed change focuses on the procedures and performance required of the clergy and the couple, which is what canons are best suited to address. The focus, therefore, is not on expounding the "church's teaching," but on the responsibilities of the clergy and the couple, focusing in particular on the vows that the couple will make to each other, and the cleric's responsibility in assuring they understand the gravity and meaning of those vows, and that they not undertake them "unadvisedly or lightly, but reverently, deliberately, and in accordance with the purposes for which it was instituted by God."

Isn't one of those "purposes" procreation?"

"Purpose" is likely a poor choice of words in this context. The more traditional language speaks of procreation as a "good" -- recognizing both that procreation is a biological reality we share with the natural world, and that, as St Augustine put it (Of Marriage and Concupiscence, I.iv), it reaches its crown of goodness when children are "generated to be regenerated," that is, as the BCP stresses, not merely to be born, but to be nurtured "in the knowledge and love of the Lord."

In all of this, it is important to note that procreation is only a factor for a couple capable of it. The BCP uses the somewhat confusing wording "when it is God's will." Earlier liturgies, such as that of the 1549 BCP, simply recognized that there were circumstances, such as advanced age in a woman, that rendered procreation impossible, and that such circumstances were not a bar to marriage. (The Theological Framework essay explores this issue at greater length.)

Now on to some more practical questions, from a Facebook thread, in particular a series of questions from Craig Uffman,.

By your reading, does the proposal allow a priest to conduct a SS marriage rite even if his bishop disallows it in his diocese?

At present, the liturgies for celebration of a same-sex marriage are provisional, and require the permission of the bishop. The proposed canon change doe not alter that; it refers to liturgies authorized by the church, and that includes the form and extent to which they are authorized. The SCLM in proposed resolution A054 asks for authorization of continued use of the "I Will Bless You" liturgy, and for use of three new liturgies with the permission of the local bishop. It is not clear to me whether they intend no longer to require local permission for the IWBY liturgy. I believe that will be clarified in the course of the work of the legislative committee and General Convention sessions, and in my opinion I think the status quo of the proviso will remain.

Does it imagine the possibility of such a rite without mentioning procreation among the purposes of marriage, as the essay argues against?

Those of us old enough to remember the 1928 BCP do not have to imagine a marriage rite with no mention of procreation. The 1928 liturgy only mentions procreation in two optional prayers. The classical 1549 liturgy mentioned procreation in the prologue, but recognized there were circumstances in which it was impossible, and so provided for omission of the prayer for children when the woman was past the years of childbearing. So, yes, it is quite possible to have a marriage liturgy without mentioning procreation, as the Episcopal Church recognized from 1789 and until the 1979 BCP was created.

To what extent is the argument for allowing same sex marriages as a rite connected to a justification based on a civil rights concern? If it is in some way so based, how is it reasonable to have a conscientious objector clause? That is, can a person refuse to marry persons on the basis of the class (same sex marriages)? If yes, how is that exemption tolerable if such discrimination becomes illegal in this nation? Or does our theology exclude the civil rights claim and posit the addition of same sex marriages as a proposal under the doctrine of reception (and therefore in some way leaving space for conscientious objection)?

While some speak of marriage equality in terms of justice -- and I would be among the last to say, given the witness of the prophets in Holy Scripture, that justice is not an important issue! -- that is not the focus of the Biblical and Theological framework, or of the proposed canon change.

When discussing civil rights, it is important to note that marriage is not an "individual" right -- that is, no one has the "right" to marry anyone they choose. The consent of the other party is always needed. (This to some extent addresses the accusation that the move to marriage equality is based on some kind of "social atomism" and "individual rights"; aside from the point that even if it were, such views are not in themselves antithetical to Christian thinking.) Marriage equality is about allowing particular couples to marry who have, for legal reasons, been barred from doing so. The better analogy is with the debates surrounding anti-miscegenation laws, which held that an individual man or woman was in no way impeded from marriage to a person of the same race. (Some have supplied similar unconvincing rhetoric in the case of individual gay and lesbian people.) But marriage is not, as I note, an individual action; it is always social.

That being said, the canon preserves the right of a cleric to decline to solemnize (or, as extended, decline to bless) any given marriage. This could be on the basis of a particular issue (a feeling the couple is not prepared to take on the responsibility) or on the basis of a belief concerning a class of people. In fact, this language made its way into the canon in order to allow clergy to refuse to solemnize the marriage of any divorced person, if they did not believe such people should remarry.

This does appear to conflict with the "non-discrimination canon" (I.17.5) which describes "marital status" as a protected class, along with age, race, and sexual orientation, among other categories. However, the canon contains a specific proviso, "except as otherwise specified by Canons." So, for example, the canons can "discriminate" on the basis of age by setting minimum and maximum ages for service as a cleric. The proviso in the marriage canon was added specifically to allow discrimination on the basis of "marital status." So a cleric is able to refuse to marry or bless a same-sex couple -- or any other couple -- if she has an objection of any sort to that couple's marriage, including an objection to an entire class of marriages. As I note, the proposed canon change preserves and extends this "individual right" of the cleric.

I am happy to follow up on further questions, but I think this is good for now.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: the conversation continues...

April 22, 2015

The Authority for Worship Forms

My earlier ruminations (in blog post and comment thread) on the subject of how liturgies of the church apart from those in the Book of Common Prayer are approved, and my critique of the allegations by ACI authors “The Reverend Canon Professor Christopher Seitz and Mark McCall, Esq.” that such liturgies are “unconstitutional” has drawn their attention. As with much of their argumentation, the bulk takes the form of mere dismissal or contradictory, “Yes, it is!” so I will do a bit more in terms of a response than a simple, “No, it isn’t.”

Let me first acknowledge that they were correct in finding me mistaken concerning their ignorance of the history involved. However, the reality is much worse than that: it is not that they are ignorant of the history, but that they do not accept the importance of the historical record for the matter under discussion.

Seitz and McCall make a very serious charge: that the General Convention has been acting unconstitutionally for many years by authorizing non-BCP liturgical texts apart from the mechanism laid out in the Constitution Article X. The problem with this line of argument is that the mechanism laid out in the Constitution doesn’t concern such texts. It only applies to the BCP and its revision in whole or in part, not to the various offices and rites that General Convention has been authorizing for centuries. These go back to the beginning with the first Book of Offices from the turn of the 18th century, containing the Ordinal and the form for the consecration of churches; these rites were later included in the BCP itself (as has often happened with such extravagant or occasional liturgies.) The Book of Offices went through many revisions and expansions, the first modern version being put together by the House of Bishops in 1917, later amended in 1937, 1940 and 1949. (I was received into the Episcopal Church using the rite from one of these books provided for Reception, which was lacking in the 1928 BCP). The Book of Offices was superseded by the Book of Occasional Services in 1979, since amended several times. Backing up a bit, 1964 saw a period of trial use for a book of Lesser Feasts and Fasts, also later amended and expanded, including such iterations as Holy Women, Holy Men. Dare I also mention the Hymnal, a cornerstone of our worship, nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. In addition, in more recent times we have seen five volumes in a series called Enriching Our Worship, and most recently a provisional rite for the blessing of a same-gender couple. Obviously the latter may be seen as the last straw, which has drawn the fire and ire of those eager to brand the whole lot of them “unconstitutional.”

It is of course quite true that the Constitution makes no mention of any of these liturgies or resources. That in itself does not make them unconstitutional, unless they violate some constitutional principle.

Seitz and McCall raise two objections to my arguments in favor of such authority.

First, that my argument that continued practice of the church indicates the General Convention believes itself to hold such a power is “naive” — they argue that long misuse does not constitute a norm or render something legal if it isn’t. They dismiss the argument from silence as not convincing.

Second, they challenge that if what they refer to as “purported authorizations” were legitimate people would not keep trying (as in the current A066 proposal) to amend the Constitution to cover these liturgies.

Their first objection begs the question, in that it assumes the action constitutes a violation, and its repetition cannot legitimize it. This objection is only correct if the action does constitute a violation, which is the question. The "unpersuasive" argument from silence is another matter, and I will turn to it below.

A response to the second challenge is twofold.

First, the desire to have a set process put in place need not stem from a realization that the current practice is illegal (though the Explanation for A066 wrongly implies that, which I have noted to the SCLM as well). In earlier motions for change (for example 2006.A078) the explanation was given that a more orderly process needed to be set into place — not that the current practice was illegal, but that it was not systematic. (My response would be to suggest that such nuts and bolts policies and practices belong in Title II of the Canons, not the Constitution, if they need to be set in place; just as the detailed process for “trial use” is currently so enshrined.)

Second, and more importantly, the same General Convention sessions that refused to amend the Constitution to “allow” for such provisional rites were perfectly happy to authorize them for use. So General Convention clearly believed itself to be competent to do that which the ACI claims requires the constitutional support that it lacks, while doing nothing to supply that lack -- something they were and are fully competent to do.

And this brings me to the real issue for ACI: they do not believe that the General Convention is the head of hierarchical authority in the Episcopal Church. McCall in particular has written and testified on the subject, noting the absence of such words as “supremacy” and “hierarchy” from the Constitution. He has failed, however, to note the significance of the word “General” and its implications in an ecclesiastical context. “General church” is a term of art in many legal cases (including SCOTUS) concerning local churches that are part of a hierarchical church, of which The Episcopal Church is one — though the hierarchy is embedded in corporate entities rather than individual persons, much as the English constitution developed the notion of “King in Parliament” so too the Episcopal Church is commonly governed by “the Rector, Vestry and Wardens,” “the Bishop and Standing Committee,” and the General Convention with its House of Bishops and House of Lay and Clerical Deputies.

(Seitz and McCall find it difficult not to ride this their favorite hobbyhorse even in this instance, bringing in another matter on which the Constitution is silent: the departure of a diocese from the Episcopal Church. Employing their own argument from silence, in this case they hold that silence implies consent, but again ignore the historical context and the intent of the founders to form a national church, which provides key to understanding the Constitutional issues at play, in much the same way the silence of the Constitution of the US on the departure of states from the Union was never spelled out as it was deemed unthinkable. History can be very informative. They claim not to rest their case on this "silence" but it is they who bring it up. Their "careful analysis" of the polity of The Episcopal Church has been convincing to a few, but not to most. But this really is a separate matter, and I only cite it here because the ACI folk appear to think it relevant.)

Most Episcopalians understand the General Convention to be the highest legislature in our church, and its governing authority. After all, the General Convention has been authorizing the liturgies of the church from the very beginning: starting in 1785 (prior to the final Constitution) when the first Convention in Philadelphia adopted a “General Ecclesiastical Constitution” Article IV of which declared,

“The Book of Common Prayer... of the Church of England,” shall be continued to be used by this Church, as the same is altered by this Convention...
There was a bit of back and forth with England concerning some doctrinal changes the English (and some Americans) thought went too far, but in 1789 the General Convention adopted a Book of Common Payer and a Constitution which read (Article 8),

A Book of Common Prayer... when established by this or a future General Convention, shall be used in the Protestant Episcopal Church in those states, which shall have adopted this Constitution.
So it is clear that the primary liturgy of the Episcopal Church is established by and in the keeping of the General Convention, and subject to amendment by it (in two consecutive sessions).

My argument on the silence of the Constitution on supplemental, occasional, and provisional rites, and the authority of General Convention to authorize them, is an argument a fortiori — if the General Convention can establish and amend the Book of Common Prayer, how much more ought it be able to authorize secondary and provisional texts, even though this authority is not spelled out in the Constitution?

Moreover, our texts are not in fact "silent" on the matter. This authority is spelled out in the Book of Common Prayer itself, which states on page 13,

In addition to [the Holy Eucharist and Daily Morning and Evening Prayer] and the other rites contained in this Book, other forms set forth by authority within this Church may be used. Also, subject to the direction of the bishop, special devotions taken from this Book, or from Holy Scripture, may be used when the needs of the congregation so require.
The latter clause concerning the bishop is referred to in the Constitution as follows:

Nothing in this Article [X] shall be construed as restricting the authority of Bishops of the Church to take such order as may be permitted by the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer or by the Canons of the General Convention for the use of special forms of worship.
But what about the first clause, which I italicized above? To what other “authority within this Church” can the rubric possibly refer apart from the one that has exercised it from the foundation, the General Convention, since the role of the bishop is addressed separately? This is plainly the case, as the history of General Convention action testifies. A more eloquent, and authoritative, testimony than either I or Seitz and McCall can muster lies in the official commentary on the Constitution and Canons from White and Dykman (1982), which notes, concerning the Book of Occasional Services:

Under the rubric of the 1979 Prayer Book (page 13, rubric 2)... the permission of the bishop is not required for the use of forms and services such as these, which are set forth by authority of General Convention. (page 462, emphasis mine)
Now, it cannot be said that Seitz and McCall are ignorant of this rubric. Seitz, in particular, is fond of alleging a “Constitutional” authority to the BCP — a point I deny in terms of law but recognize in terms of practicality, as its rubrics are governing of those matters they address. He and his colleague simply refuse to recognize that it is the General Convention to which this “authority” refers. They want at all points to shift authority to the local bishop, and even object to provisional rites where that regulatory authority is explicitly granted, and raise the specious charge of “unconstitutionality.”

As I say, Seitz and McCall are not ignorant of the rubric. In fact, in their response to me about the failed attempts to amend the Constitution (which they take to be a sign it needs amending) they quote from the 2006 report of the SCLM concerning the subject and their proposal for review. Or, I should say, they misquote from the report. It is a subtle misquotation, as it involves a failure to Romanize the word “and” linking a pair of phrases that in their version appear to bring the diocesan bishop into the “authority” to set forth other forms, as opposed to a bishop’s direction concerning special devotions. I have quoted the rubric above. Here is the version at Seitz and McCall’s ACI blog (as a graphic clipped, lest anyone suggest I’ve tinkered with their text; click to enlarge).




I do not know if their failure to return the word “and” in the fourth line to Roman font (as it appears in the 2006 Blue Book, page 222) is deliberate or an error. Clearly everyone makes errors, as the SCLM did itself in this very text, shortening “within” to “with.” But the incorrect text appears to support the ACI’s larger argument of episcopal limits on General Convention, and when errors tend that way I have to suspend judgment as to the cause of the error.

In summary, my case is that the General Convention has the authority to authorize provisional or supplemental rites, as this is provided for in the Book of Common Prayer itself. The fact that no constitutional procedure for this authorization exists does not render such acts unconstitutional.

And in the end, what if it actually were unconstitutional, not just filling a gap but actually violating some principle? Who is to make that judgment? Everyone is entitled to an opinion, including the ACI and its authors, and as am I, and as are White and Dykman.

But it is well established that the polity of the Episcopal Church lacks any tribunal for the formal judgment of such matters — except the General Convention itself. And that body has shown, by its actions in authorizing liturgical texts for over two hundred years, and refusing to amend the Constitution to make explicit provision for such authorization, to believe itself to possess this power and authority as a native element of its character as the superior synod and government of this church, custodian of its laws and author of its liturgies.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 21, 2015

Dept of Canonical Redundancy Dept

A further note on my earlier comments about liturgical revision and its process, in which I chided both those calling for and those panicking over a possible amendment to the Constitution of The Episcopal Church, Article X, I want to add to what I noted earlier about the longstanding practice of the Episcopal Church in authorizing liturgical texts in addition to the Book of Common Prayer. The proposed resolution A066 to amend the Constitution is seen by its proposers as needed to allow or regularize such authorizations. That is not the case.

Let me first reiterate that Article X is primarily concerned with the BCP and the process of its amendment. It also contains a clause about the authority of a diocesan bishop to authorize additional liturgical material -- an authority which by extension belongs to the whole House of Bishops (and which they exercised in that manner as long ago as 1907).

However, for those who crave the source of the written authority for the development and use of other liturgical texts, one can find it in the BCP itself. The permission stands among the very first modern words of the book (page 13, following on the historical Preface of 1789, which also noted that variety is the spice of liturgy). The BCP affirms that in addition to the Holy Eucharist and Daily Office "and the other rites contained in this Book, other forms set forth by authority within this Church may be used."

There were similar provisions in the BCP 1892 and 1928, which led to the work on the Book of Offices beginning in 1907, revised in 1917, 1940 and 1949; Lesser Feasts and Fasts, approved for "trial use" (even though not an addition to or revision of the BCP except in the Calendar) in 1964, and its later editions, including Holy Women Holy Men; the Book of Occasional Services (1979, since revised several times); and Enriching Our Worship volumes 1-5, last authorized for provisional use in 2012.

If one is anxious about "authority" in this case, it is abundantly clear that the authoritative body for the liturgy of the whole church is the General Convention. This is the body that authorizes the BCP itself (in two successive regular sessions) with no other approval necessary. (Proposed changes are referred to the dioceses in the time between sessions for reference, not approval). This is the body that has been authorizing additional and supplemental liturgical texts for just under a century.

Given the amount of material that has been authorized under the current procedures, it hardly seems necessary to burden the Constitution with a clause for a purpose already addressed in the BCP itself -- or to charge the General Convention with having to debate it. I urge the relevant legislative committee to mark it as redundant and "already addressed" and let the session get on to other work,

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 19, 2015

Those who are ignorant of history...

...are doomed not to know what they are talking about.

The folks at the Anglican Communion Institute are all in a dither about Resolution A066 coming to General Convention this summer. It is an amendment to the Constitution to spell out a process by which supplemental liturgical texts might be authorized. Neither the ACI nor the proposers of this resolution appear to recognize that it is neither a horrible novelty hatched as part of a "twenty-five year effort" (as ACI says) nor a strict necessity (as the proposers seem to think.)

The fact is that nothing in the Constitution or Canons forbids General Convention authorizing rites supplemental to the Book of Common Prayer. The Constitution does lay out the process for amendment of the BCP itself by revision or addition, and requires that the BCP be used throughout the church, but nowhere suggests that no other liturgical rite can be authorized.

On the contrary, the General Convention has been authorizing supplements to the BCP since the 1940s (starting with The Book of Offices, which later became the Book of Occasional Services, and Lesser Feasts and Fasts). The House of Bishops (on their own) had authorized earlier versions of the Book of Offices going back to 1916!

The ACI seems to think that the House of Bishops (and Deputies) cannot do as a body what any individual bishop can do in her own diocese (authorize a liturgy for a special occasion or for circumstance not provided for in the BCP) -- a notion that reflects their peculiar ecclesiology in which the diocesan bishop is at the apex of all rule.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: See a more detailed response to the allegations of unconstitutionality, and the accuracy of my assessment.

September 10, 2014

Carts and Horses

I've held my tongue on the subject for a while now, but I find that proverbial fire burning within.

While there is much to commend in the TREC letter  (on the restructuring of The Episcopal Church) when it comes to practical streamlining and downsizing some of the superstructure of the Episcopal Church (including several proposals I've made myself over the years, such as trimming deputation sizes and retiring some CCABs) I still find myself wondering to what extent we are putting cart before horse — if the horse really exists and it isn't all cart, all form with no real handle on the function.

I raise this because it seems to me that the Great Unanswered Question is: What is this superstructure (PB, GC, EC, etc.) for? What are the ministries that can only, or best, be performed for the good of the church and the world by an [inter]national organ of the ecclesiastical body, so conceived and so constituted.

And I find I can think of precious few things that require or commend such an [inter]national structure: setting the law and liturgy of the church; engaging in formal interreligious and interfaith dialogue and work; [inter]national level mission programs and ministry. These are off the top of my head -- there is likely more; but however much is best or only done at this supreme level, it seems to me that the vast bulk of the work of the church is done in and by the parish, secondly by the diocesan and regional entities, and only thirdly at the national and international level.

And until it is manifestly clear just what work is best done at that level, arguing about how the workforce should be structured to accomplish it is premature — and very likely a waste of time and energy. “Form follows function” should apply to ecclesiastical structures as well as buildings.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

December 20, 2013

Weaned from a Pickle

The perennial question of the location of the headquarters for The Episcopal Church is on the table once more, in part in response to a resolution from the 2012 General Convention mandating a departure from the Church Center building at 815 Second Avenue, NYC. Note that this resolution only concerns the building, not NYC, as some seem to think. Still, many want that question reopened, even as a major study is going on concerning just what the structure of TEC is to be down the road, including whether it should even have an HQ at all.

The latest step in this peculiar dance is a survey designed to receive input on all sorts of aspects of a possible HQ, including its location. (Disclosure: I tried to take the survey yesterday soon after its announcement, but I think I engaged it as it was still under construction; on my second and successful "go" one of the questions I'd answered in the first round had disappeared.)

Having been a part of many such surveys in the past, however, I do wonder at the soundness of this approach to decision-making. Too many times I've seen survey results ignored as a particular juggernaut presses forward regardless of results. (The adoption of the Revised Common Lectionary is a telling case in point.) It's a good thing Moses didn't survey the Israelites as to location issues. They wanted to go back to Egypt! Oh the leeks, oh the cucumbers! It is hard to be weaned from a pickle.

Frankly, when it comes to the Church Center and its location, I've seen this road traveled so many times it has become extremely tedious. I've been around long enough to see the plans under Presiding Bishop Allin to move to the Seamen's Church Institute undone by city office-space code; the sale of Seabury House in Connecticut; the decades of various studies and plans brought to GC; and the collapse of the General Theological Seminary space-sharing scheme.

Dealing with location issues -- by survey or study or any other means -- prior to making decisions as to restructuring seems to me to be utter madness. Form follows function... or you're stuck with the form and it shapes how you function! And a diet of pickles makes for a sour disposition.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

February 16, 2010

Theory or Praxis?

Bishop Whalon has written a thoughtful article about the sequence in which things have happened in the Episcopal Church concerning gay and lesbian persons, their relationships, and their role in ordained ministry — particularly in regard to the lack of clear statements from the General Convention, and the lack of a formal theological position certified by that body.

I would note at first that the General Convention is a legislative body, not a council of theologians. Nor do I think there is much "official theology" on the ground even when it comes to mixed-sex marriage: the 1928 BCP catechism, for example, is completely silent on the subject; the Articles of Religion only tell us that it is permitted to clergy and an estate allowed by Scripture. The 1979 Prayerbook doesn't say much more, and surely the defects (in the sense of what is wanting) in the Preface to the marriage liturgy (even as expanded from 1928 in our present BCP) should forestall anyone considering it a well-thought-out "theology," though it does, as I have reflected in Reasonable and Holy, provide the beginnings for such a theological reflection.

However, the real issue, to my mind, behind Bishop Whalon's article isn't so much about theology but about General Convention's proper role as a legislature: that the Episcopal Church, through General Convention, has not officially recognized the licitness of same-sex marriage, and by consenting to the election of a partnered (and legally married) gay bishop we have set the cart before the horse. I agree with my friend Bishop Whalon that this is a problem, and it continues to cloud the air with inconsistency.

In short, I would suggest that the theology has been done by the relevant theologians (obviously not to the liking of some others!) but that it is now time — or will be in 2012 — for General Convention to do its legislative duty in response, and give that theological work whatever "official" recognition is needed — by accepting its conclusions and providing formal recognition for the blessing of the stable, monogamous, lifelong relationships of same-sex couples on an equal footing with mixed-sex marriages.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

July 19, 2009

Convention Retrospective

I alluded in my last post to some of the highs and lows of the recent session of General Convention, for the most part in the non-legislative portion. I’d like in this post to expand on a few others, as well as to share some thoughts about what went on in the legislative sessions.

A delicate dance of symbols

A great deal has already been said about the import and impact of D025, and whether it repeals, rescinds, rebuffs, or in any other way changes the status of the church regarding 2006-B033.

Much of what you think of D025 will hinge on what you think of B033. In my opinion the earlier legislation did not enact a du jure moratorium on openly partnered gay/lesbian bishops but it had a de facto effect in that direction. Clearly the operative concept in B033 was urging restraint. It was persuasive rather than prescriptive. How much such urging or persuasion was really needed, in light of the awareness many bishops and standing committees have of the ill regard in which some in the rest of the Anglican Communion hold us, is the operative question.

I think it fair to examine that question in some detail: How likely has it been since 2006, or is it now, that an openly gay or lesbian bishop could have been or is likely to be elected any time in the near future? To posit an answer to that question, I want to simply state a few things I believe to be true (not that I wish them to be true) as premises for or evidence in to coming to a conclusion.

  • Gene Robinson’s successful candidacy and election was based in large part on the role he had played in New Hampshire for many years preceding it, and the high regard in which he was held by the people of that diocese, and in the wider church. He was not elected because he is gay, but in spite it. Although his election seemed to be a clear statement that one’s “manner of life” need not prohibit one from being called and chosen as a bishop, the affirmation in that action was not of Gene’s private (but acknowledged) life, but of his manifest public (though personal) gifts. Which, of course, is how it should be.
  • Most dioceses do not, it seems, elect bishops “from within” or at least not immediately from within—that is, a person from a diocese may be elected after a sojourn in another parochial or seminary setting in another diocese. This is a general impression; I’ve not done a statistical examination in detail, but it seems to be the case.
  • Many dioceses appear to put together slates of nominees on the “full menu” model—as a hat tip to diversity, in the full knowledge that a gay or lesbian candidate may be more a symbol of a diocese’s progressivism than a choice earnestly desired. Much as some might want to deny it, tokenism is alive and well. It actually does serve a positive purpose in indicating which dioceses may be more welcoming to such candidates in parochial settings as well as the episcopal seat.
  • Minority candidates of whatever flavor appear to fare better in suffragan elections than in diocesan. There may be a stained-glass ceiling.
  • There is still considerable reluctance among many bishops to rock the Anglican boat, even among moderate progressives. An examination of the signatories to the “Anaheim Statement” reveals a few bishops anxious to hoist such a pennant.

All in all, these premises lead me to believe that the election of an openly gay/lesbian bishop as a diocesan is probably unlikely in the next decade. A suffragan may be more likely, but even there, I doubt within the next triennium. There will be the occasional candidate, but I don’t foresee an election any time soon.

Of course, I could be wrong.

The sum of all this is to say that B033 was not really a necessary action, in spite of the earnest appeals for its passage. What was needed, it seems, was something like Mr. Chamberlain’s piece of paper, though in this case—and opposite to the Munich Accord— with a reality to back it up. A de facto moratorium already exists, simply due to the tenor of the church, then as now. So the difference with D025 to B033 lies not in the actual election of bishops, but in the willingness or unwillingness to make statement in support of or opposition to an idea.

What has changed with D025? Not a withdrawal of a legal prohibition, but a change in attitude. Restraint no longer needs to be “urged” because the natural (and unnatural) restraints already in place will likely be effective in mitigating against the election of an openly gay or lesbian person as a bishop.

Still, D025 is a step forward, even if also as largely symbolic as B033. It indicates that a door that for the last few years has been closed is at least now ajar, even if no one will swing it open and pass through within the near future.

The marriage of true minds

Resolution C056 on same-sex blessings was similarly a small step forward, though greeted with much consternation in some circles. One of the low points for me in this Convention was hearing a conservative deputy for whom I have a good deal of respect and affection (and with whom I share a number of views on other matters) declare that the passage of this resolution covered us with shame. The folks at Fulcrum have nit-picked the resolution and held it up as a complete repudiation of the various utterances of Windsor and the Primates. I will not enter into that particular logomachia, but it seems to me that C056 does little more than call for liturgical and theological study and provision of pastoral care—both of which appear to me to be within the ambit of the original Lambeth 1.10, though clearly pressing that envelope to its utter limit.

The most ironic position from the conservatives was summed up by one deputy who repeated the tiresome, “We haven’t done the theological work” argument. How odd then to speak against a resolution that calls for doing more theological work! That this involves liturgy is inherent in the issue at hand, which is about marriage and blessing—very odd it would be indeed if liturgies were not to be collected, developed, and studied, as this is how liturgical theology works. As to the range of generosity in the pastoral response—particularly in places where the civil law is already doing its part of the work—it appears that it will stop short of Windsor’s Rubicon: the authorization of public rites. It is a well established principle that only the General Convention can “authorize” rites, even though Bishops have the rubrical permission to “set forth” novel liturgies, explained in the Constitution as the capacity to “take order...for the use” of such special forms. Bishops will, I trust, be careful to make clear that this is what they are doing when they provide “generous pastoral responses.”

So, again, this is not revolutionary but evolutionary change. And most of the opposition comes precisely for that reason, as anyone with eyes to see can perceive where the trend will lead, sooner or later. The rearguard actions of many in the Anglican Communion will not in the long run be successful. While I know of many who once held traditional views on such issues, who later came to a more progressive position, I don’t know of anyone who has gone the other way. (Those who think Rowan Williams is an example of the latter don’t take account of his reasons, which have to do with his prevailing, and some might say Quixotic, desire to hold the communion together, and a hierarchy of values in which unity is dominant. I will say more on this, and my conversation with him, in a separate post.) In short, the process is not only evolutionary, but osmotic. Like the arrow of time, it goes only one way. As with almost all controversies with which the church has been embroiled, the “Traditionalist” (not traditional) position eventually fades away, or hardens into a sectarian nub. The circumcision parties of any age have their day, but eventually the church moves on, leaving behind those who have married the spirit of a former age instead of moving with the Spirit of Christ in whom novelty and creativity are the active principles.

Points of Personal Privilege

I was startled early in the Convention when I heard myself quoted on the floor by a young deputy from Massachusetts. The topic was the decision of the legislative committee on Prayer Book and liturgy to amend the reference to John Henry Newman in the now widely expanded calendar of commemorations from “Bishop” to “Priest.” He took this as an insult and cited my earlier post concerning Fr Avery Dulles of Fordham University having been created a cardinal, and my whimsical but heartfelt desire to congratulate a “parishioner”—Fordham University lying within my parish bounds. I was so startled at hearing my name come over the sound system in that cavernous hall that it took me a moment to make the connection. Did the deputy think the proper title should have been Cardinal? Like Avery Dulles, Newman was a Cardinal Priest, so honored for his theological work. [Correction, thanks to Scott Gunn: Newman and Dulles were both Cardinal Deacons. The Cardinal part of their designation has nothing to do with their Ordinal status ;-) But in any case, neither were bishops.] The motion to overturn the amendment failed.

I only spoke once on the floor of the Convention, on the last day, to offer a point of order on a second reading of a Constitutional amendment which ought to have been approved in a vote by orders but received only a simple majority. (I tried to get to the microphone as fast as I could, but was too late to stop the voice ballot.) The President graciously accepted my correction, and the matter was reconsidered and voted on properly. Now our Constitution officially provides that when TEC enters into a full communion Covenant or Concordat we will not have to amend the Constitution each time we do so. Thus the Moravian concord approved at this Convention will not require further constitutional tinkering.

Further reflections anon.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG


July 17, 2009

Coming up for air

The 76th General Convention has adjourned sine die and I admit to the customary exhaustion. This session of the Convention was very ably conducted, and managed to get through more business than any in my memory.

When I'm back to New York and settled in mind, body and spirit, I will reflect a bit more on my perceptions of what happened here in Anaheim. For this post I would just like to note that the Spin Doctors of the Church are already well at work, doing their oracular tasks and scrying the entrails of the General Convention while still warm. However, I believe that historical reflection, like revenge, is a dish best served cold. You will hear some very panicked reaction in the next few days (indeed, a certain Fulcrum is already teetering rather wildly) and language of abandonment of all that is good and holy, when from my perspective the actions of the General Convention are mild-mannered in the extreme, and need cause no histrionic outbursts. But more on that when I'm back in the peace and quiet of the beautiful Bronx.

In addition to the business of Convention, there were also the fringe events, not directly related to the actions and legislation. Here too there were high and low points. The lowest position goes to the extremely unattractive false prophets who stood outside the Convention center from time to time uttering their curses at our apostasy. High marks go to Jenny Te Paa and Rowan Smith, and others, representing a broader spectrum of the Global South than we tend to hear from in the popular church press. I was particularly happy to have dinner with Rowan Smith, and to have Jenny Te Paa express thanks for my recently published book. (I asked her if we might count on her for a jacket blurb if if goes to a second printing!) Somewhere in the middle must lie the brief face-time (or is it eyebrow-time?) with the Other Rowan, him of Canterbury. Again, more on that at another time.

And now to pack, and so I bid a good night to all, a blessed rest, and a prayer for safe travel for all who will be heading home over the next hours and days.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

July 3, 2009

Off to Anaheim

Let me see... what have I forgotten? Something, I'm sure. I've got the Blue Book, and the laptop has the BCP, BOS, LFF, NRSV, C&C2006, the last three Journals of General Convention, and most of the emails from the House of Bishops/Deputies listserv. I think I'm ready.

So in the dim hours of Saturday morning I'll be on my way. This means limited Internetworking for the next day or so, and depending on the fees, maybe limited in California, too. Besides, I've got a very busy schedule.

In addition to the usual Deputy assignments, including service on the Ministry Legislative Committee, there are three extra-curricular items on my agenda. First, I'll be signing copies of my book, Reasonable and Holy: Engaging Same-Sexuality, at the Church Publishing display in the Exhibit Hall on Wednesday July 8 from 1 - 1:45 pm or thereabouts; that is, if anyone wants a signature or the book! Then I'm on the schedule to co-moderate with Fr Nicholas Knisely in a forum discussion of B033 for new deputies — if it hasn't been discussed to oblivion or resurrection by that point. I"m also to be a table host at the Chicago Consultation luncheon.

Then, as well, there's that short meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury, which has given rise to hope in some circles and gnashing of teeth in others. I feel a bit like Mary in the Protoevangelium: "I behold two peoples with mine eyes, the one weeping and lamenting and the other rejoicing and exulting." I tend to preserve a status somewhere in the middle of that particular spectrum; though I think the meeting itself is a Very Good Thing (as I think Christians meeting and being in relationship are at the heart of the Gospel and the Mission of the Church), I primarily see its value simply for itself, as a ding an sich, rather than in terms of consequences.

So this will be my last post for a bit, until I can grab a chance to report on how things are going in Anaheim. Orate fratres.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

December 14, 2007

Come thou Long Expected Advent Letter

Well, the Archbishop of Canterbury has issued his Advent letter, strangely enough a day after his Christmas greeting.* The form and content of the Advent letter perhaps make it clear why it was delayed: it is no brief greeting but a rather detailed examination of the situation in which the Anglican Communion finds itself. For the Archbishop of Canterbury it represents something of a breakthrough in clarity, even though the situation it describes remains rather fuzzy; it is rather like a very sharp photograph of a painting by Monet — perhaps of a cathedral in the late afternoon sun.

So what can we draw from this letter. I think a few points are worth noting.

  • The Episcopal Church has done about all it can do in relation to meeting the demands placed upon it by the primates. This will not be (and has not been) enough to satisfy some of those same primates; so there is at present no consensus as to how well TEC has complied with those demands.
  • The decisions of the Lambeth Conference, while not canonical, represent the "mind" of the Communion even if they do not represent a consensus. There is thus a some tension between a general agreement, a majority view, and a true consensus.
  • The major problem now is that there is no consensus about a process by means of which a consensus can be reached: we need to have a covenant, but until we have one we have no way of deciding how to get one, unless everyone agrees — and those who don't agree are ipso facto no longer part of the consensus. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
  • Lambeth 2008 will be the forum for all of this to come to a head, and any invited who refuse to come have abdicated their place at the table, and perhaps in the Communion. Those who are not invited are not being invited because they represent, in different ways, breaches in the status quo ante of Lambeth 1998.
  • We are in this together and we should stay together. We just need rules we can all agree to, and then we'll all agree.
  • More committees and commissions will be formed to continue the dialogue as we continue to work our way through these differences of opinion. When we've decided we've got enough in common to stay together, we will stay together. Those of us who are still there, of course.

This admirable clarity being acknowledged, the Archbishop still does not appear to grasp that the House of Bishops in the Episcopal Church is an equal partner with the House of Deputies in the General Convention. They do not have any "decisive" power to operate contrary to the decisions of that Convention; although as part of that Convention they do hold an absolute veto power over any decisions of that Convention (as, of course, do the Deputies). If this is what the Archbishop means (that the Bishops alone can hold the line at GC 2009) then he is spot on. But if not, it appears the place of Bishops in our governance is one of those things that simply will not penetrate the Archbishop's psyche. They are not the primary theologians of the church; and in the Episcopal Church they are only one strand of its governance. At least the Archbishop has finally acknowledged that this may be a matter in which there is a difference between what TEC believes and what he thinks is believed "elsewhere in the Communion." And yes, it does need to be addressed.

So, where does this Advent letter leave us? About where we are. No further forward, no further backward. The Archbishop has admirably described the present situation, more precisely than he has heretofore. And the way forward, in his eyes, is further engagement and dialogue rather than separation. Several balls have been cast into several courts, and whether any are kicked back remains to be seen. I do not look for this Advent letter to find wide approval among those itching for decision. It is good, in Advent, to be reminded, "woe to those who look for the day of the Lord."

Tobias Haller BSG



*Update: According to Jake, whose more thorough commentary I commend, the Advent Letter to the Primates was actually sent to the Primates earlier, but only released now when it was assumed that all the Primates have received their copy.

Further Update:
Jake has received an e-mail from no one less than Venables himself, who declares that he, as a Primate, received the Archbishop's Letter at the same time as everyone else, on December 14. This would certainly explain his having made assertions the week before which the letter shows to have been profoundly mistaken. I do not, by the way, share Jake's assessment on this question, as I see the ABC's letter as a strong rebuke to the nonsense in San Joaquin and elsewhere.

December 8, 2007

The Gospel via Chicago

They came from as far as the antipodes: primates and bishops, laity and clergy, theologians, journalists and politicians, gathering in Chicago at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary for three days of intense discussion, planning, and strategizing. Theologians and canonists read papers (which will be available on the web in relatively short order), the assembly divided into small groups and regathered into plenary, and much newsprint was marked. Why? A modest goal — To help the church recover its soul, as a community of neighbors, a fellowship of diverse members unified by the love which called them together, through the power of the Holy Spirit.

The Chicago Consultation, as it is being called for short, addressed the prevailing boundary issue that has beset our church and our Communion over the last decades, and most irritably over the last six years: the place of GLBT people in the church’s life and ministry.

In plenary sessions and small groups, we challenged ourselves to find a way forward that would be grounded in the powerful message of Jesus’ call and care. We focused on the the full inclusion of those whom some have determined to be inappropriate minsters of the Gospel, embracing the mandate and charge which comes with the highest authority, and in response to the question, “Who is my neighbor?”

Lambeth is coming, little more than half a year away; and it too will be a forum which will provide the bishops, albeit non-legislatively, an opportunity to consider and reconsider their own past actions, and to recognize that the so-called consensus of 1998 was far from complete even then, and has demonstrably revealed itself no longer to exist, having led to increasing conflict, dissent, and in some cases, division.

Further away on the time-line is the next session of the General Convention. This will provide us with the opportunity to reevaluate the usefulness of resolution B033, and address the underlying issue of the appropriateness of moving forward in our growing recognition that same-sex couples, particularly in those parts of our country where the civil authority already recognizes the value of their relationships, deserve the church’s full support in ordering their lives in consistency with the Gospel principle: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”

This is the only “agenda” guiding the Chicago Consultation: to call and help the church to live the Gospel it proclaims.

Tobias Haller BSG

For more information, see Inch at a Time, Preludium, and keep an eye on Episcopal Café.