Being and Doing: A Response to an Essay on Marriage

A few weeks ago, John Bauerschmidt, Zachary Guiliano, Wesley Hill, and Jordan Hylden published a response to the report of the Task Force on the Study of Marriage (TFSM), titled “Marriage in Creation and Covenant,” henceforth MCC. This essay appeared on the Anglican Theological Review website along with three responses from Scott MacDougall, Kathryn Tanner, and Daniel Joslyn-Siemiatkoski. The three responders took up some of the serious problems with MCC and I commend their essays to your attention.

As one of the authors of “Essay 1" (Biblical and Theological Framework) in the TFSM report, I had hoped for a better level of engagement than MCC demonstrates; it is largely and off-handedly dismissive, but also mistaken in some of its characterizations of content, leading me to the conclusion that the MCC authors do not actually understand the argument. I have long been an advocate of the position that one can only truly have a meaningful discussion when you can state your interlocutor’s position in language she can recognize and affirm. MCC fails that test, even to the slight extent it engages with Essay 1 at all — the authors spend most of their time disagreeing with the essay on history, and I leave it to the author of that essay to address their concerns.

MCC to a large extent follows the method of questioning motives and form rather than engaging deeply with the content of the TFSM report. Interestingly enough, this seems to me to reflect the deeper issue of what constitutes marriage: MCC expounds a thesis about the form of marriage as a male-female bond that serves as an icon of the relationship between Christ and the Church in a constructive sense (I hope I’ve understood and stated their thesis correctly); whereas the TFSM focuses on the content of the marriage relationship as expressed in the vows, and in the spouses’ living out the loving mutual self-offering inherent in those vows, as an iconic realization of the relationship between Christ and the Church. Some might say, What’s the difference? We are dealing, to some extent, with the old perceived conflict between being and doing. (It also likely reflects the distinction in the honor given to icons as dulia rather than latria. Some, it seems to me, want to exalt marriage to a place it does not belong. However, in the present context, this also reflects the old difference of opinion as to what constitutes marriage: consent or coitus.

Which gives me the opportunity to correct a misapprehension of MCC, one of the few observations about Essay 1. On page 4, in the context of bemoaning the lack of references to the literature, the authors state,

...Brundage's work makes a brief appearance in "Essay 1" (13), where an incorrect citation is provided, making unclear the reference to a definitive "papal ruling" on the significance of consent and consummation in marriage. Perhaps it refers to Alexander III's Veniens ad nos or Innocent III's Per tuas? It is hard to know; neither said quite what the essay states nor offered a final word.

First, the citation is only “incorrect” to the extent that it fails to include “ff” after the page indicated — the page which marks the beginning of a subsection of a chapter dealing with this issue. More importantly, however, is the coy, and erroneous, rejection of what Essay 1 says, which is, “The eventual papal ruling settled the debate (for Roman Catholics) by taking a middle ground: consent makes the marriage, but consummation seals it.” It is true that “seals” is my language for the more convoluted “renders indissoluble by any human power.” But this is the conclusion reached by Alexander III (not in a single decree but in a process of development through many rulings) and enshrined in the Roman canons to this day (see CCL 1141-42.) As George Hayward Joyce, S.J., put it, in a work written long before our current controversies,

Alexander III... settled the dispute between the Schools of Paris and Bologna about the essentials of marriage. He approved the teaching of the Paris doctors that marriage is effected by the consent of the parties..., rejecting that of the Bolognese canonists who held that until consummation the partners were not strictly speaking married. Yet he did not accept the Paris teaching in its entirety, but retained one important feature of the Bolognese system.... Alexander III, though pronouncing consent to be the effective cause of marriage, taught that until consummation the bond was capable of dissolution. (Christian Marriage: An Historical and Doctrinal Study, Second Edition. London: Sheed and Ward, 1948. pp 430-431.)

Now, this may seem trivial, but it appears to me to indicate a problem that the MCC authors, and many others, have when wrestling with the issues surrounding marriage — same-sex and otherwise. There is a reluctance to place the locus of marriage in the action of marriage, the exchange of vows that makes the marriage, as an act of self-dedication through the human faculties of will and love. Instead there is a repeated retreat — often rhapsodically articulated — to the formal biological reality of male and female. With Augustine, and many since, they emphasize that which is shared with the animal realm rather than that which is uniquely human. (The reponses to MCC detail a few of the other problems with their use of Augustine. I would add to that, their failure to distinguish between sacramental marriage as Augustine understands it, as only existing between Christians, and what is often called “natural marriage” — a point I think fatal to their thesis about the constitutional nature of male-female marriage in and of itself. But that is a point for another essay.)

Of course, the TFSM does not deny this formal reality. However, what we do attempt is to articulate the reasons for our emphasis on the vows rather than the “purposes” of marriage — recognizing that the Episcopal Church did without an articulation of these “purposes” in its marriage liturgy for almost 200 years. But even here MCC misunderstands. For instance, on page 18 they state,

The very idea that marriage is a social form with ends (or purposes, teloi) given by God is not grasped at all; rather, such ends are described as "extrinsic" (perhaps better put, heteronomous) and so run afoul of Kant's categorical imperative never to treat persons as means rather than ends (21, 24). By this argument, we are told that the marriage vows are what really count, as they represent the moral "commitment" that two make to one another, and that the opening exhortation describing the ends of marriage is extraneous to this deeper reality (20-25).

The last sentence approaches but misses an accurate grasp of our position, though why commitment is in scare-quotes escapes me. However, the first sentence here not only misstates the TSFM position, but presents a thesis Essay 1 explicitly rejects as mistaken. Here is what the report says about “extrinsic” and the way in which the TFSM proposes to balance the Kantian ethical concern with the role of the “ends” of marriage (page 23):

Procreation can become a problematical cause or purpose when it is understood primarily as an extrinsic end, rather than as the natural outgrowth of the loving couple treating each other as ends in themselves. It is acknowledged that as the end in this case is a human life, it has its own inestimable worth. It must also be noted that many, if not most couples, desire this end and work together toward its accomplishment; and that the generation of new life is a tangible expression of their mutual love.... Children are a gift and a grace and a hope — but ought not be understood as an extrinsic expectation or demand, in the absence of which a marriage is deemed to have failed in some intrinsic way. Moreover, the greater and more fully realized the love of a couple for each other, the more likely any child who becomes part of the growing family, by birth or adoption, will be nurtured and raised in a way that expresses the familial virtues.

What the TFSM essay does is attempt to give procreation in marriage its proper place and role as reflected in the Prologue to the marriage liturgy: as a positive good (when possible, and “when it is God's will” or as the older (1946) canon put it “if it may be”). This stands in opposition to the rhetoric advanced in some circles that it is an "essential element" of marriage. This has never been the teaching of the church. The confusion arises precisely when one drifts from the language of "goods" or "fruits" into “ends,” "causes," or "purposes." The issue is that the institution of marriage (as the Prologue puts it) may have purposes which never are realized in a particular marriage — and that should not be seen as a reduction in the value of that marriage. The traditional position — which the TFSM paper supports — is that procreation should take place within a loving marriage; not that any given marriage must lead to procreation in order to be a valid and loving marriage that reflects God’s love and generativity.

I hope I’ve adequately addressed these two problems with MCC. A more general concern is that they seem to think that the proposed canon change undercuts the church’s teaching on marriage, and I hope I’ve addressed that in the previous posts on the topic of that change. Obviously, the canon change will remove an obstacle (in some minds) to authorizing liturgies for solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples where it is permitted by civil law, but that in no way alters the teaching concerning the nature of marriage — merely refocuses it on the moral center of marriage, which the tradition holds lies in the couple’s mutual consent to live by the vows they make to each other; not on their capacity to fulfill a “purpose.” It is, in short, the content of marriage, not its form, that ought to be the focus of our canonical, liturgical, and theological attention.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Marriage Canon Q and A Part 2

...continued from Part 1.

Doesn't the canon change stand in conflict with the BCP? Since the BCP supersedes the Canons doesn't this set up a conflict?

As noted in the earlier round of questions, the proposed canon does not change the doctrine of the church on marriage, nor is that the point of the canon change. The issue isn't that "the BCP supersedes the Canons" -- but they are different documents governing different aspects of marriage. For example, the canons provide for remarriage after divorce -- something which is nowhere mentioned as possible in the BCP, which on the contrary (in the Catechism) describes marriage "as life-long." One could see this as a conflict, or recognize that the intent of the two authorities is different. The purpose of the canons is not to lay out a doctrine of marriage, but to describe procedures and rules and requirements for marriage. It is not about "what marriage is" but what the cleric and the couple must do in order to marry. If -- and it is an "if" -- the church continues to authorize liturgies for same-sex marriages, then the canons need to provide procedures that address that reality. The TFSM was charged with the task of addressing this pastoral reality in states where same-sex marriage is legal, and the proposal offers a response, removing the obstacle some feel the current canon presents.

Why do you propose removing the requirement to sign the Declaration of Intention from the Canon?

It's probably helpful to begin by understanding how this requirement to sign a document got into the canons in the first place, as that in part explains why it is no longer necessary in that form (a document is still required, but the content is changed).

The requirement that the couple sign a declaration was introduced to the canons in the late 1940s, as part of the gradual accommodation of the church to remarriage after divorce. As a common ground for divorce (or annulment) is "defective intent," having a couple sign a declaration of their "intent" was felt by many to be a safeguard against later claims on that ground. This language was originally in the canon on divorce, rather than the canon on marriage.

The other circumstance at that time was that the marriage liturgy in the 1928 Book of Common Prayer lacked any of the language now found in the prologue to the current (1979) marriage rite concerning the institution of marriage. So having this repeated in the canons is, to some extent, redundant, as these purposes are now spoken publicly in the sight of the congregation. Perhaps needless to say, the church had functioned quite well without any such statement of purposes for marriage in either the liturgy or the canons for over a century.

Still, to cover the legal ground, some form of declaration is still desired. The one remaining difficulty with the current declaration, as the Task Force essay on the canon notes, is that it is cast in a creedal format: the couple must attest that they "believe" certain statements about God's intention and will concerning the institution of marriage. This creates a practical problem in some circumstances, to which I can speak from personal experience. As a priest, I am regularly faced with having to instruct people about marriage. That includes addressing the allowance, under the canons and the rubric, for the marriage of a Christian to a non-Christian, who could be a Buddhist or an atheist. One can presume that the non-believing or other-believing partner is marrying in a Christian ceremony for the sake of the conscience or wishes of her spouse (or family). She may not believe in God or that "God" has "intentions" or a "will" for either the institution of marriage or her own particular marriage. Should she be required to sign a declaration stating belief in that which she does not believe? Should the cleric refuse to solemnize the marriage if she is unable to affirm "belief" in an arguably un-scriptural notion -- at least as some understand it? I would add that the BCP description of marriage is not even exactly the same as that of the Roman Church -- so should a RC spouse be forced to affirm a description of marriage that is not what her church teaches?

These are real questions and the Task Force has sought to remove this obstacle from the path of a couple in such a situation. Unlike in 1949, the causal language is part of the liturgy -- publicly stated as an exhortation -- but no one is required to subscribe to it as a statement of belief. As the official explanation in resolution A036 says, the current wording of this declaration

...is to some extent problematical when one member of the couple may not be a “believer” at all or may come from a tradition with a different theology of marriage. It should be sufficient that the couple be instructed in, and understand the rights, duties, and responsibilities of, marriage as expressed in the marriage vows; and attest to that understanding as well as to their legal competence to marry.

Finally, as already noted, this declaration forms one of the obstacles to conscience some have felt in extending the generous pastoral support to solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples in places where the bishop approves and the civil law allows. This is an obstacle the Task Force was explicitly asked to address in its charter, so that is an additional reason to remove a statement which some, in conscience, would find very difficult, if not impossible, to sign.

So what about "defective intent"?

As noted above, this remains a reality. So to meet the legal concern about defective intent, the couple is asked to sign a declaration that, in addition to covering all of the canonical requirements (including competency, formerly solely the responsibility of the cleric, and now offering the cleric some cover should the couple later be found to have presented inaccurate or false evidence of competence), states

Sec. 3. Prior to the solemnization, the Member of the Clergy shall determine, and shall require the couple to sign a declaration attesting

(a) that both parties have the right to marry according to the laws of the State and consent to do so freely, without fraud, coercion, mistake as to the identity of either, or mental reservation; and

(b) that at least one of the parties is baptized; and

(c) that both parties have been instructed by the Member of the Clergy, or a person known by the Member of the Clergy to be competent and responsible, in the rights, duties, and responsibilities of marriage as embodied in the marriage vows: that the covenant of marriage is unconditional, mutual, exclusive, faithful, and lifelong; and

(d) that both parties understand these duties and responsibilities, and engage to make the utmost effort, with the help of God and the support of the community, to accept and perform them.

I'm more than happy to answer any further questions that come up, so please post comments here if you have any other questions.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: The questions continue...

Chaste Convention

This ember season, Brother Ed, the Minister Provincial of the BSG Province 2, set us the task of meditating on the Brotherhood's vow of chastity. It reads, in part,

Chastity is the decision to live with all in love, with respect for each person's integrity. ... in order to be free to love others without trying to possess or control."

This could not have come at a better time for me, in the run-up to General Convention, to which I am a Deputy from the Diocese of New York, and a member of the special Legislative Committee #20 on all resolutions touching on marriage. As I was also a member of the Task Force for the Study of Marriage, and worked on one of the proposals coming to the Convention, you might think I had a particular horse in this race.

And to some extent I do. All of the Task Force worked hard; and I am disappointed that the work we did has gotten so little close attention -- not to say it has not been responded to, but with vague and mistaken responses that seem to take little account of what the work actually proposes. But when all is said and done, I am resolved not to let whatever happens in Salt Lake City -- either in debate or in decision -- get me down or entangle me in "the desire to possess or control." I resolve to "speak the truth in love" and treat all with whom I disagree or agree with respect for their integrity, and to stand as a witness, not a prosecutor.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Marriage Canon Change Q&A (Part 1)

The A050 Task Force on the Study of Marriage has proposed (in resolution A036) that General Convention amend Canon I.18. The proposal has sparked some conversation and many questions. Some of the conversation is less about the proposed canon change and more about the theological and historical papers that accompany and inform it, and I will address some of those issues separately. But I would like to answer some of the questions, and correct some of the misapprehensions, concerning the proposed canon change, as best I can.

First, though, a disclaimer. Although I served as a member of the Task Force (and as its secretary) I am writing here solely on my own initiative, and other members of the Task Force may have opinions different to mine. But as I was one of the members most closely involved in the creation of the "Biblical and Theological Framework" and the wording of the canon, I think I can offer some perspective concerning matters of "original intent" whatever interpretation another may choose to give to any particular wording.

So, with that established, on to the questions. (And I will present what follows in dialogue format, which is much how it happened in the various threads, blogs, and listservs in which much of what follows originally appeared.

Does the proposed canon change alter the church's teaching on marriage?

The canon does not alter the teaching on marriage as it appears in the Book of Common Prayer. In fact, the proposed change removes the one clause in the present canon that does conflict with the Book of Common Prayer, that "Holy Matrimony is a physical and spiritual union ... entered into within the community of faith." The BCP maintains that marriage involves a "union... in heart, body, and mind," not "spirit" -- and traditional sacramental theology holds that spiritual union is engendered in Baptism and nourished in the Holy Eucharist. This is not to say that a Christian couple may not find their life -- as Christians -- enriched by their marriage, just as the witness of their marriage may inspire others to "find their lives strengthened and their loyalites confirmed." (BCP 430) But since both the BCP and the canons allow a marriage in which one of the spouses is not baptized (and, according to traditional sacramental theology, the particular marriage is therefore not sacramental) any reference to "spiritual union" or "community of faith" does not apply.

So what does the canon change accomplish?

One of the charges to the Task Force was to "consult with the Standing Commission on Constitution and Canons and the Standing Commission on Liturgy and Music to address the pastoral need for priests to officiate at a civil marriage of a same-sex couple in states that authorize such." Part of the consultation revealed a consensus that the present wording of the canon made it difficult to exercise this civil function; so an effort was made to remove the language that was perceived as an obstacle. However, nothing in the proposed canon in itself authorizes or requires clergy to officiate at same-sex civil marriages, or blessings of such relationships, unless and until the church provides liturgical texts that allow it. This has happened provisionally, and this provisional status will likely continue for some time.

This opportunity to reshape the canon also allowed for some clarification and more orderly description of the canonical process. The proposed change focuses on the procedures and performance required of the clergy and the couple, which is what canons are best suited to address. The focus, therefore, is not on expounding the "church's teaching," but on the responsibilities of the clergy and the couple, focusing in particular on the vows that the couple will make to each other, and the cleric's responsibility in assuring they understand the gravity and meaning of those vows, and that they not undertake them "unadvisedly or lightly, but reverently, deliberately, and in accordance with the purposes for which it was instituted by God."

Isn't one of those "purposes" procreation?"

"Purpose" is likely a poor choice of words in this context. The more traditional language speaks of procreation as a "good" -- recognizing both that procreation is a biological reality we share with the natural world, and that, as St Augustine put it (Of Marriage and Concupiscence, I.iv), it reaches its crown of goodness when children are "generated to be regenerated," that is, as the BCP stresses, not merely to be born, but to be nurtured "in the knowledge and love of the Lord."

In all of this, it is important to note that procreation is only a factor for a couple capable of it. The BCP uses the somewhat confusing wording "when it is God's will." Earlier liturgies, such as that of the 1549 BCP, simply recognized that there were circumstances, such as advanced age in a woman, that rendered procreation impossible, and that such circumstances were not a bar to marriage. (The Theological Framework essay explores this issue at greater length.)

Now on to some more practical questions, from a Facebook thread, in particular a series of questions from Craig Uffman,.

By your reading, does the proposal allow a priest to conduct a SS marriage rite even if his bishop disallows it in his diocese?

At present, the liturgies for celebration of a same-sex marriage are provisional, and require the permission of the bishop. The proposed canon change doe not alter that; it refers to liturgies authorized by the church, and that includes the form and extent to which they are authorized. The SCLM in proposed resolution A054 asks for authorization of continued use of the "I Will Bless You" liturgy, and for use of three new liturgies with the permission of the local bishop. It is not clear to me whether they intend no longer to require local permission for the IWBY liturgy. I believe that will be clarified in the course of the work of the legislative committee and General Convention sessions, and in my opinion I think the status quo of the proviso will remain.

Does it imagine the possibility of such a rite without mentioning procreation among the purposes of marriage, as the essay argues against?

Those of us old enough to remember the 1928 BCP do not have to imagine a marriage rite with no mention of procreation. The 1928 liturgy only mentions procreation in two optional prayers. The classical 1549 liturgy mentioned procreation in the prologue, but recognized there were circumstances in which it was impossible, and so provided for omission of the prayer for children when the woman was past the years of childbearing. So, yes, it is quite possible to have a marriage liturgy without mentioning procreation, as the Episcopal Church recognized from 1789 and until the 1979 BCP was created.

To what extent is the argument for allowing same sex marriages as a rite connected to a justification based on a civil rights concern? If it is in some way so based, how is it reasonable to have a conscientious objector clause? That is, can a person refuse to marry persons on the basis of the class (same sex marriages)? If yes, how is that exemption tolerable if such discrimination becomes illegal in this nation? Or does our theology exclude the civil rights claim and posit the addition of same sex marriages as a proposal under the doctrine of reception (and therefore in some way leaving space for conscientious objection)?

While some speak of marriage equality in terms of justice -- and I would be among the last to say, given the witness of the prophets in Holy Scripture, that justice is not an important issue! -- that is not the focus of the Biblical and Theological framework, or of the proposed canon change.

When discussing civil rights, it is important to note that marriage is not an "individual" right -- that is, no one has the "right" to marry anyone they choose. The consent of the other party is always needed. (This to some extent addresses the accusation that the move to marriage equality is based on some kind of "social atomism" and "individual rights"; aside from the point that even if it were, such views are not in themselves antithetical to Christian thinking.) Marriage equality is about allowing particular couples to marry who have, for legal reasons, been barred from doing so. The better analogy is with the debates surrounding anti-miscegenation laws, which held that an individual man or woman was in no way impeded from marriage to a person of the same race. (Some have supplied similar unconvincing rhetoric in the case of individual gay and lesbian people.) But marriage is not, as I note, an individual action; it is always social.

That being said, the canon preserves the right of a cleric to decline to solemnize (or, as extended, decline to bless) any given marriage. This could be on the basis of a particular issue (a feeling the couple is not prepared to take on the responsibility) or on the basis of a belief concerning a class of people. In fact, this language made its way into the canon in order to allow clergy to refuse to solemnize the marriage of any divorced person, if they did not believe such people should remarry.

This does appear to conflict with the "non-discrimination canon" (I.17.5) which describes "marital status" as a protected class, along with age, race, and sexual orientation, among other categories. However, the canon contains a specific proviso, "except as otherwise specified by Canons." So, for example, the canons can "discriminate" on the basis of age by setting minimum and maximum ages for service as a cleric. The proviso in the marriage canon was added specifically to allow discrimination on the basis of "marital status." So a cleric is able to refuse to marry or bless a same-sex couple -- or any other couple -- if she has an objection of any sort to that couple's marriage, including an objection to an entire class of marriages. As I note, the proposed canon change preserves and extends this "individual right" of the cleric.

I am happy to follow up on further questions, but I think this is good for now.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: the conversation continues...

Web of Tragedy

I have been in Baltimore since Monday, to be met with the unrest following the tragic death of Freddy Gray. This strikes close to home, literally. My Baltimore neighborhood (Bolton Hill) shares the same zip code with the neighborhood in which Freddy Gray lived and was taken into custody, and in which much of the unrest and protest and violence has taken place. This was highlighted in a recent story on the PBS Newshour.

The helicopters have been a nightly accompaniment to lost sleep, and have led me to sundry thoughts, which I share with you in no particular order.

• The War on Drugs has had little effect on drugs but has impoverished and criminalized whole populations, here and abroad.
• Who says racism is a thing of the past?
• When looking police in the eye is a crime, who are the criminals?
• And when doesn't flight from police seem like a good idea?
• Abuse of suspects is a heinous crime, even when it doesn't result in serious injury or death. If the "rough ride" is the norm, is it any wonder people hate the police?
• Some in the BPD seem to believe in taking justice into their own vans.
• Time to reevaluate flight as probable cause for pursuit.
• When does what amounts to entrapment become the primary modality of law enforcement?
• “Resistance is futile” ought not be the motto of law enforcement.
• When does media coverage become the cause rather than the observer (cue Heisenberg... and I don't mean the meth king of Breaking Bad.) When does covering the news create the news?
• And speaking of media, since when does freedom of the press mean not obeying the law? There are more media than protestors out after the curfew. 
• I wish Elijah Cumming would run for President.
• How does the view from a helicopter differ from the view from a drone, and to what extent does it further dehumanize the populace. (Cue Harry Lime on moving dots from the top of the Ferris wheel in Vienna.)
• Who doesn't think reactions would be very different if Freddy Gray were white? Of course, were he white the whole situation would be different from the get go, so doesn't that tell us that the problem is systemic?
• Some kids need to be forcibly reminded that their grandmas now have no where to get their heart medicine.

That's the summary for now. God bless us all, and may sanity prevail.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Dear SCOTUS

Listening to the presentations yesterday, I was struck by the shallowness of the repeated arguments about procreation as the essential core of marriage. Whatever else can be said, it seems some are unable to think logically about this subject. I hope for better from the justices themselves, and offer this virtual Venn diagram as a help. 

In spite of heterosexual marriage having been the normative place for procreation to take place (not the same as a "cause" but a context, and only realized in some of the marriages) the reality is that the other purpose of marriage (binding two people in a committed relationship with each other) is true of all marriages, regardless of the gender of the couple. It's a simple rule that something that applies to all situations is more fundamental than that which applies only to some, but the drum-beat argument that "marriage is for procreation" continues its ostinato in spite of the fact that not everyone is dancing to its beat.
For those who want a Scriptural approach, Genesis 1 might come up. There God creates male and female and tells them to be fruitful and multiply. However, there is no sign of marriage in this command. In fact, God gives the same command to the birds and fish, and no one suggests they ought to marry. It has also been observed that this can be read as an address to the species as a whole, rather than a commandment to two individuals.

Genesis 2, however, gives us something much more recognizable as a marriage: the very important concept of unity of the two in one, including the formation of a new household, but without any reference to procreation.

So I might chart it out this way:
Heterosexual sex (a biological phenomenon) is necessary for procreation (pace any biotech innovations!)
But not all heterosexual sex leads to procreation.
And not all procreation takes place within marriage.
The commitment of marriage as permanent fidelity of two persons (a human phenomenon) can and does apply to all who are married. A "failed" marriage is not one which has produced no children, but one that has not sustained the bond of fidelity. 
Placing the legal and moral concerns at the biological rather than the human level is an inversion of the purposes of law and morality. Obviously everyone wants children to be brought up in a loving, caring, nurturing household. Those are moral qualities that biology cannot, on its own, provide; and they can be provided by any couple who engage the will and receive the grace to do so.

Got that?


Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Duty and Death...

for KMY

Somewhere a child is crying.
Lord, help me find him
that I may do my duty to my King.
Led by what dark star
to the outskirts of the capital,
as a man under orders,
commanded, I go.

All of them, he said,
up to the age of two.
I passed one by a while back,
perhaps small for his age;
the soldier behind me thought otherwise.

Soldier. Is this soldiers’ work?
Up to the age of two, he said.
The King is a hard man.
It’s no disloyalty to acknowledge it.
You don’t build a kingdom being soft.
He cuts a broad swath, our King.
All of them, he said,
up to the age of two.

It’s quieter now the screaming’s over.
The cobblestones are slippery
and it’s too dark now
to see with what.
But somewhere up ahead
a child is crying.
Lord, help me find him
that I may do my duty to my King.

— Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

A mirrorwise reflection between Matthew 2.16 and John 16.2

---

This poem was first published in The Witness online, December 2003; the image is from my series of Aaronic Blessings.

Another Perspective

How petty our theological arguments
must seem to those in bliss.
I do not imagine that the angels spend much time
arguing about how many theologians
can dance on the head of a pin.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
a thought from 1983, but still true

The Authority for Worship Forms

My earlier ruminations (in blog post and comment thread) on the subject of how liturgies of the church apart from those in the Book of Common Prayer are approved, and my critique of the allegations by ACI authors “The Reverend Canon Professor Christopher Seitz and Mark McCall, Esq.” that such liturgies are “unconstitutional” has drawn their attention. As with much of their argumentation, the bulk takes the form of mere dismissal or contradictory, “Yes, it is!” so I will do a bit more in terms of a response than a simple, “No, it isn’t.”

Let me first acknowledge that they were correct in finding me mistaken concerning their ignorance of the history involved. However, the reality is much worse than that: it is not that they are ignorant of the history, but that they do not accept the importance of the historical record for the matter under discussion.

Seitz and McCall make a very serious charge: that the General Convention has been acting unconstitutionally for many years by authorizing non-BCP liturgical texts apart from the mechanism laid out in the Constitution Article X. The problem with this line of argument is that the mechanism laid out in the Constitution doesn’t concern such texts. It only applies to the BCP and its revision in whole or in part, not to the various offices and rites that General Convention has been authorizing for centuries. These go back to the beginning with the first Book of Offices from the turn of the 18^th century, containing the Ordinal and the form for the consecration of churches; these rites were later included in the BCP itself (as has often happened with such extravagant or occasional liturgies.) The Book of Offices went through many revisions and expansions, the first modern version being put together by the House of Bishops in 1917, later amended in 1937, 1940 and 1949. (I was received into the Episcopal Church using the rite from one of these books provided for Reception, which was lacking in the 1928 BCP). The Book of Offices was superseded by the Book of Occasional Services in 1979, since amended several times. Backing up a bit, 1964 saw a period of trial use for a book of Lesser Feasts and Fasts, also later amended and expanded, including such iterations as Holy Women, Holy Men. Dare I also mention the Hymnal, a cornerstone of our worship, nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. In addition, in more recent times we have seen five volumes in a series called Enriching Our Worship, and most recently a provisional rite for the blessing of a same-gender couple. Obviously the latter may be seen as the last straw, which has drawn the fire and ire of those eager to brand the whole lot of them “unconstitutional.”

It is of course quite true that the Constitution makes no mention of any of these liturgies or resources. That in itself does not make them unconstitutional, unless they violate some constitutional principle.

Seitz and McCall raise two objections to my arguments in favor of such authority.

First, that my argument that continued practice of the church indicates the General Convention believes itself to hold such a power is “naive” — they argue that long misuse does not constitute a norm or render something legal if it isn’t. They dismiss the argument from silence as not convincing.

Second, they challenge that if what they refer to as “purported authorizations” were legitimate people would not keep trying (as in the current A066 proposal) to amend the Constitution to cover these liturgies.

Their first objection begs the question, in that it assumes the action constitutes a violation, and its repetition cannot legitimize it. This objection is only correct if the action does constitute a violation, which is the question. The "unpersuasive" argument from silence is another matter, and I will turn to it below.

A response to the second challenge is twofold.

First, the desire to have a set process put in place need not stem from a realization that the current practice is illegal (though the Explanation for A066 wrongly implies that, which I have noted to the SCLM as well). In earlier motions for change (for example 2006.A078) the explanation was given that a more orderly process needed to be set into place — not that the current practice was illegal, but that it was not systematic. (My response would be to suggest that such nuts and bolts policies and practices belong in Title II of the Canons, not the Constitution, if they need to be set in place; just as the detailed process for “trial use” is currently so enshrined.)

Second, and more importantly, the same General Convention sessions that refused to amend the Constitution to “allow” for such provisional rites were perfectly happy to authorize them for use. So General Convention clearly believed itself to be competent to do that which the ACI claims requires the constitutional support that it lacks, while doing nothing to supply that lack -- something they were and are fully competent to do.

And this brings me to the real issue for ACI: they do not believe that the General Convention is the head of hierarchical authority in the Episcopal Church. McCall in particular has written and testified on the subject, noting the absence of such words as “supremacy” and “hierarchy” from the Constitution. He has failed, however, to note the significance of the word “General” and its implications in an ecclesiastical context. “General church” is a term of art in many legal cases (including SCOTUS) concerning local churches that are part of a hierarchical church, of which The Episcopal Church is one — though the hierarchy is embedded in corporate entities rather than individual persons, much as the English constitution developed the notion of “King in Parliament” so too the Episcopal Church is commonly governed by “the Rector, Vestry and Wardens,” “the Bishop and Standing Committee,” and the General Convention with its House of Bishops and House of Lay and Clerical Deputies.

(Seitz and McCall find it difficult not to ride this their favorite hobbyhorse even in this instance, bringing in another matter on which the Constitution is silent: the departure of a diocese from the Episcopal Church. Employing their own argument from silence, in this case they hold that silence implies consent, but again ignore the historical context and the intent of the founders to form a national church, which provides key to understanding the Constitutional issues at play, in much the same way the silence of the Constitution of the US on the departure of states from the Union was never spelled out as it was deemed unthinkable. History can be very informative. They claim not to rest their case on this "silence" but it is they who bring it up. Their "careful analysis" of the polity of The Episcopal Church has been convincing to a few, but not to most. But this really is a separate matter, and I only cite it here because the ACI folk appear to think it relevant.)

Most Episcopalians understand the General Convention to be the highest legislature in our church, and its governing authority. After all, the General Convention has been authorizing the liturgies of the church from the very beginning: starting in 1785 (prior to the final Constitution) when the first Convention in Philadelphia adopted a “General Ecclesiastical Constitution” Article IV of which declared,

“The Book of Common Prayer... of the Church of England,” shall be continued to be used by this Church, as the same is altered by this Convention...”

There was a bit of back and forth with England concerning some doctrinal changes the English (and some Americans) thought went too far, but in 1789 the General Convention adopted a Book of Common Payer and a Constitution which read (Article 8),

A Book of Common Prayer... when established by this or a future General Convention, shall be used in the Protestant Episcopal Church in those states, which shall have adopted this Constitution.

So it is clear that the primary liturgy of the Episcopal Church is established by and in the keeping of the General Convention, and subject to amendment by it (in two consecutive sessions).

My argument on the silence of the Constitution on supplemental, occasional, and provisional rites, and the authority of General Convention to authorize them, is an argument a fortiori — if the General Convention can establish and amend the Book of Common Prayer, how much more ought it be able to authorize secondary and provisional texts, even though this authority is not spelled out in the Constitution?

Moreover, our texts are not in fact "silent" on the matter. This authority is spelled out in the Book of Common Prayer itself, which states on page 13,

In addition to [the Holy Eucharist and Daily Morning and Evening Prayer] and the other rites contained in this Book, other forms set forth by authority within this Church may be used. Also, subject to the direction of the bishop, special devotions taken from this Book, or from Holy Scripture, may be used when the needs of the congregation so require.

The latter clause concerning the bishop is referred to in the Constitution as follows:

Nothing in this Article [X] shall be construed as restricting the authority of Bishops of the Church to take such order as may be permitted by the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer or by the Canons of the General Convention for the use of special forms of worship.

But what about the first clause, which I italicized above? To what other “authority within this Church” can the rubric possibly refer apart from the one that has exercised it from the foundation, the General Convention, since the role of the bishop is addressed separately? This is plainly the case, as the history of General Convention action testifies. A more eloquent, and authoritative, testimony than either I or Seitz and McCall can muster lies in the official commentary on the Constitution and Canons from White and Dykman (1982), which notes, concerning the Book of Occasional Services:

Under the rubric of the 1979 Prayer Book (page 13, rubric 2)... the permission of the bishop is not required for the use of forms and services such as these, which are set forth by authority of General Convention. (page 462, emphasis mine)

Now, it cannot be said that Seitz and McCall are ignorant of this rubric. Seitz, in particular, is fond of alleging a “Constitutional” authority to the BCP — a point I deny in terms of law but recognize in terms of practicality, as its rubrics are governing of those matters they address. He and his colleague simply refuse to recognize that it is the General Convention to which this “authority” refers. They want at all points to shift authority to the local bishop, and even object to provisional rites where that regulatory authority is explicitly granted, and raise the specious charge of “unconstitutionality.”

As I say, Seitz and McCall are not ignorant of the rubric. In fact, in their response to me about the failed attempts to amend the Constitution (which they take to be a sign it needs amending) they quote from the 2006 report of the SCLM concerning the subject and their proposal for review. Or, I should say, they misquote from the report. It is a subtle misquotation, as it involves a failure to Romanize the word “and” linking a pair of phrases that in their version appear to bring the diocesan bishop into the “authority” to set forth other forms, as opposed to a bishop’s direction concerning special devotions. I have quoted the rubric above. Here is the version at Seitz and McCall’s ACI blog (as a graphic clipped, lest anyone suggest I’ve tinkered with their text; click to enlarge).

I do not know if their failure to return the word “and” in the fourth line to Roman font (as it appears in the 2006 Blue Book, page 222) is deliberate or an error. Clearly everyone makes errors, as the SCLM did itself in this very text, shortening “within” to “with.” But the incorrect text appears to support the ACI’s larger argument of episcopal limits on General Convention, and when errors tend that way I have to suspend judgment as to the cause of the error.

In summary, my case is that the General Convention has the authority to authorize provisional or supplemental rites, as this is provided for in the Book of Common Prayer itself. The fact that no constitutional procedure for this authorization exists does not render such acts unconstitutional.

And in the end, what if it actually were unconstitutional, not just filling a gap but actually violating some principle? Who is to make that judgment? Everyone is entitled to an opinion, including the ACI and its authors, and as am I, and as are White and Dykman.

But it is well established that the polity of the Episcopal Church lacks any tribunal for the formal judgment of such matters — except the General Convention itself. And that body has shown, by its actions in authorizing liturgical texts for over two hundred years, and refusing to amend the Constitution to make explicit provision for such authorization, to believe itself to possess this power and authority as a native element of its character as the superior synod and government of this church, custodian of its laws and author of its liturgies.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Dept of Canonical Redundancy Dept

A further note on my earlier comments about liturgical revision and its process, in which I chided both those calling for and those panicking over a possible amendment to the Constitution of The Episcopal Church, Article X, I want to add to what I noted earlier about the longstanding practice of the Episcopal Church in authorizing liturgical texts in addition to the Book of Common Prayer. The proposed resolution A066 to amend the Constitution is seen by its proposers as needed to allow or regularize such authorizations. That is not the case.

Let me first reiterate that Article X is primarily concerned with the BCP and the process of its amendment. It also contains a clause about the authority of a diocesan bishop to authorize additional liturgical material -- an authority which by extension belongs to the whole House of Bishops (and which they exercised in that manner as long ago as 1907).

However, for those who crave the source of the written authority for the development and use of other liturgical texts, one can find it in the BCP itself. The permission stands among the very first modern words of the book (page 13, following on the historical Preface of 1789, which also noted that variety is the spice of liturgy). The BCP affirms that in addition to the Holy Eucharist and Daily Office "and the other rites contained in this Book, other forms set forth by authority within this Church may be used."

There were similar provisions in the BCP 1892 and 1928, which led to the work on the Book of Offices beginning in 1907, revised in 1917, 1940 and 1949; Lesser Feasts and Fasts, approved for "trial use" (even though not an addition to or revision of the BCP except in the Calendar) in 1964, and its later editions, including Holy Women Holy Men; the Book of Occasional Services (1979, since revised several times); and Enriching Our Worship volumes 1-5, last authorized for provisional use in 2012.

If one is anxious about "authority" in this case, it is abundantly clear that the authoritative body for the liturgy of the whole church is the General Convention. This is the body that authorizes the BCP itself (in two successive regular sessions) with no other approval necessary. (Proposed changes are referred to the dioceses in the time between sessions for reference, not approval). This is the body that has been authorizing additional and supplemental liturgical texts for just under a century.

Given the amount of material that has been authorized under the current procedures, it hardly seems necessary to burden the Constitution with a clause for a purpose already addressed in the BCP itself -- or to charge the General Convention with having to debate it. I urge the relevant legislative committee to mark it as redundant and "already addressed" and let the session get on to other work,

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

The (Mis)Shape of the Liturgy

On the topic of liturgical change, be it dubbed "renewal" or "experimentation" I am on record as being conservative. I'm perfectly happy with liturgy that maintains a specific shape, and even specific texts or a small set of texts. Others prefer a cornucopia or cafeteria of seemingly endless options to be mixed and matched like one of those childhood flip-books that pieces together four different parts of clowns, firefighters, nurses, bricklayers and fashion models to produce comical chimeras. Amusing, but not edifying, to my mind, but clearly otherwise to other minds.

I was conversing with the deacon who serves in my parish, and it struck me this may be a personality trait. I am very familiar with it from my years in the theater. Some actors (such as myself) were and are perfectly happy playing the same role night after night, and finding the "new" in each iteration without changing the text beyond perhaps a different inflection, but being present in the moment, moment by moment, as the fiction slowly emerges into reality -- or as real as the stage can be. (As a side note, that is certainly my experience of reading the Scriptures in the Daily Office for over 40 years. Every reading brings a new insight, but the text hasn't changed; I have.)

But back to personality: some other actors grow bored and start "playing" and making changes either to the text or the blocking, only rarely to good effect. At worse they being to violate the reality of the play and commune with the audience in sly contempt for it. Zero Mostel was a classic example of the downside, and I had the sad experience of seeing him perform in one of his last runs as Tevye; it was deeply embarrassing, and all the more so as he knew it. I saw him after the performance and spoke with him briefly. I was with a company performing The Tempest in the National Parks around Washington DC. Mostel sighed deeply, "I wish I could do that." He was desperately wanting to be able to do that sort of work, but imprisoned by his own need for constant self-amusement at the expense of the other actors and the play -- brilliant on opening night but an embarrassment as the run went on. He walked away a shrunken man, sadness brimming in his eyes, a prisoner in his own self-constructed cell.

I think some clergy and some liturgists are the same -- they can only find excitement in change, not in iteration. The same may be true of congregations. But it seems that imposing variety on those who want constancy and regularity is not a good course. In our hectic, revolving world, the church may be best at offering a still point.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Those who are ignorant of history...

...are doomed not to know what they are talking about.

The folks at the Anglican Communion Institute are all in a dither about Resolution A066 coming to General Convention this summer. It is an amendment to the Constitution to spell out a process by which supplemental liturgical texts might be authorized. Neither the ACI nor the proposers of this resolution appear to recognize that it is neither a horrible novelty hatched as part of a "twenty-five year effort" (as ACI says) nor a strict necessity (as the proposers seem to think.)

The fact is that nothing in the Constitution or Canons forbids General Convention authorizing rites supplemental to the Book of Common Prayer. The Constitution does lay out the process for amendment of the BCP itself by revision or addition, and requires that the BCP be used throughout the church, but nowhere suggests that no other liturgical rite can be authorized.

On the contrary, the General Convention has been authorizing supplements to the BCP since the 1940s (starting with The Book of Offices, which later became the Book of Occasional Services, and Lesser Feasts and Fasts). The House of Bishops (on their own) had authorized earlier versions of the Book of Offices going back to 1916!

The ACI seems to think that the House of Bishops (and Deputies) cannot do as a body what any individual bishop can do in her own diocese (authorize a liturgy for a special occasion or for circumstance not provided for in the BCP) -- a notion that reflects their peculiar ecclesiology in which the diocesan bishop is at the apex of all rule.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

UPDATE: See a more detailed response to the allegations of unconstitutionality, and the accuracy of my assessment.

Let the Children...

When I'm asked about the role of children in marriage, I respond that in my parochial experience they are usually old enough to serve as ring-bearers or flower-girls.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Provisional Provision

A few folks in the more conservative wing of The Episcopal Church have expressed concerns about General Convention's provision of provisional liturgies to be used at the discretion of the diocesan bishop. There is at present no explicit constitutional clause describing such liturgies. Instead, the Constitution speaks of "trial use" of liturgies supplementing or revising either portions or the whole of the Book of Common Prayer -- which liturgies, unlike their provisional cousins, are not to be gainsaid by individual bishops who do not care for them.

There is a move afoot to amend the Constitution to spell out the practice of provisional use (Resolution A066), and while likely a good thing in terms of dotting and crossing the relevant vowels and consonants, it is not strictly necessary, and at this point in time may raise more hackles than it calms. While such provisional or occasional use is not at present explicit in the Constitution, it is implicit in the present Constitution's allowance (Article X) for individual Bishops, acting in accord with the governing rubric of the BCP (page 13), to provide for liturgies for occasions for which no extant liturgy suffices. If an individual bishop can do this within her own diocese, then surely the General Convention, which includes the whole House of Bishops, can by a majority vote make such a provision, subject always to the local bishop's approval for use within her diocese. The House of Bishops first did this just after the turn of the previous century, authorizing a Book of Offices for occasional use. This reached a settled form in 1917, and was amended in 1949 and 1949; and it led to the Book of Occasional Services in 1979, which has itself gone through several revisions. So if the church has been acting in contravention of the Constitution in this regard, it has been doing so for a century; and the text of the Constitution is silent on the matter, so it may well be taken to be settled as permitted. (Article X is about the BCP and its amendment, not all liturgy. For that, see Title II of the Canons.)

I say this as one who does not favor a proliferation of liturgies, but that is an opinion not all share. But opinions aside, I think the General Convention has acted well within the spirit of the law in its past approval of provisional liturgies whose use is contingent on the approval of the diocesan.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

On Church Growth: A Thought

The problem is not that the church isn't counter-cultural enough. The problem is that the church is thoroughly encultured to a culture of fifty to a hundred years ago. Relating to people in their cultural present, out of the depths of eternal truths, seems a better course, but it is one to which the institutional body seems hard-pressed to bend.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Do the Math

For those who want to place procreation at the head or heart of marriage, it is good to recall that the prevailing description of marriage is the means by which two become one, not how two become three or more.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Allowance is not Mandate: A Thought on Marriage

I have heard it said by some that the Episcopal Church cannot amend its Canons to allow for marriage equality because the Book of Common Prayer's marriage liturgy makes no such provision, and furthermore "defines" marriage as only between one man and one woman. I will simply note in response that the Canons provide at present for marriage by a party to someone other than their living former spouse, after divorce, a situation which is nowhere deemed possible in the Book of Common Prayer's marriage liturgy, which "defines" marriage as requiring life-long fidelity in no uncertain terms.

Canonical allowance does not require full congruity with liturgical practice. Nor does permission need to rise to the level of mandate. The present proposed amendment to the Canons would allow for the celebration of same-sex marriage (should the church authorize liturgies with that in mind), but would no more require them than the present canon on remarriage after divorce requires bishops to approve, or clergy to celebrate, such marriages.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Meditations on the Way of the Cross

This is a combination of a Symphonic Poem (#1) I wrote back in 1982 with images from the Way of the Cross that I wrote last year for my parish. The musical portion is based on some of the traditional Passion music, including a closing chorale the looks beyond the Way of the Cross to Easter....

Peace and all good, and blessed Good Friday,
Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

My Drugged Childhood

I'm not sure whether this qualifies as April Fool's or Throwback Thursday, but I was thinking this morning about all of the substances -- some of them now Controlled -- to which I was commonly exposed as a child in the 1950s. Easily available and widely used, these were some hefty meds, and on top of that they tasted lovely. Who can forget the licorice sweetness of Paregoric (tincture of opium) or the cheery, cherry tang of Cheracol syrup (with codeine). One use that followed me into adulthood (until they changed the formula) were the wonderful Parke Davis Throat Disks (best thing for public speaking, as chloroform does wonders for clearing the throat, and they had that familiar anise flavor harking back to Paregoric!)

And who can forget the inhalants! I was never without my Vicks Inhaler (methamphetimine does wonders for a stuffy nose; and I think the photo above indicates recent use thereof). The classroom was a garden of scents, from Magic Marker to the Holy Grail of freshly run-off mimeographs. And dare I say that Airplane Glue and Dope (I'm not making this up) -- not huffed or puffed, but just enjoyed as a side-benefit of model airplane construction; which perhaps helps explain the popularity of that hobby in the fifties.

Veering away from actual consumption, I won't even retail what you got in the average 1950s Chemistry Set, but suffice it to say that between it and some items purchased from the local pharmacy I was able to make enough black powder to burn up much of my bedroom, and lucky enough not to have set it off in a tightly sealed package.

And all of this probably helps to explain the sixties and seventies.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Thought for the Day: Historical Jesus

While it is possible to express truth through fictional means -- the parables may be a good example -- I don't think one can separate history from a minimal factual basis. That's not to say that historians don't differ both in their interpretations and in the facts they present, but there needs to be some basis to the historical narrative or it isn't historical.

If it could be shown that Jesus never existed, I don't think there would be much point in the Christian faith as Christian. There are some wonderful notions enshrined in it, some excellent teachings, but most of them can be found out through reason and humanistic ethical thought, or in any number of other religious traditions. As someone once said, Christianity is not just assent to a set of propositions, but Yes to a person -- and if that person never existed, as Paul observed, we Christians are of all people the most to be pitied.

I take great comfort in the knowledge that proving a negative is nigh on to impossible, and will accept the scant documentary evidence that those feet, in ancient times, walked the Middle East, even if they never made it to England's pleasant hills.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG