April 25, 2012

Issues under Review

The Church of England is undertaking a review of its Issues in Human Sexuality, which has been a guiding document for their explorations over the last several years. I did a review of Some Issues in Human Sexuality a while back, and it seems to me an appropriate time to republish my thoughts here:

Some Issues in Human Sexuality: A guide to the debate. London: Church House Publishing, 2003.
A review with comments by Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
[Originally published in 2005]

A bit over a year ago, I was asked by my Bishop to take a look at the publication from the Church of England, Some Issues in Human Sexuality, and to offer some detailed comments on it. I would like to share my observations in this forum. I wish I could be enthusiastic concerning this publication, as it is clear that a good bit of work went into it; but I’m afraid that on the whole it is extremely disappointing. I say this not simply because the document reaches a status quo conclusion, but because in large part it appears that that is what it was designed to do: it is a particularly good example of “begging the question” — the conclusions are assumed as premises. Over and over when objections to a traditional view are raised, they are first to some extent misrepresented, and then “refuted” largely not by argument but by an appeal to the very consensus they challenge. The so-called consensus or mainstream thus becomes unassailable, and always has the last word.

Another major problem is the tendency to cast the net very broadly to find anything against a more liberal view of homosexuality, while presenting a very selective, and not very representative or well-represented response from the “revisionist” position. (I note in passing I’m also troubled by the use of certain code words such as this; “lifestyle” is another.) This is typical in the work of Robert Gagnon, who takes a maximalist view by reading an anti-homosexual meaning into texts few before him ever read in that way, and heaping criticism (sometimes fallacious and often irrelevant and ad hominem) on the various straw men he sets up, as well as the scholars whose work he misrepresents (or at least misunderstands) and impugns.

On a related note, one of the major flaws of this book is simply poor scholarship: it has the appearance of scholarship (footnotes, bibliography, citations, etc.) but the footnotes and citations often do not refer to the subject at hand.

I’m also troubled by the “soft” anecdotal “Voices from the debate” — these subjective elements add little to the discussion, and Bishop Forster, an ardent supporter of ex-gay ministries, sees to it that this aspect of the debate receives a disproportional representation, along with all of the demonizing language of “the strategy of the enemy.” In addition, although I understand the rationale for lumping bisexuality and transsexualism into the debate concerning secular issues and civil rights, I find that the attempt to deal with these issues in the present volume clouds the theological debate, as the issues are rather different.

My Notes on Some Issues in Human Sexuality

1.1.5 the last sentence articulates the mythology of the universal consensus on sexual morality through Christian history.

1.1.10f the use of “lifestyle” in this argument is insulting and beside the point

1.1.16 wrongly suggests that the industrial revolution is a major cause in the “breakdown of traditional forms of socially imposed morality.” Adultery was both common and condemned long before the industrial revolution.

1.1.23 this whole section about autonomy fails to address the Christian notion of love as the gift of one person to another.

1.2.7 states that the Protestant reformers argued for “equal importance of marriage and celibacy as forms of Christian discipleship.” The English reformers at least were not as enthusiastic about either as their catholic predecessors; they were suspicious of celibacy, and tolerated marriage as “an estate allowed.” The idealization of marriage is a relatively recent phenomenon and derives from largely secular sources (“marriage as the basis of society” etc.)

1.2.9 here we get the first reference to the problematical notion of complementarity. The definition of complementary as “differences between men and women ... intended for the mutual good of each” is not particularly truthful, nor does it relate to the dictionary definition of complementary as the lack of one made up by the other.

1.2.17 Aquinas’ argument is only hard to follow because it is a circular argument; it also partakes of an “ends justifies the means” ethic

1.2.21 again misrepresents the Protestant view of marriage and celibacy; Karl Barth harshly criticized celibacy in Church Dogmatics III, particularly celibacy in community, which he saw as a rejection of the “opposite”

1.2.24.2 this is a misreading of Ephesians 5.32; the great mystery is the relationship between Christ and the church, as Paul says (“but I speak of Christ and the church”).

1.2.25 this is the first of several misrepresentations of Boswell’s thesis. Boswell’s conclusion was not about the intent of the rites so much as how they were used. That variant sexual relationships have been tolerated (if not affirmed) at various times in Church history is obvious. That the rites Boswell describes were used for same-sex blessings is evident in that this is one of the main reasons given for their suppression. Note also an example of faulty scholarship is SIHS: the footnote refers to a book published 12 years before Boswell’s work was published. While a number of scholars have disagreed with Boswell’s conclusions, SIHS fails to recognize is that that’s what scholarship is all about: scholars often disagree about any number of things but that doesn’t necessarily settle the question; on many of these issues the jury of history is still out. The search for consensus is at fault here. In cultural history (as in science of all sorts) the mainstream or consensus often awaits correction by the new discovery and understanding.

1.2.26 it is typical of a Roman Catholic document to say that tradition has always declared something which was only stated explicitly in the 1990s, i.e., that homosexual acts are “intrinsically disordered.”

1.2.34 the forward thinking American BCP of 1785/89 also challenged the reasoning behind the so-called ends of marriage by removing reference to them from the rite

1.3.6 Gagnon has not advanced beyond the point of seeing the sexual organs as some kind of proper fit; in reality they aren’t particularly “well-fitting” as any woman whose husband knows nothing of sexual relations beyond “insert tab a into slot b” will attest; moreover, there is a whole field of science dedicated to the evolution of the form of the sexual organs, which in many species are intended to make fertilization difficult, not to promote it

1.3.8 it is interesting to see that the British in 1954 were aware that national servicemen “living in a predominantly male service community” might need some protection from each other.

1.4.11 needs to ask why “the official teaching about homosexuality in both the Church of England and the Anglican Communion in general has remained more conservative than it has on other subjects connected with sexual morality.” Might that not be prejudice rather than adherence to some pure truth?

1.5.2 how true for instance that “on some issues, for example, the need for faithfulness within and abstinence outside of marriage, its (the Anglican Communion) beliefs have not changed” except to the extent the provision for divorce and remarriage constitutes what many of those who opposed it considered a formal blessing of adultery.

2.1.4 it should be noted that authority as such is not in the Scripture but in the interpretation and explication and application of the Scripture.

2.2.15 what Hart fails to recognize is that even those who think they are doing type 1 interpretation are really doing type 2, because meaning does not reside in text.

2.5.12 citing Article VII on rites and ceremonies, I simply note that ordination and marriage are exactly that

2.5.16 it is not at all evident that the requirements of the council in Acts concerning food strangled or blood or meals associated with idolatry “relate to specific cultural and historical circumstances that have no direct parallels in this country today.” Scripture assigns these conclusions to the Holy Spirit, not societal or cultural pressure.

2.6.5 “the final point we need to note is that we cannot simply reduce the Bible’s ethical instruction to the command to love” suggests that Jesus didn’t know what he was talking about when he did exactly that.

2.7.4 Barton’s suggestion that “rather than biblical interpretation preceding and shaping Christian ethics and practice, it is the ethics and practice of the Christian community that needs to (and in reality does) precede and shape its biblical interpretation.” This seems a truism; we know the community came before the Scripture was written, and subsequently interprets what it wrote; only a certain class of biblical fundamentalists imagine the Scripture is the source rather than the product.

2.7.6 notice in this translation of 2 Timothy 3.16-17, the whole clause is in apposition to what precedes. “Every Scripture inspired by God is suitable for instruction....”

2.7.9 how to determine what reading is true to text? Whether The Merchant of Venice is a comedy or tragedy depends on whether you are Shylock or Portia.

3.1.2 “the biblical text nowhere identifies the image of God with some inherent human capacity to be or to do certain things.” On the contrary, the Johannine tradition locates this precisely in the capacity to love. (e.g. 1 John 4:16)

3.1.3 Genesis 1 analogizes the creation with the construction of a Middle Eastern Temple, in which the image of the deity is placed in the sanctuary in the center of the Temple. Thus God creates humanity in his image as the finishing note in his work, just as the builder of a Middle Eastern Temple would create the image of the god to place in the sanctuary.

3.4.7 John Stott disregarded the plain sense of Gal 3.28 because the plain sense of it would require of him something that he would find too difficult, that is, to overlook sexual differences within the church, including in its ministry and in its rites.

3.4.8 notice the disappearance of the idea of each person being made in the image of God from the previous section.

3.4.9 again this begs the question by saying that the Genesis accounts established something permanent about human sexual relationships rather than about their beginnings; this transforms a Creation account into a settled "thus and always so" (c. Titus 1:14-15; 1 Timothy 1:4)

3.4.17 the 2 quite distinct Genesis accounts (which are incompatible from a narrative standpoint) have been blurred together; that Jesus did this as a midrash to make a point about the indissolubility of the marriage bond is no reason to do it on a narrative level

3.4.23 the import in Genesis 2 is not that Eve is female but that she is human — it is her “likeness” to Adam, not her difference from him that is important

3.4.27 one could just as easily add same-sex covenant to marriage, community, etc., as a means of dealing with the fact that it is not good to be alone

3.4.35 circular reasoning: of course Anselm couldn’t have been homosexual because Anselm couldn’t have been homosexual as he understood homosexuality; so therefore all of the language he uses, that to any other person would mean homosexuality, couldn’t possibly mean what it appears to mean when Anselm uses it

3.4.50 this section is very poor; it stresses complementarity when Genesis 2 is about similarity

3.4.53 repeats the old heresy (yes, from a Christological standpoint) that “from now on neither is complete without the other. The man needs the woman for his wholeness, and the woman needs the man for hers.” This ignores the fact that Jesus Christ is perfect man complete in himself. Each human being is created in God’s image, and each person is complete and full in him or herself: the Chalcedonian definition declares that Jesus derives his human nature entirely from Mary, and she could not bestow what she didn’t possess, which is a full and complete human nature in all its perfection.

3.4.65 another circular argument

3.4.72 the married state is not exalted, even in the here and now, in the NT

3.4.74 it is specious to generalize that the first three chapters of Genesis provided some kind of “basic conceptual framework within which to understand and assess all that follows in the Old Testament” largely because the first three chapters of Genesis date from a later period than much of the rest of the Old Testament and can hardly be held to be constitutive. Otherwise those who composed the older sections of the Scripture wouldn’t have understood what they were saying! (This is a kind of pre-critical thinking here; surely the SIHS authors know the Scripture wasn’t written in the order in which we now have it bound in a single volume.)

3.4.75 the exclusiveness of the union between Adam and Eve is a result of the fact that there wasn’t anybody else. There is no suggestion whatsoever in the Old Testament that polygamy is sinful, though it may fall short of an ideal. It is explicitly provided for in the Law of Moses. (Dt 21:15f)

3.4.76 this does not answer Vasey’s critique. Jesus’ teaching is not pro-monogamy but anti-divorce; he is most likely responding to the rebbinic tradition that mandated the divorce of infertile wives (after ten years) in fulfilling the commandment to “be fruitful and multiply”

3.4.77 the New Testament does not affirm monogamous marriage; it allows it. The references in Timothy and Titus to one wife refer to being married only once; it is a proscription of remarriage in widowhood

3.4.78 if marriage is relevant within the context of “the new community created in by Christ” then where are all the married couples? There is no case in which marriage is seen as preferred rather than as allowed.

3.4.79 what Genesis 2 teaches about marriage is that it is permanent, not that it is the only human relationship

3.4.80f all of this could apply to same-sex couples as well

3.4.83 back to the circular argument

3.4.89f this pattern of argument is repeated: a good point versus opposition based on specious arguments

3.4.91 rejects “other forms of family life” as “at variance to God’s plans for human life” — why then did God choose to become incarnate in such an irregular variety of family life --- a woman pregnant (not by her husband) prior to marriage, and foster-fatherhood?

3.4.92 “the traditional pattern of family life is the best environment for the raising of children because it provides them with the greatest degree of security and stability.” Not only is this not borne out by studies but it overlooks the rich Christian metaphor of adoption --- starting with Joseph. The biological family is sometimes not the best place to raise a child. This is another example of the tendency towards misplaced and ill-informed idealism that afflicts this whole study.

3.4.93 now we are on to the well-being of society as a whole; this is plain and simple utilitarianism

3.4.96 here we have Karl Barth’s heresy in full, “real man, genuine fellow humanity, man and woman as they truly are.” Overlooking that Jesus Christ is true and perfect man. A man and woman do not become more complete as creatures through sexual union.

3.4.98 fails to meet the standards of Gal 3.28 — all that stems from race, status, or sex is of no import in Christ.

3.4.100 celibacy is not an option; it is presented by Christ as eschatological sign of the Kingdom

3.4.103 we get some real confusion here about the difference between singleness and celibacy. In this paragraph we seem to see a difference between the provisionality of singleness and the permanence of celibacy. But then celibacy is seen as something where marriage is “often” permanently renounced. Temporary celibacy is singleness.

3.4.108 now singleness is being talked about as a vocation. This language of call returns in 3.4.10, 3.5.5

3.5.4 assumes the mainstream interpretation must be right, ipso facto

3.5.8 obviously it would be much easier if gay and lesbian people didn’t exist since they are so hard to “fit into this picture.” Maybe the picture is wrong, or the viewers of it?

3.6.11 overlooks the fact that the same-sex relationship that is faithful without the external needs of a family or society might in fact be morally exemplary and superior to the “ends”- based marriage that stays together because of the external concerns such as the children, the house, the business, etc.

3.6.36 I don’t understand why Coakley is brought in at this point; the argument seems irrelevant.
Chapter four, voices: at the end of citation two this poor young man seems not to be able to distinguish his own “stubborn intellectual integrity” from the “willful interpretations” of the people who might have led him to some kind of healing or reconciliation. Who, in short, is willful here?

4.2.3 the traditional Jewish understanding of the visit to Sodom has nothing to do with homosexuality; this is clear from the Talmud
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4.2.7 this time the consensus or the mainstream does appear to be on the liberal side. However...

4.2.8 it is now convenient to undercut this consensus with specious arguments. The unambiguous verb for sex is not yada but shakav.

4.2.9 the sin of Sodom was antecedent to the visit of the angels — so the sin for which the city suffered was not homosexual rape

4.2.11 here we have Gagnon at his worst; the Ezekiel passage simply because it uses the word abomination must be referring to homosexuality, even though Ezekiel never uses the word abomination in this sense elsewhere. As to Jude and 2 Peter texts — they refer to slander and malice, not sex. “Going after someone’s flesh” is a metaphor for slander, not lust. (For example, in Daniel 3:8 and 6:24/25 the idiom is simply accepted as such by the translators, and the colorful image of the Chaldeans “chewing on the Jews’ parts” becomes simply, “they denounced them” and those “who chewed on Daniel’s parts” becomes “who accused him.”) The slander of “the glorious ones” — whether angels or the rightful leaders of the congregation, is the focus of Jude’s rhetoric.

4.2.14 in an astonishing misuse of evidence, even though they state that “the texts we have just looked at say nothing directly about this topic” they immediately refer them to “sexual relationships that fall outside the limits the God has laid down”!

4.2.16 this whole section completely misreads Leviticus and its context

4.2.21 only raises one of Milgrom’s three objections; the others are more significant

4.2.23 totally misrepresents the use and significance of the word abomination; the citations from Proverbs are irrelevant — this is wisdom literature not legal code, from an entirely different era, and figuratively expands the concept of abomination; it is only in Proverbs that the phrase “toevah adonai” is used; and all other uses here are metaphorical as in “righteousness is abominable to the sinner”

4.2.24 completely overlooks Milgrom’s very serious observation that lesbianism is not covered by this commandment; while the commands on bestiality do cover both men and women. The complete absence of a Levitical proscription on lesbian sex should indicate that this is a social/cultic matter, not a divine command, unless one wishes to take this literally and believe that God only forbids male homosexual acts (between Jews in Israel, as Milgrom notes)

4.2.25 fails to observe the difference between ritual and cult

4.2.27 it is not that “Commandments regarding human sexuality are intended to prevent the violation of the boundaries between natural and unnatural laid down by God in creation.” It is because they were practiced by the Egyptians and the Canaanites. That’s what the text says. If we take the text literally, then, there is nothing unnatural about lesbianism.

4.2.30 Deuteronomy 25.5, raises the whole issue of the levirate law. I take it there is not desire to affirm this part of God's ordinances. (Note to England: this is an issue of some relevance to Henry VIII.)

4.2.33 whatever else it is this is clearly a cultic regulation

4.2.28 Gagnon is wrong again: the rejection is not of homosexuality or of prostitution but of cult; the verses are about men and women, hetero- and homosexual, and the only common factor, which is the reason for the condemnation, is the cult. Milgrom notes (Lev 17-22; p 1789) that Temple prostitution is a bad translation for this phenomenon

4.2.39 it’s not homosexual prostitution that is condemned, but cult prostitution by either sex

4.2.40 appears to reach a conclusion when it hasn’t understood the evidence

4.2.41 what does Deuteronomy 25.5 say about God’s intention for human sexuality?

4.2.45 is begging the question ever valid?

4.2.49 the Old Testament is severe because it is protective of the cult; the cult preserves the cult-ural division of Israel from its neighbors

4.3.2 the whole section on Romans 1 confuses punishment and crime

4.3.6 the very important observation of the rhetorical relationship between chapters 1 and 2 is never taken up again until page 264 in section 8.4.17; this rhetorical device is crucial to the proper understanding of Romans as a whole

4.3.12 other recent scholarship supports the view that the "unnatural" female sexual activity referred to irregular heterosexual intercourse. This was Augustine’s view. (De nup. 2.20)

4.3.14 Barrett rightly notes that the sexual practices are a consequence of idolatry

4.3.17 when Paul talks about shameless acts in Rom 1.27 if he was thinking of Leviticus 18 and 20 as Dunn suggests, he would not have been thinking about the abomination; the shameless acts (aschemosunen) described in Leviticus are heterosexual. Aschemosunen means “making naked” — the “uncovering of the nakedness of your mother, sister, etc.”

4.3.21 Gagnon again — para phusin may simply mean “alternative use”; and all of this talk about the glove-like fit and the lack of mutual pleasure is simply ignorance. Not all penile-vaginal sex is mutually pleasurable, and there are numerous forms of sexual behavior practicable by homosexual and heterosexual people alike that are!

4.3.23 the section ends without noting the significance of Romans 2 for the impact of the rhetorical argument

4.3.28 would St. Paul have appealed to the law?

4.3.29 Hays cites Scroggs but then misuses his argument

4.3.33 note that Genesis 1 and 2 might well be qualified as Jewish myths. Neither will stands as a literal historical account --- and they cannot stand together as literal because they are contradictory in detail, narrative and sequence.

4.3.37 Orthodox rabbis precisely narrowed the meaning of the critical proscription to anal intercourse

4.3.39 male homosexual acts would not constitute adultery under Jewish law. A man can only violate someone else’s marriage.

4.3.41 implies that somehow only the same-sex regulations of the old covenant are still binding on God’s people under the new covenant, without explaining why

4.3.52 the refutations are extremely weak and offer no real evidence

4.3.60 it is not a “logical conclusion” but a reductio ad absurdum

4.3.61 Gagnon once more makes a false summary: “No first century Jew could have spoken of porneai (plural) without having in mind the list of forbidden sexual offenses in Leviticus 18 and 20.” In Mark 7.21 all of the sins are in the plural, it is the NRSV that renders them as singular. No Jew would read Leviticus 18-20 into porneai: even the root of the word is rare in the Torah (in the LXX), and in Leviticus it only refers to actual prostitution. The LXX only has one use of the plural form of which Gagnon makes so much, in 2Kgs 9.22 — the “harlotries” of Jezebel -- which are metaphorical.

4.3.63 utterly fails to understand celibacy not as a mere option but as an overturning of the first commandment to “be fruitful and multiply.” In this Jesus “undoes” Genesis’ first mandate to humans, because he is inaugurating a new creation for the new humanity.

4.3.64 Gagnon again: there is no “uniform opposition within the Judaism of [Jesus’] day” — homosexuality is hardly mentioned in rabbinic Judaism. And remember there is nothing whatsoever in the Torah against lesbianism. Rabbinic Judaism does not treat a married woman caught in a lesbian relationship as an adulteress. She is punished for disobedience, but not executed.

4.3.71 the lifestyle again; what about the prostitute it Luke 7

4.3.77 the Acts Council is not about accepting certain people, it is about not restricting certain actions.

4.3.78 begs the question

4.3.79 but we don’t observe the blood prohibition which is one of the four specifically binding rules on the alien: Leviticus 17.10; see also 24.16: Lex talionis is binding on all.

4.3.81 tries to have it both ways; it is hard to read the Jewish attitude towards homosexuality into the apostolic ban since it isn’t part of the apostolic ban.

4.3.82 the blood prohibition is not one of the Jewish food laws; it is in a different class altogether; it is Noachide in origin and thus not “Jewish” and held (in Rabbinic Judaism, derived from Genesis) as biding on all human beings. And if the food laws aren’t important (as in binding on the alien) then why did the authors bring them up at 4.3.70?

4.4.3 since “this general agreement has ceased to exist,” where is the so-called consensus

4.4.5 offensive use of the phrase “takes seriously” as if other views don’t

4.4.10 apparently to “take seriously” means to take the traditional view

4.4.21 because it is convenient to argue that the idea that “there was no awareness in the ancient world of the idea of homosexuality as an innate or congenital orientation,” the authors attack this straw-man. But what could all of the “change” language that they take such pains to develop in sections 4.3.16 to 22 possibly mean — Paul’s language of change. Change from what? If Paul did not believe that people were naturally heterosexual, why would he have all of that language of how people had changed their natures.

4.4.23 “While we should certainly take people’s sense of themselves with the ‘utmost seriousness’ it would mark a radical break with the Anglican theological tradition if it were to be accepted that this should be given priority over the witness of holy Scripture when making moral decisions.” God forbid we should actually believe people's accounts of their own experience! This contradicts the part of Lambeth Resolution 1.10 that called for listening to the experience of gay and lesbian people. If the evidence of personal experience is to be dismissed beforehand as irrelevant, or even more insultingly listened to and then ignored, then why bother? Indeed, some have expressly rejected this portion of the resolution.

This is not just about some alleged new leg to the “three-legged stool” called “experience.” The issue here is the nature of revelation: the initiative is entirely from God’s side, but the perception/reception is entirely on our side, thorough and with human experience. The Holy Scripture itself is the result of human response to God’s revelation. Whether the burning bush, the resurrection appearances, or Paul on the road to Damascus, the experience of the individual in the face of God’s revelation is the primary evidence whose authority we either trust or dismiss: they become the entry points for God’s action in the world.

The church is badly in need of an Emmaus experience to have its heart warmed and eyes opened. Otherwise the church falls into the trap it did when the Apostles refused to believe thewomen who had personal experience of the risen Christ: “But it seemed to them to be an idle tale.” (Luke 24:11) How many resurrection appearances does it take before a “consensus” is reached that Christ is truly risen?

4.4.24 listening to people, it appears, is simply an “attempt to relativize the witness of Scripture” — again notice that people who disagree with the premises of this paper are assumed not to take Scripture seriously. But why do we listen to the witness of the people who wrote the Scripture in the first place?

4.4.26 while they seem strained to “admit that there is an element of truth in his argument” actually it is evident; the Scripture emerges from a sexist and heterosexist milieu and worldview; it is not above and beyond human culture. It is no more troubling to think that those who recorded the Scriptures lacked a full and complete understanding of human sexual dynamics than to admit that they had a less than perfect understanding of human reproduction or the solar system.

4.4.27 “the biblical vision for the relationship between men and women is fundamentally patriarchal in nature; patriarchy is as much about fertility as it is about power” — the question is not hierarchy but procreation. They really want to have it both ways, missing the fact that you can’t say marriage is for procreation and then say that it isn’t about patriarchy, which in the world of that time only knew that as a way of determining parenthood.

4.4.40 is needlessly obtuse. Although Christ comes to us mediated through the Scripture he also comes to us in the sacraments and the teaching of the church. This section veers dangerously close to sola scriptura

4.4.43 more begging the question: “I think homosexuality is a sin and God came to deliver us from sin and that includes homosexuality.” That is not a conservative approach to the debate; that is a tautology.

4.4.48 “once we accept that gay and lesbian people are the objects of God’s creative activity this means there is no fixed order of creation in the light of which we are called to live.” Unless gay and lesbian people are indeed part of that fixed order, but those who wrote Genesis were not aware of this reality. What if God’s fixed order has nothing to do with the sex of people? How “fixed” is it if in Christ there is “no more male and female”?

4.4.49 we are in the world here of “any change in the moral teaching” equals “no fixed morals.” This slope isn’t just slippery, it is vertical. This seems to be innocent of awareness of much of the change in moral teaching over the last century. To change something does not necessitate changing everything.

4.4.51 confuses Alison’s reading of the text with the text itself. It is ultimately only God and not any part of creation that is natural in every sense of the word.

4.4.52 once again we hear how important Jesus’ teaching about men and women being meant to be “joined to each other as one flesh for life.” One wonders why this paper isn’t about divorce rather than about homosexuality.

4.4.53 by placing our concept of what is “natural” in the place of God we commit idolatry — that is Alison’s point

4.4.57 I would say that the existence of controversy is exactly why we cannot always have unequivocal teachings about the subject. The fact is, “that some people have either misread them, or simply do not wish to accept what they are saying.” However, I believe it is the conservatives who have misread and do not wish to accept the true reading which is even now emerging as greater understanding is brought to the texts.

4.4.60 while “the jury is still out on the causes of homosexuality” — whatever the causes, homosexuality is natural, for it exists widely in nature. As someone once said, if you can do it, it is natural. We don’t know what “causes” heterosexuality either.

4.4.66 why in these discussions do they always talk about “other human problems, such as drunkenness and violence” — this begs the question by assuming that homosexuality is a problem. Why not talk about other human gifts, like musical talent or the ability to be charitable?

4.4.70 “taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that the Bible would cease to have a normative function in our ethics and merely be used to affirm what we already believe on other grounds.” Ironically, the authors here have named the very process by which they are working, and by which the church has always worked. The church always ignores the things it no longer finds convenient. The Bible does not, in the life of the church, have normative function: rather, the church uses selective portions of the Scripture to validate what it wishes to enforce in each era. This is how earlier generations were able to justify slavery and condemn divorce.

5.2.18 “the right to pursue personal happiness in this way has come to be widely regarded as integral part of people’s human rights” — maybe it makes sense then, given the Declaration of Independence, which substituted “pursuit of happiness” for Locke’s “property,” that Americans should take the lead.

5.2.22 “as we noted in Chapter Three, Christians have held that the traditional pattern of family life is that which is most conducive to the flourishing society as a whole.” Putting aside the question as to whether the traditional pattern of any life is in fact the most beneficial to society, Jesus and Paul both supported celibacy as opposed to the traditional family. Where your heart is, there is your treasure! If it is the family you idealize, that is where you will worship. This is simply a statement of a kind of revisionist secular humanism. The authors see themselves justified “in rejecting patterns of sexual relationship that they see as undermining family life.” A good look at divorce would be in order -- but faithful same-sex couples can only help to build up society by their fidelity.

5.3.38 now they’re defining complementarity as “equality in difference” — this definition, which differs from the one at 1.2.9, is no more reasonable than the one outlined there.

5.4.6 we got this far and there’s been no mention of David and Jonathan.

5.4.7 finally Boswell’s claim is articulated correctly, that the “brother-making ritual” had functioned as a same-sex union.

5.4.8 this misrepresents Boswell’s claim that the rite functioned — for some — as a means to sanctify their relationship — whether erotic or not.

5.4.24 not proven; the passage about women in Romans 1 may refer to anal intercourse, or to a woman in the “dominant” position.

5.5.10 I’d rather take the minimalist view and look only at particulars rather than generalities. There are ultimately only persons. This is the difference between spirit and law. The spirit looks to individuals as such, the law sees only classes of behavior — not the persons made in Christ’s image in whom there is “no more male and female” i.e., no more of that “Genesis stuff.” Christ does not simply restore paradise, he makes a new creation. See below on 5.6.2

5.5.18 human care is indeed the litmus test for holiness. And it is always specific: it is no coincidence that a casa, while a home, is also a case — an actual occasion

5.6.2 Paul explicitly uses “no more male and female” in Galatians 3:28 as a direct rebuttal to Genesis 1:27; his is speaking of a realized eschatology. If the church is not to be the sign of the eschaton — which is end both in terms of goal and accomplishment --- what use is it? It is then just a benediction of secular society. (Is the establishment role of the Church of England showing here?) I’m sure the authors of True Union in the Body would not like to think that the nuptial imagery in Revelation describes bestiality — the marriage of the Lamb with the New Jerusalem could hardly be described as “one man, one woman marriage.”
The available evidence supports Freud’s claim; in reality most people are capable of bisexuality and culturally geared towards heterosexuality. The British Public School system, as C.S. Lewis described it in his autobiography, is a good example.

If we don’t insist on some component of friendship in marriage, then what about marriage after menopause? If we only see marriage as the means for the fulfillment of external ends (children, a good society, etc.) rather than as the locus for the self-giving love exemplified in Christ and the Church, in which the beloved is the end and not the means to some other end, then we have an ethically defective and essentially mercenary view of human relationships.

The authors see “the danger that a focus on friendship as a controlling metaphor for God will lead to a sidelining of other biblical images that stress the sovereignty and authority of God over human beings” — in response I note that it was God’s idea to become our friend, as spelled out in John 15:15. Some people would rather have the stern disciplinarian rather than the loving Father.

6.4.3 again disvalues personal experience, as if reality should have no impact upon our understanding. When reason trumps Scripture, reason wins. Always. And so it should.

6.4.8 the slippery slope argument appears once again; if we allow for bisexuality it “means moving to a position in which all forms of sexual activity are to be accepted if they meet the needs and desires of the people concerned.” That is not what is being said. We see here again the ongoing struggle between idealism (which soon becomes idolatry) and realism — the latter is based on the Incarnation, the former on too much reliance upon a “doctrine of creation” which overlooks the significance of the new creation in Christ
Chapter eight, “Voices” page 252: the quote that ends at the top of the page is from an ex-gay who notes that not all gays are able to “be healed” — “in the end healing is a mystery, and we must trust in the righteousness of God’s way for each individual.” — unless of course God means the person to be gay. Could it be that God intends some people to be gay?

In the next to the last quote we have the unfortunate language about the “strategy of the enemy.”

8.2.7 betrays the logical slip between bisexuality, and bisexual sexual activity.
The final point, about sexually active relationships among the clergy being rejected: another circular argument

8.3.5 Vibert says, “Paul is calling for a greater exemplification of the one standard amongst those who were going to lead the flock, not a lower standard for the laos.” But doesn’t it amount to the same thing: if one is higher then aren’t the others automatically lower, whether you’ve lowered them or raised the other? It is all relative.

8.3.6 again it is assumed that those take a liberal view are “ignoring biblical principles” — what it all really depends on which biblical principles you are talking about

8.4.17 “there is a need to avoid the hypocrisy of singling out homosexuality as a particular bar to participation in the life of the church while conveniently overlooking forms of sin to which others in the church may be subject.” This is however exactly what has happened regarding ordination.

8.4.19 Atkinson can only state that the first word a homosexual person “seems to hear from the Christian Church is one of moral rebuke.” Seems?

8.4.24 the Catch-22 reappears: a more liberal approach conflicts with the majority of Christian opinion. Perhaps the majority opinion is mistaken.

8.4.25 “the line on sexual morality taken in Issues in Human Sexuality still reflects the consensus of typical scholarship and the prevailing mind of the Church of England, and it would be both wrong and impossible for the church to move officially to a more liberal position as long as this remains the case.” But to what extent — as in this document — is the mere existence of a tradition used as a means of perpetuating the tradition.

8.4.27 Genesis 1-2 does not mention the civil phenomenon called marriage.

8.4.31 note that the question in the ordinal of the Book of Common Prayer calls upon the ordinand to frame his or her life according to the doctrine of Christ, not the doctrine of Saint Paul

8.4.39 to allow faithful homosexual relationships on the basis of Paul in 1 Corinthians 7.9 would be in line with what Paul may have meant, since civil marriage is the only marriage that existed in his time; in verse 7.10, 28, 34, 36 and 39 gameo can apply to the wife as well

8.4.43 indeed, if the church has weakened on divorce given the greater explicitness of Scripture and tradition, homosexuality should be easier, not harder

8.4.44 unfortunately we are back to the Catch-22; paragraph b completely misses the fact that only male homosexual acts are referred to as an abomination; and not “before God” by the way; and in the last line in this paragraph Sibley engages in mind reading about what St. Paul’s original intent may or may not have been

8.4.45 “the Bible and the Christian tradition allow for the possibility of divorce and even remarriage, whereas they give no such support to same-sex relationships.” How easily the camel enters the gateway of an open mind! No citations, no argument, just an assertion of a notion contrary to the tradition until about fifty years ago.

8.4.47 now it’s only “perhaps the majority” who regard Jesus’s teachings on divorce as clear

8.4.72 this paragraph is a consequence of confusing mandatory abstinence with charismatic celibacy

8.4.74.a confuses revelation with one’s own understanding

8.5.4 homophobia is not just about violence, but about a psycho-social attitude, much like racism

9.3.2 fails to notice that because opinion “remains divided” on the subject of homosexuality it can scarcely be “a position” — one cannot claim to have the consensus one lacks, unless the consensus is that we don’t agree.

9.3.4 refers to “those who accept the authority of Lambeth” — a very important point, since Lambeth from its very foundation rejected taking the position of authority

9.6.3 this whole section is simply an embarrassment, and seriously misrepresents postmodernism

9.6.8 Postmodernism is not self-refuting; there is a difference between a logical conclusion and a reductio ad absurdum. In the third paragraph the authors have confused the distinction between context and substance — not surprising since they are in fact essentialists. The point of postmodernism, that “timeless truths” are not necessary, is incarnational: truth exists in every time suitable to the time and to the occasion. A close reading of the church’s record, and how many “timeless truths” have later been shown to be in error, is in order. Galileo would remind us that it is all about worldview.

9.6.59 there is significant debate as to whether “ex-gays” were ever really gay, and to what extent those who were gay are really “cured.” Some conservatives even deny that there is a "gay identity" and that is it only a lifestyle choice. Mere choice should be easier to change, and the fact that it isn't easy to change seems to point to the fact that this is not a mere matter of behavior.

9.6.62 “those who take a more conservative approach would note, however, that there is also a danger of confusing the spirit of God with the prevailing attitudes of contemporary culture.” The point is that God has given us a way to tell the difference — the fruits of the spirit. And what of those who confuse the spirit of God with the prevailing attitudes of past cultures?

April 22, 2012

Anglican Algebra

Today's lesson is very short and consists of a single formula, which can be taken as an axiom:

  Covenant ≠ Communion 

This simple expression can serve as a reminder that the Proposed Anglican Covenant, only having come into prospective being within the last few years, and perhaps never to see broad acceptance throughout the Anglican Communion, is not in fact essential to or definitive of the Anglican Communion.

It was a proposal, a mechanism, perhaps even a movement: but it was not, is not, and never shall be “The Communion.” It will remain, in relation to the Communion, something that was adopted at a particular point by some of its members. It is not of the esse of the Communion; perhaps not even of the bene esse of the Communion.

Class dismissed.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 18, 2012

The Universal Effect of Christ and the Church's Role, Briefly

Far be it from me to say that a person who has never heard of Christ is not saved by Christ, and made part of his risen life — in fact I think she is. Salvation is the work of Christ, not us. But the point of the sacraments, given to the church by Christ, is that they are objective means of grace: a person who is baptized is definitely incorporate in the mystical body of Christ. Grace is not limited to the sacraments, but the sacraments "certify" as well as impart grace. That is part of the root meaning of sacramentum.  The impetus of evangelism is to spread that word, and empower people to become conscious of their salvation and to give thanks for it: precisely what baptism and eucharist are about.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 15, 2012

Leak Concerning John

Dean Jeffrey John is rightly protesting the leak that he believes to have cost him the appointment to the See of Southwark. Whether it so cost him or not, he is rightly concerned that the matter of who leaked the fact that his name was under consideration, while it was looked into, has not been made public. The late Colin Slee, whom some had suggested was the leaker, protested he was not, and the press person to whom the leak was made has confirmed it not to have been Dean Slee, while in good journalist manner not divulged the name of him or her who dealt it.

Leaks are an interesting aspect of political life, in and out of the church. There are, in US circles, several kinds of leaks. I don't know if this is true in the UK, or the CNC (the Crown Nominations Committee — the object of the current complaint).  But I imagine this is a fairly universal typology of this particular aspect of hydrodynamics.

  • There is the leak malicious -- information leaked to scuttle some plan or other by someone unable to get the group in question to share his or her objections to a proposal. 
  • There is the leak prophetic -- information shared with the general public as a statement (albeit surreptitious) of conscience because something illegal is about to be done in their name. 
  • Then there is the leak politic -- this is the leak everyone, or almost everyone, on the body knows about, and it is done as a way of testing the waters while at the same time preserving "deniability" and allowing butter quietly to melt in their mouths and hands to remain clean.
From Colin Slee's notes, it appears this leak was of the first type, though perhaps in an over-charitable mood one might imagine the person who leaked thought it in the best interest of the church at large to do so. However, either of these sorts of leaks reflects on the wisdom of such a leaker's continuance on the body, and one would hope for a dismissal. And the third type, the politic leak of information to test the waters, is below the standards of a Christian organization that ought to have the courage of its convictions and act impartially.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
h/t Thinking Anglicans

April 13, 2012

Lack of Balance at Fulcrum

Over at Fulcrum, Stephen Kuhrt is once again widely missing the mark by trying to portray the failed (in England) Anglican Covenant as if it had been brought down to defeat by a combination of liberal protestant ecclesiology and gay Anglo-Catholic fear. The latter is an assertion undignified enough to relegate to the rubbish heap on which it belongs.

But what about the former? Kuhrt decries too little attention paid to Ephesians and Colossians by liberals; as if the Anglican Covenant truly expressed the theology of radical community these letters describe. The problem is that the Anglican Covenant, particularly in section four, does nothing of the sort. instead it offers a "conservative protestant" model of excision and "relational consequences" — what some of these sects call "shunning" — for the dissenter or the irregular, rather than the closer organic embrace called for in the Pauline vision of one part of the body not saying to another, I have no need of you.

The Anglican Covenant is not a "Catholic" document, but by virtue of its emphasis on doctrinal purity and conformity, a Calvinist document, though a half-baked one. That "liberal protestants" and Anglo-Catholics would oppose it is, to some extent, a fair assessment — but not at all for the reasons Kuhrt proffers.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 9, 2012

Fruits of Lenten Discipline

Early this year, Arthur Longsworth, a member of my congregation who hails from Belize approached me to ask if I would be willing to write an icon for the Cathedral of St John in Belize City, which celebrates its 200th anniversary this summer. Being somewhat attached to St John Baptist myself — as an Officer of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem, and as one devoted to the spirituality of service with the willingness to hand responsibilities over once one's work has been completed — I agreed and at the beginning of Lent this year decided to make this a part of my Lenten discipline. I shared a number of possible prototypes with Arthur and he chose one by Titian as the model for this good-sized work — the largest I've executed at two by three feet. I followed Titian faithfully but not slavishly, and of course in my own manner, and during Holy Week was able to put the finishing touches on the work. Although this is in oil rather than tempera, it is on panel, and I applied the learning I garnered under the direction of my teachers and inspirations from the 14th through the 19th century!

Arthur will be taking the work to Belize this summer, for dedication and installation in the Cathedral Church. My hope is that it will be placed so as to have the figure of the Baptist gesturing towards the high altar. I am pleased with the result of this Lenten discipline; it has the distinct advantage over, for example, giving up chocolate, in that at the end of Lent there is something to show for it, which will, I hope inspire others to take up the vision of ministry that St John the Baptist epitomized.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

April 8, 2012

The Good News

There is one old story that never grows old, and it has an effect however often it is told. -- a sermon for Easter 2012

Saint James Fordham • Easter 2012 • Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG
Now I would remind you, brothers and sisters, of the good news that I proclaimed to you, which you in turn received, in which you also stand, through which also you are being saved.+

Happy Easter! We come once again to the glorious morning on which we celebrate the resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord. In the midst of the celebration, the flowers and the festivity, we might sometimes be tempted to miss the centrality, the vital importance, of this day. This is the day that makes Christianity what it is — the day on which God affirmed that Jesus was his beloved Son by raising him from the dead. And the fact that Jesus was raised from the dead is the heart and soul of the gospel, the good news.

To look at the teaching of some Christians, you might think it was otherwise. For some, the emphasis appears to be on the cross, the crucifixion, suffering and death of Jesus. And surely that is important, as I said last Sunday, “crucially” important. But as with a story that you understand only when you have read it to the very end, the importance of Good Friday depends entirely upon what happened on Easter.

Think about it for a moment: if Good Friday, and Christ’s death on the cross had been the end of the story, if the women had gone to the tomb and found it closed but perhaps recruited a helpful friend to roll the stone away, and then just went about the sad business of anointing the dead body of their dear friend with spices and then sealing the tomb back up — — in short, if Jesus had not been raised from the dead, I don’t think we’d be here this morning. As tragic as his suffering and death was; even as comforting as meditating on his passion and death has been down through the years for many suffering, wounded, or injured people — if that had been the end, then little note would have been taken, there would have been no resurrection to witness, no preaching of the gospel, no good news — the best news and the greatest gospel: that an innocent man who suffered and died was vindicated in being raised from the dead, and more than that: that he gave power and promise to all who believe in him to share in a life like his. This, my friends, this is the good news — not just that he “was crucified under Pontius Pilate” but that “the third day he rose again from the dead.”

+ + +

We need to be reminded of this, just as the people of Corinth needed to be reminded, as Saint Paul did in fact remind them. This good news is not just something told once, and then filed and forgotten. This is good news that never grows old — even as it becomes the “old, old story”— this isn’t like some story on CNN that gets told over and over again to fill the 24-hour news cycle, but is forgotten as soon as some other item rises to the surface and grabs our attention. Last year, didn’t we all get tired of watching that offshore under-water oil-leak, week after week, as CNN became the “Oil Leak All the Time Channel”? But the leak was quickly forgotten once it was stopped up, and people are right back on the drill-baby-drill bandwagon!

No, the good news of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is not like that. This is good news that never grows old, except in that wonderful way of really good, old stories. The Good News is news we can hear over and over again. We can hear the old, old, story, that is always new, the one we love to tell, and we tell it out because it tells of glory. Not just death on the cross, but life, new life, triumphant.

And not only does it tell of glory, this gospel, this good news: it has an effect upon us, a saving effect. For the story of salvation is salvation itself. It is told so that we may believe, and believing, have eternal life.

Wouldn’t it have been wonderful if all that news “coverage” of that oil-leak could actually have covered the oil-leak and made it stop? But it didn’t. The story of the resurrection, however, the gospel of the good news of God at work in Christ Jesus — the story of salvation actually saves. For it is in hearing the good news, and believing it, that we are saved.

Saint Paul reminded the Corinthians of the process: of the good news that is first proclaimed to them, which they in turn received — for what good is a message if you do not receive it! But there is more: it is good news in which also they stand; that is, they hold on to it and stand on it and by it — which is to say they put their trust in it, their faith in it. And so it is through that message of the good news they are being saved. They have not believed in vain, but to a purpose and an end.

This is the fruitfulness, the productivity of the gospel message: Christ rose from the dead not just to rise from the dead, but so that we might be saved through him, through that proclamation, reception, holding fast and standing by that message. The gospel, and the gospel alone, bears the fruit of salvation.

Compare this with an earthly message, say, about that oil-leak. You can proclaim it — surely CNN did so hour after hour, day by day and week by week. I can receive it — and with cable TV the reception is pretty good, in HD no less. I can even believe it — after all, there’s the live under-water oil-leak-cam running in the lower corner of the screen, day and night, twenty-four hours a day, and seeing is believing.

But that’s the end of it. This news bears no fruit, does nothing for my immortal soul one way or the other.

Only one news story ever had the fruitful effect of bringing everlasting life, and you heard it once again this morning, as we do each Easter. It is a message first delivered to some frightened women, at first so frightened that they didn’t spread the news. But as the Gospel tells us, eventually they did, and Jesus himself began to appear to others, showing himself to have been raised from the dead. And the good news spread, from east to west, that sacred and imperishable proclamation of eternal salvation.

So, my friends, do not let this Easter morning be the end of that good news, as good as it is for you. Even if this is the first day you’ve been in church for a season — do not let it be your last. And more importantly, become news-bearers yourself: Continue to tell the story, the old, old story of the good news of Jesus and his love, how he was raised from the dead, and through his resurrection brought salvation to the world. Alleluia, Christ is risen; the Lord is risen indeed, Alleluia.


April 3, 2012

Identity as Response to Social Pressure

The Archbishop of Canterbury made some interesting observations concerning what is commonly called identity politics, which leads me to a thought that has been brewing for a few weeks, since I gave a talk at the Church Club on the history and development of the marriage canons.

I have often observed that people are most concerned about other people's identities. So society insists it know if one is male or female: note the anxiety comically portrayed in SNL's "Pat" sketches. This is where identity actually becomes political -- when the polis demands that one retreat from the Christ-like mode of New Adam into the "male" or "female" or "French" or "Welsh" for that matter.

After the talk at the Church Club, one gentleman in the audience was adamant that "marriage" ought not be used for same-sex couples, not on the grounds that it is an innovation or an inaccuracy, but on the grounds that henceforth when someone tells him he or she is married, he will have to ask if they are married to a person of the same or different sex. It is this man's need to know and annoyance at not knowing that makes the identity of the other significant. And of course, why he needs to know is based on his need to treat different people differently.


This reminds me of a feature of the Japanese language and culture, in which it is very important to know the identity of the person to whom you speak, because your societal relationship determines the form of language used, unless one is to be considered boorish for treating social superiors informally or impolitely! This is an example of identity very much determined by society, based on a need to classify and categorize rather than to deal with each and every individual as a unique entity, even without getting into the theological arena that holds each person to be a precious gift of God.

So long as people push their own "need to know" on others -- or are pushed by their society to feel such a need -- a degree of "identity politics" will remain in place. If all people were simply treated as people -- images of God each and every one, male and female, Japanese and Welsh -- much of this would disappear.

I'm not holding my breath.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 28, 2012

Covenant Amendment

Now that England has said No to the Proposed Anglican Covenant — though of course they can eventually reconsider, so claims it is "dead" are a bit like those concerning that Monty Python victim I referred to earlier — some are mooting the notion that the Gafcon group or some other contingent might now sign on, and then reshape the PAC by amendment to be more to their liking. There is a fatal flaw in this plan, first raised by the ACI some while back, and it lies in the text of the Covenant itself.

The amendment process to the Covenant (4.4.2) involves and requires, in no uncertain terms, the participation and instrumentality of the full Standing Committee and Primates and Anglican Consultative Council — after all, this thing was conceived as the future for the whole Anglican Communion, and the hope and goal was that most if not all would adopt it. So the amendment process does not involve just the signatories. The signatories have the last word on amendments once passed through the digestion process described — which includes revisions to the amendments made by the full bodies — but they have no capability to amend on their own. Sorry folks: if you want to start a revolution, you will need to start de novo, or continue to beef up Gafcon into a rival Communion.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 27, 2012

On Rowan's Ministry, Briefly

Many are penning or blogging “post-mortems” on the ministry of Archbishop Rowan Williams, and the dance of the aspirants round the greasy pole is well under way. But I think it fair to allow him an occasional, Monty-Pythonesque “I'm not dead yet!” before the hammer blow of retirement actually descends.

I do want to offer one perspective, however, on his way of working, and its result. As a true exponent of inclusion, the Archbishop was unwilling to risk losing “conservatives” in order to provide more visible roles in church leadership to “progressives” or those who incarnated such things as troubled the “conservative” side. He was confident that the “liberals” would bear with the unhappy situation, as they had for so long, and that the “reactionary” would bolt, as they so often threatened to do. I think he also held to the “progressive” view that things will eventually come out on that side (one need not be a scholar of history to see that trend), and he was, and is, playing the long game.

I think he read the situation rightly, but in placing more value on the continued presence of the “intolerant,” fulfilled his own prophecy that this will be a long game. Only a retrospective of a generation or so will tell us if his modus operandi had a virtue that is not particularly evident this close to events.

Meanwhile, I do wish him well in his remaining time as Archbishop and Primate and Instrument — there is still an ACC meeting coming up — and in his retirement as Master of the college.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 24, 2012

Political Science 101

The voting in the synods of the Church of England Dioceses to date has resulted in a majority of dioceses against the adoption of the Proposed Anglican Covenant. I am happy that good English common sense has prevailed over the sometimes strained and rhapsodic appeals for the adoption of the PAC, often with little reference to, or congruence with, its actual text.

One of the things most odd about the rhetoric on the Covenant is the refrain that without it the communion will just become or be "a federation." This tune has been sung by Archbishop Rowan, Mark Chapman, and apparently now (in a tweet) by Ruth Gledhill. Allow me to make one short observation to address this concern:

The word federation derives essentially from the Latin foederis = "covenant." A federation is precisely a group of entities bound by an agreed covenant. What we are (or are supposed to be!) is a "communion" and the Proposed Anglican Covenant would have turned us into a weak federation.

Class dismissed.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG 

Cb4B 2 GC

The Diocese of Eastern Oregon is bringing "communion without baptism" or "communion before baptism" to the General Convention. You can read about it here.

My observation in response to pitching this as "radical inclusivity" is simple: The church is radically inclusive and baptism is the means by which people are included. Communion is the celebration of that inclusion, not its means.

It is supremely ironic that a church that spends so much energy (rightly) celebrating the baptismal covenant could then turn its back on its significance in what seems a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of these two sacraments, and their interrelationship.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 20, 2012

Meaning and Intent: Porneia in the Apostolic Fathers

Peter Carrell of Anglican Down Under (and Hermeneutics and Human Dignity) and I engaged in what for me was a fruitful discussion a while back. I hope it was for him as well. It grew out of his response to my book Reasonable and Holy and my efforts to answer some of his concerns and questions about my method and conclusions. One of these involved my reliance on rabbinic sources to try to come to an understanding of the meaning of the porneia word group, in response to the assertion by some, such as Robert Gagnon, that Jesus’ use of the word must necessarily include condemnation of same-sex relationships. This derives in part from the paired assertions that the word and its relatives refer both to any sexual behavior forbidden by Scripture (with particular reference to Leviticus 18) and that it had a broad and imprecise range of meaning, covering any kind of sexual immorality, as a few lexicons claim and a few versions of ancient texts translate. All of this stands in contrast to the understanding that relates the word to harlotry ("whore" being the meaning of the root), and the evidence that the overwhelming use of the word-group in the Hebrew texts refers either to (1) prostitution or (2) figuratively to idolatry.

My goal was to assess the accuracy of the assertions and translations, and discover what the word and its relatives actually would mean to hearers in those contexts, and if it is was as broad and inclusive as some lexicons suggest, or rather designed as a more limited category, and if so, what. Peter further wondered why, in my search for answers, I turned to the rabbinic texts rather than looking more to early Christian texts. In addition to offering an explanation, I will take the opportunity to do just as Peter suggests at the end of this exposition.

First, though, I wish to establish one basic principle, which I hope goes almost without saying. However, I had better say it just to be clear. And that is the evident truth that words change their meanings — both the meaning intended and the meaning conveyed. A word may have an explicit meaning in the mind of the speaker, but if it is capable of conveying a range of meanings, a listener may well misunderstand the speaker's intent. In normal conversation one can correct such misapprehensions, but when the "speaker" is a "writer" and the text some centuries old, other tools for understanding need to be employed. This is a particular challenge to translators of ancient texts, if they are to convey to modern readers a sense of what the ancient author intended.

So an accurate translation of a text or definition of a word requires the translator or the lexicographer to be immersed in the world and culture of the time in which the texts were written. Those familiar with the Hebrew Scriptures or classical Greek or Roman literature should not be surprised to know that there are human activities, some of them sexual, that were considered moral or morally neutral, or perhaps even virtuous, in those cultures that we now consider definitely immoral; and vice versa: there are actions considered serious breaches in Leviticus and the Pauline Epistles that scarcely raise an eyebrow in these latter days. Thus, to translate porneia (or its Hebrew equivalents) as vaguely as “sexual immorality” fails to take due notice of distinctions that careful study reveals would have been made by the speakers or writers, and easily allows a modern reader to think the ancient author may have been condemning something that we find offensive but which the author may have found neutral or even acceptable. (It may well be that this broadening has come about second hand through a broadening given to the word fornication — a standard translation for porneia. Originally a fairly narrow category, this word came, in popular speech, to be used as a synonym or euphemism for any sexual act, including between married couples!)

A case in point is some lexicons’ suggestion that porneia means “adultery.” The fact is it can be used to mean adultery as we understand it today, but this blurs an important distinction from the times of the writing. Our modern equality-of-the-sexes understanding of adultery does not match the double standard of the cultures of the biblical period. Under Jewish law a man was free to have intercourse with unmarried women (prostitutes), or to take another wife. Under Roman law, though monogamy was the rule, a man could have a mistress or concubine, or freely resort to prostitutes. Given the inequality of the sexes, married women did not have these options. Male adultery meant violating another man’s marriage, female adultery meant violating her own. In Hebrew Scripture the word for adultery (na’af) covers “sexual intercourse with the wife or betrothed of another man,” in contrast with zana, “illicit heterosexual relations but not necessarily in violation of the marriage vow,” the latter being the equivalent of porneia and so translated in Greek. (TWOT, na’af) The Greek word for adultery, moixeia, is used in the Greek version of the Hebrew Scriptures and in the New Testament.

I would venture an even more precise distinction, however. There is a clear overlap with porneia and moixeia when it comes to women: a woman who strays from her husband is "playing the harlot." But a man who visits a prostitute or has a mistress is not legally guilty of moixeia — though we would consider him an adulterer, the ancients would not have done so. If they wished to cast opprobrium on such a man — and they often did, particularly under the influence of growing moralist movements in rabbinic Judaism, Christianity and Greek and Roman culture under Stoic influence — he would be tagged precisely with porneia. This is why the two words often appear together in lists of immoral behaviors, to condemn both men and women who are guilty of sexual relations in violation of marriage — but specifically to bring men under the same moral standard that applied to women, which moixeia alone did not accomplish.

See, for example the passage in Hebrews 13:4, “Let all honor marriage, and the marriage bed [be] undefiled, for God will judge the pornous and the moixous” — that is, those who are violators of their own or others’ marriages. This same pairing occurs in 1 Cor 6:9 where the employment of the pair to cover both categories is even clearer, as the words are separated by a disjunctive ou construction: neither porneia nor moixeia are acceptable. Similar pairings of the term occur in other Biblical texts, and in the early Christian writings, about which more in a moment)

But first I want to explain my primary reason for expounding the rabbinic evidence on this subject, rather than the early Christian usage. That is: the nature of the rabbinic discussion. While early Christian writers make use of the words porne and porneia, the rabbis actually engage in detailed discussion as to what the words (the Hebrew equivalents zonah and z’nut) mean, and what is included under the various shades of meaning. In short, while the meaning of the word has to be gleaned from verbal and cultural context in the early Christian sources, the rabbinic texts go to great pains precisely to define exactly what they meant — as fine points of law (halakhah).

Which brings me to the Apostolic Fathers and my other reason for not bringing them up: they add little to the discussion. The use of the porn- word group in the Apostolic Fathers is consistent with that in the canonical scriptures, though the words of this group do not appear very often. The most frequent use is paired with moixeia, in order to include men who have sex outside of marriage with an unmarried woman (whether a prostitute or a concubine). Again,this conflicts with our modern understanding of adultery as including extramarital sex by men or women, a notion foreign to the biblical and imperial Roman double-standard culture; hence the pairing in order to provide the equivalent of the modern inclusive concept of "adultery." This is, no doubt, what the lexicons mean when they say that the range of meaning for porneia includes adultery; it is adultery in the modern sense of the word, rather than in the sense that moixeia is used in those cultures. The point is that we no longer have a word that corresponds directly to what the ancients meant by moixeia, because we no longer maintain that double standard. I am reminded of the telling phrase my Hebrew professor, Dr. Richard Corney, used to cite: Traduttore traditore — to translate is to betray [apparently even this phrase!].

Some details from the Apostolic Fathers:

The root word porne occurs once, in 1 Clement 12.1, with reference to Rahab the harlot. This is the normative use of the equivalent word in the Hebrew scripture, referring to real or virtual (i.e., idolatry) harlots or harlotry.

The derivative words of this group occur a handful of times, always in conjunction with or paired with adultery. Hermas Mandate 4 1:1 gives a good example of the thinking behind this usage (note the use of fornication in these translations):

“I charge you,” said he, "to guard your chastity, and let no thought enter your heart of another man's wife, or of fornication, or of similar iniquities; for by doing this you commit a great sin. But if you always remember your own wife, you will never sin.”

This is clearly designed to rule out both adultery (as understood in the period) and resort to prostitutes or concubines.

Other examples include “vice lists” (Didache 5:1, Hermas Mandate 8 1:30) in which porneia and moixeia are paired. A twist on this in Hermas Mandate 4 1:5 deals with the case of a man with a straying wife and refers to her persistent “porneia” — which if a man tolerates makes him a “sharer in her adultery.” A similar note is struck in Didache 3:3, which is reminiscent of the proverbs concerning youth staying clear of loose women: “My child, be not a lustful one; for lust leads the way to fornication; neither a filthy talker, nor of lofty eye; for out of all these adulteries are engendered.”

Polycarp’s Letter to the Philippians 5:3 similarly quotes 1 Corinthians 6:9 as a particular counsel to youth to avoid being pornoi, as well as malakoi or arsenokoitai. This mention of the porn- root in conjunction with, though distinguished from, words commonly held to refer to male same-sex behavior (most likely prostitution or pederasty, as these were tolerated under Roman law), is echoed in the remaining uses of the word group. Barnabas 19:4 includes this trio: “You shall not commit fornication: you shalt not commit adultery: you shalt not be a corrupter of youth (paidophthoreseis).” This is echoed in Didache 2:2, which includes a long list of forbidden behaviors, including theft and murder. As I have noted before, these lists appear to indicate a distinction (even when not separated by “ou = nor” as in Didache 2:2 or 1 Corinthians 6:9) between the various items in order to include all possibilities. Ultimately, if the word porenia already included these possibilities as a kind of catch-all for any sexual indiscretion the lists would be superfluous.

It is thus clear that the early Christian use of the term and its relatives was closely related with prostitution and concubinage, equated with adultery by women, who were also classed as guilty of porneia by virtue of their straying: which for men we would call "adultery" but which the ancients distinguished from adultery on the basis of their legal codes.

To apply it to any form of sexual immorality (so judged either by the ancients or by us) is a translational step too far.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 16, 2012

The Wrong Model

How is one to address the issue of unity in the Anglican Communion, much less the church, without reference to Jesus Christ? Christ himself prayed, in the High Priestly Prayer in John 17, that those who would believe in him would be one "just as" he and the Father are one. This is an intrinsic part of the priestly office which Christ embodies perfectly: the bringing together of the community of the faithful.

But what is the nature of the "oneness" of God, the unity of the Father and Son? The unity of God is that of ontological relationship, not based on an agreement or covenant document. It is eternal and everlasting, and has no relational consequences or means of disengagement, because it is the relationships that constitute the essence of Who God Is.

How does this apply to church unity? The churches of the Anglican Communion have, up until now, enjoyed the connectedness implicit in our ontological relationship, along lines of descent from England, Scotland, and to a very large part, The Episcopal Church. This is what it means when we say, in the Preamble of our Constitution, that The Episcopal Church is a "constituent member" of the Communion -- that is, we are an essential part of what constitutes that Communion, and built it up over the years.

The Proposed  Anglican Covenant that is on the table, on the contrary, offers a bare-bones outline of some high points of Anglican theological and missiological thinking, while omitting other important points. It provides a vague conflict-management system that has consultation as its primary tool, and implicit threats of minimized relationships or participation as its primary means of discipline. To suggest that this bears any resemblance whatever to the High Priestly Prayer of Jesus seems a rather large stretch.

We need a model for the church based on Christ's prayer, and the mode of the Divine Who Is a Trinity in Unity.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 14, 2012

England and Canterbury: A Point to Note

Regardless of the Archbishop of Canterbury's feelings regarding the possible failure of the Proposed Anglican Covenant in the Church of England, under article 4.2.8 of the document, should the Church of England not adopt it, the Archbishop will not be eligible to participate in decision-making of the [Joint] Standing Committee [of the Primates and the ACC] when it comes to Covenant implementation matters under section 4.2.

That might be all to the good, as it will allow him to preserve the neutrality becoming of an Instrument of Communion.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 12, 2012

Scotland the Brave

England is hogging all the attention in the Proposed Anglican Covenant arena these days, as their synodical process winds on in a pattern not unlike that of the Republican primaries. So it is good to be reminded that the Scottish Episcopal Church is also going through a synodical approval process. Paul Bagshaw reports that five of the seven synods have voted, and all of them have said No to the Covenant. The remaining two may do so as well.

I commend Archdeacon Simonton's long and carefully written rebuttal to the historical revisionism that forms some of the PAC's undergirding.  It is important to note, from an American perspective, the debt The Episcopal Church in the United States owes to that in Scotland, not just in the person of Seabury, but in our liturgy, the eucharistic prayer of which derived not from the pruned stub of the English 1662 book, but the rich rootstock and leafy branches of the full-blown Prayer preserved by the disestablished Scots.

There is more to the Anglican Communion than the relics of England's faded Empire, and more to the Communion than the proposed Covenant deems worth noting or celebrating.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 11, 2012

Some Informal Notes on "Kovenaunty"

by H. Dumpty, PhD.

I have been asked by the blog host to say a few words about the poem Kovenaunty, that appeared recently on this site. May I first say that I join K. Leslie Steiner in sharing with her what an odd feeling it is to be a fictive character offering an analysis of a literary work. That being said, I shall bear up and continue.

The poem in question is clearly a variant of one upon which I had offered commentary in an address to A. Liddell, collected in the works of Dodgson. I need say nothing here about the vocabulary found in the earlier variant, and I refer those interested to that earlier commentary.

Brittig is a time of day at which tea is taken, a particularly British, and one might say, brutish, custom, as the tea is rarely consulted about where it is being taken, and under what circumstances. To gyre, as in the earlier poem, is to spin about, and in this case is related to wimpling, a combination of whimpering and tippling, in a particularly wimpy sort of alcoholic consumption, no doubt involving brandy surreptitiously added to the aforementioned tea. The nave as locus for this bibliousness may explain its clandestine nature. Piscophobes are fearful of looking at things, particularly things they don't like looking at because they are afraid of them. Pre-Lates are people who generally arrive before they would be late, and are hence punctual. That they are misbehaving is an indication that they may be, in fact, late.

The Kovenaunt itself is a species of Vaunting Juggernaut. It moves deliberately and slowly, and is very hard to stop, as its various parts work together conventionally and conveniently towards its own ends. Exactly which clause it is that forms the catch, whether the 22nd or some other number in a series of catches, is not entirely clear from the text. The speaker, assumed to be the parent of the adventuresome "son" who assails the Kovenaunt, is not identified. Neither is the "son." Neither are you, for that matter.

The Gafcon bird is a large flightless species of dodo, noted for its loud trumpeting call, which in spite of its intensity betrays a forlorn quality. Why it should be shunned is unknown, as its own habit of shunning makes it rather inaccessible much of the time, except when invading the nests of other birds. The Bristol-patch appears to be a spot or area in which Bristols are found. Bristols are a small large-leafed shrub producing brightly colored berries bitter to the taste. The bark and leaves are used to make Bristol board, in Bristol fashion.

The corporal word appears to be a printed text; indeed it should be noted that this poem seems to recount a kind of logomachia, a dispute over words, as we shall see in the next stanza most explicitly. The "son" appears to be reflecting on the text in hand, in his mishmatched thunk, a kind of carefully contrived (mixed, meshed and matched) cogitation that ends with a thumping, of bibles or other textbooks, as a kind of "Eureka!" or "Q.E.D." The Pry-Mate tree seems an odd and irrelevant detail. This is a tree, the wood of which is used in certain shires of England for the manufacture of bundling-boards to keep married couples from marital relations during forbidden seasons, such as Great Lent, or Very Good Advent. Its appearance in the poem is likely circumstantial.

Uff is a kind of bemusement and ennui. The text examined by the "son" in the previous stanza seems to have lulled him into a torpor of sorts. Meanwhile, the brass-thighed Kovenaunt makes its appearance. Treeling is a kind of long scroll fed through a typewriter, in this case, a generic underwood. This is, by the way, the most Scripturally informed stanza in the poem: the thighs of brass no doubt an indirect (and poetically modified) allusion to the vision in Daniel 2, and the ass a clear reference to Balaam's articulate donkey. The Kovenaunt, it seems, is capable of semi-articulate speech in the same manner. One suspects an early iteration of Siri or some other voice synthesis for rendering printed text in an approximation of human speech. "Mumbled from its ass" is about right.

The "son" then attacks the Kovenaunt with his text, literally throwing the book at it, or furiously composing a blog post at a keyboard, with its click and clack. (Some have suggested an allusion to the Car Guys, but that seems very unlikely in this context, and I think the suggestion idiotic. Automotivists are always trying to read things into perfectly clear Pedestrian texts. Really, it annoys the yolk out of me. But I digress...)

That the "son" is described as vortuous, which is a kind of tortuous spinning, no doubt explains the "parent's" desire to embrace him. That the day is described as dorous, that is, received as a great gift, is clear from the expression of relief in the final line.

As with all texts, of course, I abide by my position that things mean precisely what I take them to mean, and neither more nor less. So this is not only my considered opinion on this poem, but my inconsiderate opinion as well. You may take it, or, on the other hand, leave it.

March 10, 2012

Essential Fault

The most significant failing in the current rash of pro-Proposed Anglican Covenant propaganda is the disingenuous assertion that this proposed document is crucial or definitional for the future of Anglicanism and the Communion. This is false for two primary reasons.

First, the PAC may well determine the future shape of the Communion, if it is adopted, but only for those who adopt it, as even its supporters assert. If everyone signed on — which may have been the hope at its inception — things would be different. But in practice it seems that the Covenant will become the determiner of a very different Communion from the one we have known until now. As the Archbishop of Canterbury and others admit, there will be "tiers" or "tracks" — though these are nowhere referenced in the document itself. The reality is that the PAC will not save or preserve the Anglican Communion, it will fundamentally change it in ways that introduce (or confirm) division between some of the Communion's current members.

Second, though pitched to the Communion in some of its language, the text itself provides for inviting non-Anglicans to adopt it (4.1.5), and affirms that any church that withdraws from the Covenant is not thereby withdrawing from the Instruments of Communion or repudiating its Anglican character. (4.3) By its own text, therefore, the Covenant cannot be understood as fundamentally or uniquely Anglican.

Which indicates that this half-baked document needs to go back into the oven prior to a second serving. There is no rush, and many of us aren't that hungry.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

March 8, 2012

Supreme Court on Freedom of Religion

In an earlier post, I had said that I did not think the requirement that health insurance including contraceptives being available to the employees of church-related institutions violated the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. This afternoon I came across a passage from the SCOTUS Opinion on Employment Division v. Smith (1990) and think it supports my view, though the circumstances of the case were very different. The Opinion was penned by Justice Scalia.

Here is a portion I think relevant to the contraception discussion (read the full document if you wish.) :

We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs [p879] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. As described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-595 (1940):
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.
(Footnote omitted.) We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice. "Laws," we said,
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Id. at 166-167.
Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, supra, 310 U.S. at 595 (collecting cases).
I would argue that this seems that the general health care insurance requirement, which is valid and neutral, and not explicitly religious, would not be held as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion. I'm also pleased to see that Justice Scalia makes the argument I did concerning withholding ones taxes out of a religious objection to the fact that some of those taxes are used for warfare.

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG

Not again: Golden Apples

Yes, this is another comment on the Covenant. (Contrary to what some say, I do not spend all my time thinking about this. I'm a fast writer; what can I say.) I do want to clarify something I've said before, and that is, I am not opposed to the idea of a pan-Anglican Congress to explore some kind of common agreements. I am clearly opposed to the current Covenant Proposal because I think it was drafted, revised slightly, and proffered in too much haste for something as important for our life together as a Communion of churches. It's tepid reception is evidence of others similar thinking.

I and some of those others have suggested in its place a series of Anglican Congresses with all orders of ministry, including the laity, and representing the whole Communion. It is vital to understand that this is not necessarily to come up with a more centralized government. The concern is finding effective ways of working, and the reliance on Lambeth, for instance, which might have been of use a hundred years ago, is not helpful in the present day. The Primates' Meeting is even worse — the notion that one person can speak effectively for an entire (in some cases multi-) nation-church is a bit absurd. I would if anything see a beefing-up of the ACC as a mission-oriented body more concerned with facilitating relationships between the provinces — not governing them.

The point is that the world is moving away from pyramidal or hub and spoke orientations to networks — and the Anglican Communion is ahead of the curve as an essentially networked structure to start with. We could be the Christian Polity of the future and not even know it — or squander it in a premature grab at a dazzling prize: a golden apple of distraction in the race towards the higher goal! 

Tobias Stanislas Haller BSG